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Abstract 
 
 
In this thesis I present a phenomenological investigation of our experience of 
time – of things as they fall within time – and suggest that something important 
goes missing in recent debates. This is the notion of a point of view. I believe that 
articulating the sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is 
a point of view upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an 
experiencing subject. 
 
In the first chapter, I elucidate the specious present. I argue that theorists appeal to 
the specious present under two guises without explicitly distinguishing between 
them; yet these two conceptions are not identical, while one entails the other the 
reverse is not true. In the second chapter I defend an appeal to the specious 
present (as developed in the first chapter) against proponents of what I refer to 
as snapshot models of temporal experience. I argue that perceptual experience 
minimally presents something of some non-zero temporal extent as such. 
 
In the third chapter I discuss how we are to characterise experience over 
intervals of time of a greater extent than the specious present. I offer a proposal 
on which a subject is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with 
this interval marking the partition between the past and the future for the 
subject. In the fourth chapter I compare and contrast our experience of objects 
and events, and our experiential point of view in space and in time. Among other 
things, I argue that getting right how things are for the subject requires an appeal 
to the subject’s asymmetrical awareness of times either side of the specious 
present. In fifth and final chapter I demonstrate that appeal to an experiencing 
subject’s tensed temporal perspective can explain the sense in which time seems 
to pass. 
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Introductory remarks 
 
 
“And you run and you run to catch up with the sun but it's sinking; 
Racing around to come up behind you again; 
The sun is the same in a relative way, but you're older; 
Shorter of breath and one day closer to death.”  
         – Roger Waters (Pink Floyd) 
 
 
Sitting in the midday summer sun, I feel my skin getting warmer and a bead of 
sweat run down my back. Looking out of the window in the autumn, I see leaves 
trembling on the branches of a tree as the wind blows. Working in the office on 
a winter’s day, I hear the pitter-patter of raindrops against the window. Smelling 
a bouquet of flowers in the spring, one fragrance gives way to another and to 
another and so on. On a day-to-day basis I watch the second-hand of my watch 
sweep around the clock face as I impatiently wait for the bus. I lie in bed, unable 
to see or hear anything in the darkness, frustrated at how much time seems to 
have passed since my waking; I think about how the morning alarm is drawing 
closer in time as the previous evening recedes into the past. Time is the dominant 
feature of our lives. 
 
We represent time on clocks and calendars; we plot the change in seasons and 
record upcoming deadlines. Time is not merely a constant in how we plan our 
lives, it is also a pervasive feature of our wakeful experience (as the above 
examples bring out). It has long been thought that our conscious experience 
brings with it a particularly intimate relation to time (for example, see Kant, 
A34/B50-51, quoted below). Yet, this intimacy can also be a source of 
puzzlement. Among other things, theorists have questioned how time (and/or 
temporal relations) features in experience, with some theorists denying that it 
does.1 People have questioned the ways in which our experience of time is 
                                               
1 For example, see Reid (1785). Strictly speaking, Reid denies that we can perceive any temporal 
relations other than simultaneity. He does not deny that we can recall, perceive, or imagine 
occurrences as things which occur in time. 
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supposed to differ from our experience of space; and what our experience can 
tell us about how we seem to exist in and over time, in contrast to space. 
 
Motivated by such issues, in this thesis I present a phenomenological 
investigation of our experience of time – of things as they fill/fall within time. 
These topics are gaining increased attention in recent philosophical discussion, 
but in this context something important often appears to go missing. This is the 
notion of a point of view. This is particularly unfortunate because articulating the 
sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is a point of view 
upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an experiencing subject. It 
is not merely that we manifestly experience things that occur in time; we are 
manifestly experiencing in time. 
 
 
1. Present debates 
 
Many recent debates concerning temporal experience have focused on 
explaining the perception of distinctly temporal phenomena. In particular, there 
has been a focus upon the temporal properties presented2 in perceptual 
experience – such as change, duration, and persistence – and the temporal 
properties of experience – whether experiences themselves must be things that 
undergo change if they are to be experiences of change.  
 
With such a research focus, some theorists provide models of temporal 
experience on which an experience is said to lack any significant temporal 
extension, and on which the only temporal relation that can be presented in 
perceptual experience is that of simultaneity. Such models are often illustrated 
through an analogy with cinematic depiction, where a movie is presented 
through a rapid sequence of snapshots being presented. On these models of 
                                               
2 Throughout I will use the term ‘present’ so as to be neutral between various accounts of the 
nature of perceptual experience. I take it that saying experience ‘presents’ x could be read as 
experience ‘presents through a relation of acquaintance’, ‘presents through a relation to sense 
data’, or ‘presents through representation’. I will also mostly drop the prefix of ‘perceptual’, but 
there is no philosophical significance behind doing so, throughout my focus will remain on 
perceptual experience unless explicitly stated otherwise. (This is not to say that the arguments 
presented could not, in some cases, be extended to other phenomenally conscious occurrences.) 
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temporal experience (discussed at length in Chapter 2) theorists either seek to 
explain why it is so natural for us to claim that we perceive occurrences unfolding 
over time, such as change and succession, when in actual fact we do not (as we 
are, at a time, only perceptually presented with a snapshot of some state of 
affairs); or else they seek to explain how a sequence of such snapshots can 
account for our perceptual experience of phenomena such as change and 
succession. 
 
It is more common in recent debates for theorists to reject the snapshot model 
– though it has enjoyed some recent support3 – and to instead claim that that 
which is presented in experience has temporal extension: the specious present 
(discussed at length in Chapter 1). The point of contention is then what accounts 
for such a temporal extent being presented in experience.4 On one view, 
experiencing is itself said to be temporally extended, as is that which is presented 
in experience; there being an explanatory relation between the two.5 On the 
opposing view, such an explanatory connection is denied; yet, unlike the 
snapshot model, that which is presented in experience is said to possess a non-
zero temporal extension.6 Broadly, debates between advocates of either view are 
concerned with the temporal extent which is presented in perceptual experience 
(or the content); the temporal extent of the perceptual experience (or the act); and 
how the two relate to one another. In these debates, the notion of a point of 
view is often secondary to more central concerns, if it is considered at all.7 
                                               
3 Recent writers such as Arstila (2018), Chuard (2011 and 2017), and Prosser (2013, 2016, and 
2017), propose snapshot models of temporal experience (though the latter does not 
unequivocally support such a model). Their proposals will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
4 On this way of formulating the debate, see Andersen (2014: 26) and Dainton (2016). For a 
recent discussion which displays scepticism about the differences between apparently competing 
accounts of the temporal microstructure of the specious present, see Prosser (2016: 147). 
5 In terminology from Dainton (2016), these may be referred to as extensional accounts. 
Advocates of such accounts appear to include Dainton (2001, 2006, 2008, and 2014); Foster 
(1979, 1982, and 1991); Hoerl (2013); Phillips (2010, 2011a, 2014a, and 2014b); Rashbrook 
(2013a); Russell (1992); and Soteriou (2010).  
6 In terminology from Dainton (2016), these may be referred to as retentional accounts. 
Advocates of such accounts appear to include Almäng (2014); Grush (2007); Kiverstein (2010); 
and Lee (2014a, 2014b, and 2014c). Such accounts are often described as appealing to punctate 
experiences that present temporally extended occurrences. Yet, while the retentional theorist 
denies the explanatory relationship between the temporal profile of experience and that which 
is presented in experience that the extensional theorist asserts, she need not be read as appealing 
to punctate experiences (this point is pressed by Lee). 
7 Though it may be thought that, when grappling with how to reconcile that perceived events 
seem to be happening in the present with the fact that events are perceived to happen over an 
extended temporal interval, some theorists are dealing with the notion of a temporal perspective 
albeit not in these terms. Classic discussions include James (1890, ch.15) and Husserl (1905). 
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2. A point of view and what it is like 
 
Many theorists find themselves in broad agreement with Nagel’s claim that 
“…not all reality is better understood the more objectively it is viewed. 
Appearance and perspective are essential parts of what there is, and in some 
respects they are best understood from a less detached standpoint” (Nagel, 1986: 
4). Nagel suggests that occupying a given (type of) point of view is essential to 
how things are for an experiencing subject; that “[i]f we try to understand 
experience from an objective viewpoint that is distinct from that of the subject 
of the experience, then even if we continue to credit its perspectival nature, we 
will not be able to grasp its most specific qualities unless we can imagine them 
subjectively” (Nagel, 1986: 25). One of the thoughts behind Nagel’s discussion 
appears to be that we need to articulate the sense in which we occupy a given 
type of point of view in conscious experience if we are to characterise the 
phenomenology, or in Nagel’s terms what it is like for an experiencing subject.  
 
Given that I am herein presenting a phenomenological investigation of a 
subject’s point of view in time, it is important to say more clearly what this – and 
talk of ‘what it is like’ – involves. Like Nagel, my concern is not merely with 
what is often referred to as the qualitative character of experience. When theorists 
appeal to an experience’s qualitative character they often take themselves to be 
thereby picking out some number of qualitative or sensuous properties. That is, 
the qualitative character of experience is often taken to correspond to ‘qualia’.8 
For example, looking at and drinking one’s coffee might be said to be an 
experience with a given qualitative character because it involves various sensory 
qualia, e.g., qualia particular to the coffee’s flavour and qualia in one's visual 
experience of the coffee’s colour.  
 
A somewhat broader notion than qualitative character is also regularly appealed 
to in the philosophy of mind, where it is said that conscious experiences have a 
phenomenal character. The phenomenal character of an experience is how that 
                                               
8 For discussion see Tye (2018) and Van Gulick (2018). There is disagreement about the nature 
of qualia (Churchland, 1985; Shoemaker, 1990; Chalmers, 1996) and, depending what one says 
about their nature, there is also disagreement about their existence (for example, Harman, 1990; 
Dretske, 1995; and Tye, 1995, all suggest that introspection reveals no such qualities). 
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experience seems from the point of view of the perceiver.9 Appeal to the 
phenomenal character of experience is used to pick out what is manifest to a 
subject in virtue of having a given experience, where this may involve sensory 
qualia but it is also concerned with the manifest structure of the subject’s 
experience of the world.10 In appealing to the manifest structure of our 
experience of the world – and in pursuing a phenomenological investigation of 
our point of view within and upon time – I share an assumption with much 
contemporary philosophy: that a typical subject’s conscious experiences have a 
given character that is somehow manifest to her as she undergoes them. 
Articulating that distinctive character, and any implications which follow for the 
ontology of experience, is my main focus. 
 
I take it for granted that introspective reflection on one’s conscious experience 
has a substantive role to play in investigating the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience. Of course, there is a great deal that introspective reflection cannot 
reveal about the nature of conscious experience. Introspection is hardly expected 
to reveal the underlying biological and physical structures that might be thought 
to ground or realise conscious experience, yet this is no bar to thinking that 
introspective reflection plays a central role in articulating what is made manifest 
in virtue of undergoing conscious experience. The thought behind assigning a 
central role to introspective reflection is that as self-conscious subjects, granting 
that there is something it is like for us to undergo a given conscious perceptual 
experience, we are typically able to reflect on what it is like for us to be having 
the experience. This is not to say that a subject must be self-conscious in order 
for there to be something it is like for her to have a conscious experience, but 
given that we are self-conscious, we are in a position to reflect on and articulate 
what it is like for us to have a given conscious experience. 
 
 
 
                                               
9  ‘Seems’ is here – and throughout – used in order to pick out some feature of what it is like for 
a subject, rather than a use which is interchangeable with ‘it strikes me that…’ or ‘it is plausible 
that…’. This is concerned with a subject’s experiential occurrences and phenomenal 
consciousness quite generally, and not merely perceptual phenomenology. 
10 In what follows I will use ‘phenomenology’ and ‘phenomenal character of experience’ 
synonymously. 
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3. A temporal point of view 
 
Thomas Nagel (1974 and 1986) appeals to what it is like for an experiencing 
subject in conscious experience, where his concern appears to be with the way 
the world seems from the point of view of that experiencing subject. Given the 
wider interest in the literature in articulating the phenomenal character of 
experience and the sense in which a typical subject occupies a type of point of 
view, one might question why the current discussion is largely restricted to the 
notion of a temporal point of view. There are several reasons. Firstly, it is a matter 
of practicality. With such complex and widely discussed issues, a single thesis is 
not nearly enough space to discuss all that may be of interest regarding an 
experiencing subject’s point of view. A restriction in scope thus makes the 
project more manageable (though that is not to say that I manage to cover all 
that may be of interest regarding an experiencing subject’s point of view in time).  
 
Secondly, insofar as occupying a type of point of view is intimately tied to what 
it is like to be the kind of experiencing subject one is, so too is the experience of 
time. Many theorists have found plausible that in perceptual experience, which 
is often taken to be the paradigm case of phenomenally conscious experience, 
the subject is confronted with (what appears to her to be) the present time;11 and 
in perceptual experience, what we are presented with appears to be in flux and 
constant change.12 In order to articulate the sense in which a time seems to be 
present and yet in flux, we need to articulate how a subject occupies a temporal 
perspective (so I will argue).  
 
The thought that, in wakefully conscious experience, our point of view is temporal 
in an important sense can also be traced to Kant. In §6 of the Transcendental 
                                               
11 For example, Broad claims that “it is the essence of the perceptual situation that it claims to 
reveal its object as it is at the time when the situation is going on” (Broad, 1925: 145). It is 
plausible that in order to capture how anything can be presented as present, we need to explain 
the role played by a subject’s perspective in time.  
12 For example, James claims: “Consciousness . . . does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. 
Such words as ‘chain’ or ‘train’ do not describe it fitly as it presents itself in the first instant. It is 
nothing jointed: it flows. A ‘river’ or a ‘stream’ are the metaphors by which it is most naturally 
described. In talking hereafter, let us call it the stream of thought, of consciousness, or of 
subjective life” (James, 1890: 159). Geach (1969) objects to the notion of a stream of thought, 
arguing that the character of thought over time is discontinuous, however he appears to allow 
that the sensory aspects of mind might be stream-like over time. See Soteriou (2013, ch.2) for a 
discussion of the different temporal profiles of thought and experience. 
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Aesthetic Kant argues that time is the condition of all appearances, both inner 
and outer:  
 
“Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. 
Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an a priori 
condition merely to outer appearances. But since, on the contrary, all 
representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, 
nevertheless as determinations of the mind belong to the inner state, 
while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner 
intuition, and thus of time, so time is an a priori condition of all 
appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of inner 
intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer 
appearances. If I can say a priori: all outer appearances are in space and 
determined a priori according to the relations of space, so from the 
principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in 
general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and stand necessarily 
in relations of time” (A34/B50-51). 
 
If it is thought that whatever we experience, perceptually or otherwise, is 
experienced as occurring in time, and that this can be contrasted with space, then 
articulating the sense in which we occupy a temporal point of view is of primary 
importance in characterising how things are for wakefully conscious subjects. 
 
I have so far suggested two reasons for focusing on the notion of a temporal point 
of view: the first is a matter of practicality, restricting the scope of the present 
discussion; the second is a reflection of the thought that, in wakefully conscious 
experience, a subject has a particularly intimate relation to time, as the quoted 
passage from Kant illustrates. Thirdly, and finally, I take it that the usefulness of 
this approach – focusing on an experiencing subject’s point of view in time – 
can be demonstrated in how it can be used in order to solve puzzles that arise in 
connection with our experience of time. For example, time and time’s supposed 
passage is often taken to be a particularly pervasive feature of a wakefully 
conscious subject’s experiential life (discussed at length in Chapter 5); and yet 
this is also taken to be particularly elusive to inspection. In reflecting on our 
perceptual experience we are often said to be presented with that which a given 
experience is an experience of, features of experience itself are said to be 
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‘diaphanous’.13 It is my conjecture, to be supported through the subsequent five 
chapters, that in articulating what is distinctive of our temporal perspective in 
wakeful experience we can explain how time can seem to be pervasive in 
experience – where a subject is presented with successively present moments – 
and yet in an important sense transparent to first-personal inspection. 
 
 
4. The project 
 
My discussion proceeds as follows. In the first chapter I elucidate the notion of 
the specious present. I explain why it is widely held to be part of the explanation 
of both our experience of motion/change and the sense in which our experience 
over time is fleeting and partial. I argue that this widely held view over-simplifies 
matters. Contemporary and historical theorists frequently appeal to the specious 
present under two guises without explicitly distinguishing between them; yet 
these two conceptions are not identical, while one entails the other the reverse 
is not true. In the second chapter I defend an appeal to the specious present (as 
developed in the first chapter). Appeal to the specious present has recently been 
attacked by proponents of what I refer to as snapshot models of temporal 
experience, such as Chuard (2011, 2017), Prosser (2013, 2016, and 2017), and 
Arstila (2018). I consider and reject these snapshot models, arguing that 
perceptual experience minimally presents something of some non-zero temporal 
extent as such. Yet this is not to answer all questions one might have about 
experience over time. In particular, this leaves open what we are to say about the 
phenomenology and ontology of experiencing over greater intervals of time.  
 
In the third chapter I discuss how we are to characterise the experience of events 
which occur over intervals of time of a greater extent than the specious present 
– such as plays, concerts, and football matches. I offer a proposal – through 
                                               
13 For example, Moore says: “The moment we try to fix our attention upon consciousness and 
to see what, distinctly, it is, it seems to vanish: it seems as if we had before us a mere emptiness” 
(Moore, 1903: 41). Though Moore later adds that with effort and focused attention we can 
become aware of properties of our conscious experience. Focusing on the temporal case, Hoerl 
puts a transparency claim as follows. “There is just no scope within a description of our 
experience of temporal properties for a distinction between those experienced properties 
themselves and a point in time from which they are experienced” (Hoerl, 2018: 143). 
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developing Russell’s construal of what is given in experience – on which a subject 
is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this interval marking 
the partition between the past and the future for the subject. This brings out a 
sense in which an experiencing subject possesses a temporal perspective, where 
that which a subject has a perspective upon is fleeting and partial. I demonstrate 
that this proposal does not bring with it any principled criteria for individuating 
between discrete, successive experiences in the stream of consciousness. I 
suggest that the question of what should count as a token experience is in an 
important sense interest/context relative. 
 
In the fourth chapter I compare and contrast our experience of objects and 
events, and our experiential point of view in space and in time. In Noë’s Varieties 
of Presence (2012) we get an illustration of some of the ways in which the two are 
and are not analogous. Developing Noë’s proposal, I demonstrate that in the 
temporal case our experience is not perspectival in the same sense as it is in 
space. Firstly, in the spatial case objects seem to afford other perceptual 
perspectives in space, this is to be contrasted with events in the temporal case. 
Secondly, getting right how things are for the subject requires an appeal to an 
asymmetrical awareness of times either side of that which is given in experience: 
that there were immediately preceding times/temporal parts she experienced, 
and that there will be immediately subsequent times/temporal parts she will 
experience. Such an asymmetrical awareness in time is to be contrasted with a 
subject’s awareness of the regions of space around that sub-region which is given 
in experience (which features no such asymmetry). 
 
In the fifth and final chapter I demonstrate that appeal to an experiencing 
subject’s temporal perspective can explain the sense in which time seems to pass. 
In offering an account of time seeming to pass, I argue that we should not be 
merely trying to articulate some feature of what is presented in perceptual 
experience; we should be trying to articulate an aspect of wakeful consciousness 
that concerns the times which bookend the (interval of) time presented in 
experience. Reflecting on O’Shaughnessy’s (2000) discussion of wakeful 
consciousness (in addition to the proposals put forwards in Chapters 3 and 4), I 
further illustrate and motivate the claim that, as well as being presented with 
19 
 
some interval of time in perceptual experience, an experiencing subject has a 
primitive and asymmetrical form of awareness of what was experienced in the 
immediate past and what is anticipated in the immediate future. That the subject 
is aware of what was just experienced and what is anticipated, in this distinctive 
sense, goes towards explaining how the time an experiencing subject has a 
vantage point upon seems to be fleeting and incessantly changing, and why time 
seems to be passing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Chapter One 
 
A Tale of Two Williams: James, Stern, and the 
Specious Present 
 
 
“...whatever we are actually experiencing is always the content of a present moment of experience, 
which may be called the empirical present, in order to distinguish it from an abstract 
mathematical moment of time, which, like a mathematical point of space, has in itself no content 
at all. We have no actual experience which is not included in the content of the empirical present 
moment...” (Hodgson, 1898: 35). 
 
 
“Gravesen forward. Rooney. Instant control. Fancies his chances... Oh a brilliant goal! 
Brilliant goal! Remember the name: Wayne Rooney! It’s premiership history, the big league’s 
youngest ever goalscorer signals his arrival on the big stage!” It is one of the most iconic 
pieces of football commentary of the Premier League era. It was October 19, 
2002, when football commentator Clive Tyldesley excitedly shouted the words 
that announced the goal of Everton’s then 16-year-old striker Wayne Rooney. 
Rooney, now the leading goalscorer for England and Manchester United, came 
off the bench as a substitute after 80 minutes to score his first ever Premier 
League goal and in doing so ended Arsenal’s 30-game unbeaten run in the 
League.  
 
Watching (and re-watching) Rooney’s goal, we see Gravesen hit a high ball 
forward towards the penalty area, Rooney controls the ball on the edge of the 
18-yard-box, swivels, takes one or two touches as the defenders back away, and 
then curls a strike past a diving David Seaman. Switching mind-sets from 
football fans to philosophers, there are two particularly interesting aspects of the 
above case that I am concerned to bring out. Firstly, you experience the football 
players moving; you experience the ball moving through the air; and you experience 
the net bulging as the ball hits it. You experience motion and change. Secondly, 
when you are perceptually aware of the ball in the back of the net you are no 
longer perceptually aware of the ball being kicked by Gravesen at the halfway 
21 
 
line, which occurred a few seconds earlier. While it is plausible that a subject is 
perceptually aware of more than a momentary state of affairs (a claim defended 
in Chapter 2), that which she is perceptually aware of nonetheless seems to be 
of a quite limited temporal extent.  
 
These two features, that experiencing subjects perceive motion and that what is 
presented in experience is (in a certain sense) temporally limited, are frequently 
supposed to be explained by a single phenomenon: the specious present. My 
main aim in the present chapter is to elucidate the notion of the specious present. 
Reflection on the historical and contemporary literature reveals two distinct 
conceptualisations of the notion, to be outlined and explained in what follows, 
one relating to the perception of motion and the other relating to the sense in 
which experience is temporally limited. In contemporary discussions theorists 
often fail to differentiate between these two conceptualisations, which has 
implications for how debates regarding our experience of temporal phenomena 
proceed.14 I begin by looking to the origins of the notion in order to explain why 
it is widely held to be part of the explanation of the two aforementioned features 
of our experience. I then turn to the two conceptualisations that need to be 
pulled apart. While the two are intimately related, I demonstrate that they are 
nonetheless importantly distinct. 
 
 
1. The specious present introduced  
 
1. 1. The origin of the specious present 
 
The term ‘specious present’ was introduced into the wider philosophical and 
psychological literature in William James’ Principles of Psychology (1890). As 
developed by James, the specious present is said to be a short duration of which 
we are immediately and incessantly sensible, characterised in contrast to the 
mathematical present. In his discussion of the perception of time, James says 
                                               
14 Distinguishing between these two conceptualisations provides a fresh perspective on debates 
in the literature, revealing subtly different explanatory projects. One example, discussed in 
section 3.i. below and in greater detail in Chapter 2, concerns how some theorists have argued 
against an appeal to the specious present. 
22 
 
that the mathematical present, the instantaneous point of contact between past 
and future, “is, in fact, an altogether ideal abstraction, not only never realized in 
sense, but probably never even conceived of by those unaccustomed to 
philosophic meditation…” (James, 1890: 406). He says that the mathematical 
present is not realised in sense because he takes our experience to present 
something temporally thicker: “The only fact of our immediate experience is 
what Mr. E. R. Clay has well called ‘the specious present’” (James, 1890: 406). In 
taking the specious present to be the only fact of immediate experience, James 
can be read as saying that the interval of time picked out by the specious present 
is that interval which we can become aware of when we reflect on our 
experience, rather than an abstract conception of what ‘the present time’ 
denotes.15  
 
While James may have popularised the notion of the specious present, he did 
not coin the term; the genesis of this terminology is credited to Kelly.16 Kelly 
introduces the notion in the following passage: 
 
“The relation of experience to time has not been profoundly studied. Its objects 
are given as being of the present, but the part of time referred to by the datum is 
a very different thing from the conterminous of the past and future which 
philosophy denotes by the name Present. The present to which the datum refers 
is really a part of the past – a recent past – delusively given as being a time that 
intervenes between the past and the future. Let it be named the specious present, 
and let the past, that is given as being the past, be known as the obvious past. All 
the notes of a bar of a song seem to the listener to be contained in the present. 
All the changes of place of a meteor seem to the beholder to be contained in the 
present. At the instant of the termination of such series, no part of the time 
measured by them seems to be a past. Time, then, considered relatively to human 
apprehension, consists of four parts, viz., the obvious past, the specious present, 
the real present, and the future. Omitting the specious present, it consists of three 
... nonentities – the past, which does not exist, the future, which does not exist, 
                                               
15 We might think that the target here is something like ‘the present’ as it is discussed by St 
Augustine in Book XI of the Confessions. Augustine reasons that the objective present must lack 
duration because in any temporally extended interval there will be earlier and later parts; being 
earlier and later these parts would be past-wards or future-wards with respect to one another. In 
order to move beyond this problem (of parts of what was thought to be the present in fact being 
past or future) it is suggested that the present must be extensionless. Lacking temporal extension, 
the present no longer has the temporal breadth for this problem to arise again. 
16 Though Kelly is given the pseudonym ‘Clay’ by James. See Andersen and Grush (2009) and 
Andersen (2014) for discussion. 
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and their conterminous, the present; the faculty from which it proceeds lies to us 
in the fiction of the specious present” (Kelly; quoted by James, 1890: 406). 
 
Kelly offers a suggestive characterisation. To begin, we can highlight what, for 
Kelly, is supposed to be specious; there are two related ways of capturing this. 
Firstly, let’s assume – as Kelly does – that an appeal to ‘the present time’ is 
typically, in philosophical discussions, a reference to what James calls the 
mathematical present. To the extent that our experience presents an interval as 
being present – and a whole bar of notes can supposedly be presented within 
the specious present, according to Kelly – this is specious in that it suggests that 
something of some temporal extent is present, as opposed to the extensionless 
moment.  
 
Secondly, we could interpret Kelly as saying that our experience is specious in 
that what it presents as being present is really part of the past.17 Being of some 
positive temporal extent, Kelly suggests that the occurrences presented over the 
specious present must have already happened, on pain of otherwise saying that 
what is presented in experience is really part of the future (given the assumption 
that there is an extensionless present moment). Taking a subject’s experience to 
present part of the recent past, Kelly says that this is not how it seems to the 
experiencing subject. There is an important sense in which a subject’s experience 
seems to present the present (rather than the past or future).18 That which is 
presented in experience must therefore be occurrences belonging to the past, 
speciously given as of the present.  
 
These are two ways in which the interval presented in experience can be taken 
to be specious, for Kelly. In taking the notion of the specious present from Kelly, 
                                               
17 Part of the datum which Kelly is characterising appears to be that the objects of experience 
are given ‘as of the present’ where this phenomenological datum – things being given ‘as of the 
present’ in experience – does not pick out the strict present, as it has some temporal extension. 
Some theorists might be reluctant to describe the objects of experience being presented ‘as of 
the present’, rather than simply being presented, but I won’t dwell on this issue here. For reasons 
to think that there is a sense in which what a subject perceives is presented as present, see the 
discussion of an experiencing subject’s tensed temporal perspective in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
18 This is focusing on perceptual experience. The same might be said of a subject’s experiential 
occurrences more generally, but this would require spelling out how in memory and imagination 
the subject can seem to have a present representation of a non-present time. In the current 
context I leave this complication to one side. 
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James also appears to hold that a subject’s experience seems to present the 
present, and that that which is so presented is of some temporal extent.  
 
Writing shortly after James, William Stern appeals to a similar notion that he 
terms presence-time.19 Motivated by an attempt to explain perceptible motion and 
change – Stern appeals to speech perception, the observation of movement, and 
hearing a sustained or gradually changing tone, as probative examples (see Stern, 
1897: 317) – Stern also appeals to a temporal extent that is presented in 
experience. In similar fashion to James’s and Kelly’s appeals to the specious 
present, Stern says that from reflection upon what can be revealed in 
introspection: “Immediate perception is … ‘present’, yet ‘present’ in a different 
manner than as in a logical abstraction, neither as a mathematical point nor as 
the mere limit between what has past and what is yet to come, but rather (and 
regardless how brief), as a positive and finite stretch of time” (ibid.: 325).  
 
Despite any ambiguities and complications with the original characterisations 
traceable to James and Stern, much of the contemporary literature on temporal 
experience focuses on a (fairly) agreed upon notion of the specious present. In 
order to narrow the focus towards what has emerged as the dominant 
contemporary use of the notion, we can distinguish this from a distinct 
interpretation which can be read in James’s work and some of the discussions 
that followed. 
 
 
1. 2. Varying interpretations of the specious present 
 
Contemporary theorists converge on a view of the specious present on which 
this notion is used to capture a sense in which a wakefully conscious 
experiencing subject is aware of – or represents – a brief temporal extent in her 
ongoing experience (I will clarify this suggestion in what follows). The sense in 
                                               
19 His notion of presence-time may be broadly similar to the specious present, but this is not to 
say that they are identical (depending on how one characterises the specious present). Stern 
appeals to presence-time as the stretch of time over which a mental act can be extended, but he 
comments that this is not identical with the time during which a presentation persists (in this 
latter case he appeals to ‘primary memory’). He only discusses the term ‘specious present’ in a 
footnote (see Stern, 1897: 325, footnote 15). 
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which a subject’s experience is said to present a brief duration is frequently tied 
to a subject’s very ability to experience temporal phenomena such as succession 
and change. In this context, James has often been taken to task for offering 
implausible estimates of the length of the specious present. This might suggest 
that he was – knowingly or unknowingly – using the notion in an ambiguous 
way, or in order to gesture towards two or more temporal phenomena. 
 
In discussing the experimental findings of Wundt and Dietze, James says that 
they show that a subject can hear forty strokes, each at around 0.3 seconds apart, 
remembering them as a whole so that they can be identified without error when 
repeated. James says that these experiments aim to determine firstly “the maximal 
extent of our immediate distinct consciousness for successive impressions” (1890: 408; 
emphasis in original), and secondly the interval that such stimuli have to be 
separated by in order to be experienced as distinct. From this, James concludes 
that 12 seconds – 40 multiplied by 0.3 – is the “maximum filled duration of which 
we can be both distinctly and immediately aware” (ibid.: 409; emphasis in original). Tying 
this to his discussion of the specious present, James continues: “These figures 
may be roughly taken to stand for the most important part of what, with Mr. 
Clay, we called… the specious present. The specious present has, in addition, a 
vaguely vanishing backward and forward fringe; but its nucleus is probably the 
dozen seconds or less that have just elapsed” (ibid.: 409; emphasis in original).  
 
Wundt and Dietze’s experiments appear to be designed in order to demonstrate 
the maximum interval of time over which one can retain certain discriminatory 
abilities – being able to accurately recall a number of discrete strokes in order. 
Regardless of whether or not the figure of 12 seconds is an accurate measure of 
such an interval, this is not the only – or even the most straightforward – way 
of understanding what is picked out by talk of time as it is realised in sense. This 
may show that the term ‘immediate awareness’ is not, for James, simply a matter 
of awareness of what is presented in perceptual experience (in apparent contrast 
to contemporary usage of the specious present).20 
                                               
20 Such a use of the notion of the specious present – one which seems to be used to capture 
something like a temporal interval which can be retained in consciousness – with some role for 
what can be accurately recalled in memory, appears to be employed by James at some points in 
his writing, and it has since been used this way by others. One example is Pockett (2003), who 
considers (and repeats) a series of psychophysical experiments from the Twentieth Century. 
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The original characterisations Kelly and James offered of the specious present 
appear to be open to multiple interpretations.21 However, despite any 
ambiguities or complications, much of the contemporary literature on temporal 
experience converges on an understanding whereby the specious present is taken 
to play an explanatory role in accounting for the experience of motion/change; 
this is generally taken to further entail that a limited interval is presented in 
experience.22 It is this understanding which I will focus on in what follows. As it 
is used in the contemporary literature, there are at least two distinct ways of 
interpreting an appeal to the specious present when so understood. As a result 
it is unclear how to interpret some of the arguments concerning the specious 
present, and it is not entirely clear what estimates23 of its temporal extent are 
actually estimates of. 
                                               
Pockett’s concern is with Husserlian phenomenology and the validity of the phenomenological 
project. In this context she speaks of a perception “remain[ing] immanent for some considerable 
period of time” (ibid.: 67), connecting this with James’ discussion of Wundt and Dietze, where 
this concerns the maximal temporal extent of our immediate distinct consciousness – to use 
James’s terms – for successive impressions. 
Mabbott (1951: 156) also derives an estimate of the length of the specious present from 
experiments conducted by followers of Wundt in the 1880s. These experiments were set up to 
determine the interval that subjects could estimate most accurately, without over- or under-
estimating the length of the interval in memory. Similarly, Pöppel (2009) – concerned with what 
he refers to as the subjective present – suggests that “[a] numerical answer [to the question of the 
length of the subjective present] can be derived from a number of different experiments which 
all converge to a value of approximately 2 to 3 seconds” (Pöppel, 2009: 1891). (That Pöppel 
refers to James and Stern as psychologists who were also interested in the subjective present as 
“a basic temporal phenomenon” (Pöppel, 2009: 1891) highlights how Pöppel’s subjective present 
can be taken to be broadly analogous to the specious present.) The evidence Pöppel goes on to 
cite in support of this claim concerns the accuracy of a subject’s recollection, appealing to 
scenarios designed to investigate the maximum interval over which subjects can most accurately 
reproduce presented auditory or visual stimuli. 
21 Fraisse (1984) suggests that three different intervals are often of interest in such discussions. 
There is an appeal to something akin to the simultaneity threshold (“less than 100 msec, at which 
perception is an instantaneity” (Fraisse, 1984: 30)), the interval of separation between two stimuli 
which is necessary for a subject to be able to discriminate between their temporal locations – 
discriminating their non-simultaneity. There is an appeal to something which may be akin to the 
specious present (“100 msec – 5 sec, perception of a duration in the perceived present” (ibid.)); 
this appears to be somewhat similar to the time said to be given as intervening between past and 
future. Finally, there is a further measure which will involve recollection (“above 5 sec, 
estimations of duration involving memory” (ibid.)).  It is to Fraisse’s credit that he distinguishes 
between several temporal intervals which may be of interest in this context, yet it is not clear 
what significance the phrase ‘the perception of a duration’ holds for Fraisse, and as a result it is 
not clear how we should interpret the claim that the perceived present is between 100msec-5sec. 
There may, of course, also be further ways of interpreting Kelly and James which I have not 
explored here. My intention has been to demonstrate some of the ambiguities; not all of them. 
22 See, for example, and despite their many differences, the specious present theories of: Broad 
(1938); Dainton (2001, 2006, 2008, and 2014: 109); Foster (1979, 1982, and 1991); Grush (2007); 
Hoerl (2009 and 2013); Kiverstein (2010); Lee (2014a, 2014b, and 2014c); Phillips (2010, 2011a, 
2014a, and 2014b); Rashbrook (2013a); and Russell (1992). 
23 Most theorists who have made estimates about the length of the specious present – at least 
those who appear to have in mind the understanding of the notion currently being discussed – 
have speculated that its extent is somewhere between a couple of hundred milliseconds to a 
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In order to dispel this ambiguity, it is necessary to introduce some novel 
terminology. In the following section (2.1.) I focus upon one conceptualisation 
of the specious present that can be read in William Stern’s discussion (1897). In 
this context the specious present is to be characterised in terms of the 
explanatory role it is introduced to serve: accounting for those cases of motion 
which are perceptible and those which are imperceptible. I will proceed to refer 
to this as the Explanatory notion of the Specious Present (the ESP). This notion 
is invoked as part of an explanatory account of why, for example, typical 
experiencers perceive the motion of the second-hand of a clock, but not of the 
hour-hand.  
 
In section 2.2. I demonstrate that there is a different way of characterising the 
specious present, which can be read in Kelly’s original discussion of the notion.24 
Kelly, quoted approvingly by James, says that “[a]ll the notes of a bar of a song 
seem to the listener to be contained in the present” (Kelly; quoted by James, 
1890: 406). This is to be contrasted with the whole song, which does not seem 
to be present to the experiencing subject in this sense. The thought behind 
Kelly’s appeal to the bar of music appears to be that what is given in experience 
seems to be of some non-zero interval, and yet of some limited temporal spread. 
In keeping with this thought, James can be read as offering a characterisation of 
the specious present which is appealed to in order to express the idea that we 
are perceptually presented with things as they fall within a given interval (such 
that we are aware of things within this interval in a way in which we are not 
aware of things which occur over a greater interval). I will refer to this notion as 
the Phenomenal notion of the Specious Present (the PSP).25 Much of the 
philosophical literature in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Century does not 
distinguish between these two conceptualisations; I will emphasise the utility of 
doing so in section 3. 
                                               
whole second (or at most two). See, for example, Dainton (2006) for an estimate of 0.5secs; 
Grush (2007) for an estimate of a few hundred milliseconds; Lockwood (2005: 381) for an 
estimate of 1-2secs; and Strawson (2009: 298) for an estimate of around 300msec. 
24 This is not to say that the ESP cannot also be traced to Kelly. See Andersen & Grush (2009) 
and Andersen (2017) for the suggestion that James and Kelly did have the very possibility of the 
perception of motion (partly) motivating their appeal to the specious present. Also see Andersen 
& Grush (2009) for a discussion of the genesis of these ideas in writers prior to James and Kelly; 
in particular Hodgson (1878 and 1898). 
25 To use the labels ESP and PSP in this way is not to assume from the outset that these are 
distinct phenomena; I will discuss the relationship between these two in the rest of this chapter. 
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2. Two conceptualisations of the specious present 
 
2. 1. The specious present as the ESP 
 
In order to characterise and motivate an appeal to the ESP, consider how Stern 
introduces his notion of presence-time. Stern says that we do not typically take 
ourselves to only infer motion and change, saying that – in at least some cases – 
we take ourselves to perceptually experience motion and change: “Duration, 
succession, rhythmic patterns, speed, and acceleration can be perceived 
directly…” (Stern, 1897: 323). However, he recognises that this claim does not 
sit well with the claim of the momentariness of consciousness,26 where this is 
the idea that experience does not present anything of a non-zero temporal 
extent, or that the only temporal relation experience can present is that of 
simultaneity.  
 
In this context he says that “[o]ne must renounce either one or the other: the 
direct perception of time or the momentariness of consciousness” (ibid.: 321). 
He claims that “for those who cannot and do not want to give up simultaneity, 
there is only one consequence: a direct apprehension of time as such must be 
repudiated entirely” (ibid.). That is, a theorist who endorses the momentariness 
of consciousness – who denies that a brief duration is presented in perceptual 
experience – must deny that we can perceive temporal phenomena such as 
motion/change. Stern takes such a denial to be unacceptable, given a subject’s 
introspective evidence in favour of the claim that she perceptually experiences 
motion. Stern’s proposed solution is to reject the claim of the momentariness of 
consciousness.  
 
The temporal extent of the specious present/presence-time – the ESP – is then 
taken to do explanatory work in accounting for a subject’s perceptual experience 
                                               
26 Stern refers to this as “[t]he dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness…” 
(1987: 321); according to which “only those contents can belong to a whole of consciousness 
that exist together and are simultaneously present at any given time and, therefore, that an ideal 
cross-section at any given moment in the life of the soul would have to contain every element 
belonging to that whole of consciousness” (ibid.: 313). 
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of dynamic temporal phenomena such as continuous27 motion and change.28 The 
temporal extent of the ESP is sufficiently great for the spatial displacement of a 
given stimulus to be discriminable within this interval;29 this is why an 
experiencing subject can experience the movement of the given stimulus. Stern 
also takes it that such a temporal measure, which plays an explanatory role in 
accounting for the perceptibility of motion, entails that there is a temporal extent 
(this temporal extent) which is presented in perceptual experience.30  The ESP is 
that interval of time over which an object must move a discriminable distance 
in order to be seen as moving – to give rise to this ingredient of the perceptual 
phenomenology. If an object does not move a discriminable distance over this 
interval it will not be seen as moving. If it is nevertheless moving, albeit slowly, 
the subject will only later be able to infer that it has moved. 
 
Writing after Stern, Broad (1923) also uses the distinction between perceptible 
and imperceptible motion, and the case of a second-hand and hour-hand of a 
clock, in order to motivate an appeal to the notion of the specious present. He 
says: “If a change takes place slowly [such as the movement of the hour-hand of 
a clock], this means that closely adjacent events are qualitatively very little 
different from each other. It may therefore happen that two events are not 
qualitatively distinguishable by us unless they are separated by more than the 
duration of a Specious Present. If this be so, these two qualitatively 
                                               
27 The same thought might apply to discontinuous change – see Soteriou’s discussion of 
experiencing instantaneous events (2013, esp. Chapter 4.5) – but this is more contested – see 
Prosser’s discussion of experiencing discontinuous change (2016, esp. Chapter 5.6). 
28 This is not to say that Stern was ignorant of, or against, an alternative understanding which 
will be outlined and motivated in what follows. However, without clearly distinguishing between 
the two – something Stern does not do – it is not always entirely clear what Stern would take to 
be at stake in his discussion when it is cast in terms of the ESP and the PSP (for more on Stern, 
see Dainton, 2017). 
29 The talk of two states of affairs being discriminable should not be read as implying that the 
subject deliberately engages in the task of judging when the second- or hour-hand has moved. 
To say that it is in virtue of a stimulus being in two discriminable positions within the ESP – 
plus some other conditions concerning the typical functioning of the subject’s visual 
mechanisms – that motion is perceived is not to say the subject is making personal level 
judgements about the relative positions of a stimulus. 
30 I will put pressure on this claimed entailment, in light of a recent argument presented by 
Prosser (2016). Rather than discussing Prosser’s positive proposal in detail I demonstrate that 
the existence of an explanatory unit in psychophysics, to be expressed in temporal terms, does 
not necessarily entail that anything temporally extended is presented in experience. (The purpose 
of considering Prosser’s argument in this context is not to engage with his positive proposal – 
see my Chapter 2 for this – it is because he provides us with the material to break the connection 
between an explanatorily relevant interval of time and the interval of time presented in 
experience.) 
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distinguishable sections of a single long event are too far separated to be sensed 
together [i.e. we will not experience it as moving]” (Broad, 1923: 352). In this 
and surrounding passages, Broad31 is highlighting an apparent phenomenological 
difference between our experience of the second-hand of the clock and the 
hour-hand of the clock.32 Assuming the clock has hands which sweep around 
the clock face in uniform motion, rather than ticking, first-personal reports 
(from reflection on the phenomenal character of experience) reveal that subjects 
see the second-hand moving, but do not see the hour-hand moving. If the 
subject was to stare at the clock face without looking away for a whole hour, 
there would be a time at which she could see that the hour-hand had moved 
from its earlier position, but she would not see the hour-hand moving.  
 
An interpretation of the specious present in terms of this explanatory role is 
prevalent in contemporary discussions. As succinctly captured by Hoerl: “[T]he 
notion of the specious present, as introduced by James, and subsequently 
understood by others, is supposed to be a notion that plays a fundamental 
explanatory role in accounting for our very ability to perceive motion and 
change” (Hoerl, 2013: 394).33 Discussions by contemporary authors also capture 
the claim, which appears to be widely assumed in the literature, that in order for 
                                               
31 Russell, writing in his An Outline of Philosophy (1927) shortly after Broad, similarly claims: 
“…you cannot see the minute-hand of a watch moving, but you can see the second-hand 
moving. That is because it is in several appreciably different places within the short time that is 
required for one visual sensation to fade, so that you do actually, at one moment, see it in several 
places… Thus not only an instant, but a short finite time, is sensibly present to you at any 
moment. This short finite time is called the ‘specious present’” (Russell, 1927: 205). This, again, 
is to take the specious present to play the explanatory role captured by the ESP, and to maintain 
that, as a consequence, this limited interval must be presented in experience. 
32 This distinction is denied by Plumer, who (pace Broad) states: “[Broad] claims that he cannot 
see either the minute- or the hour-hand moving... I suspect he did not look at them very long 
(who does?)” (Plumer, 1985: 28). However, Plumer is certainly adopting a minority position in 
denying this distinction; based on my own idiosyncratic experience, the phenomenology certainly 
favours Broad’s account. 
33 Kiverstein (2010: 161-2) considers how altering the length of the specious present could make 
our experience of the second-hand like that of the hour-hand, by decreasing the interval (where 
motion could become imperceptible in both cases), or by increasing the interval (such that 
motion will be perceptible in both cases). Like Kiverstein, Phillips (2011a) considers what would 
result from increasing or decreasing this interval, suggesting that “if we are to perceive change 
at all, a certain amount of change must take place within the temporal field” (Phillips, 2011a: 
819). The authors acknowledge both that there is a distinctive phenomenology associated with 
the experience of motion/change and that there needs to be an explanatorily relevant interval 
which accounts for the distinction between perceptible and imperceptible motion: the ESP.  It 
is possible to also read Kiverstein and Phillips as acknowledging a role for the PSP – this may 
be what the latter refers to as the temporal field – and suggesting that the PSP also plays the role 
of the ESP. See section 3.2. for the development of this line of thought. 
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the ESP to play this explanatory role, it must be an interval presented in 
experience. This appears to align with Grush’s interpretation of the specious 
present, when he claims: “Since motion only manifests over an interval, then on 
the assumption that we can perceive motion, the content of perceptual 
experience, what is experienced, must include a temporal interval. The specious 
present doctrine… is one way to capture this” (Grush, 2007: 29). These authors 
appear to be taking the specious present to play an explanatory role in 
accounting for our experience of motion, further taking it to be an interval 
presented in experience; seemingly taking the former to entail the latter.  
 
An interesting result of characterising the specious present as the ESP is that it 
leads some theorists to suggest that it may be modality-specific. This possibility 
is explicitly entertained by Barry Dainton – in a supplementary document 
concerning the specious present to his Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy entry, 
‘Temporal Consciousness’ (2016) – who suggests that it would be wrong to 
assume that the specious presents of different sense modalities (and of different 
subjects) are of exactly the same extent. Theorists might suppose that the 
auditory, visual, and tactual temporal measures would be more or less similar 
intervals, but Dainton says that this is something that we should not 
automatically assume.  
 
 
2. 2. The specious present as the PSP 
 
The ESP is not the only conceptualisation of the specious present and an 
explanatory account of how we perceive motion and change is not the only 
motivation for invoking the specious present. From James’ discussion of the 
notion we can bring out an alternative conceptualisation, based upon a 
phenomenological claim about what we seem to be confronted with when we 
reflect on our ongoing experience: that it seems to be of some limited interval. This 
is, I suggest, of interest in articulating the phenomenal character of experience. 
On the assumption that conscious experience has a phenomenal character which 
is manifest to an experiencing subject when she undergoes the experience, James 
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can be read as saying that in an effort to articulate what it is that is manifest to 
us we must appeal to something of some interval.  
 
That an interval is presented in experience is, on this conceptualisation, to be 
motivated through reflection on what it is like to experience temporally extended 
phenomena, rather than coming as the entailment of a line of reasoning 
concerning perceptible motion. Reflecting on what it is like for a subject 
experiencing a temporally extended occurrence – such as listening to a piece of 
music or watching a football match – it is suggested that there is a sense in which 
she seems to be perceptually aware of some limited but non-zero temporal 
extent. This conceptualisation of the specious present is suggested in the writing 
of two authors who appeared to shape James’ thoughts on the perception of 
time, Kelly and Hodgson. 
 
While James takes the terminology of ‘the specious present’ from Kelly, his 
chapter on the perception of time draws significant influence from Hodgson’s 
discussion of experience and time, evidenced in part by the number of quotes 
from Hodgson included in James’ discussion.34 Hodgson certainly appears to 
offer a proposal which is in line with the PSP, taking reflection upon one’s 
experience to support the claim that experience presents some limited temporal 
extent: 
 
“...whatever we are actually experiencing is always the content of a present 
moment of experience, which may be called the empirical present, in order to 
distinguish it from an abstract mathematical moment of time… We have no actual 
experience which is not included in the content of the empirical present 
moment...” (Hodgson, 1898: 35)  
 
Operating with a phenomenologically driven methodology – in some ways a 
precursor to the methodology better known from the writing of Husserl35 – 
                                               
34 I cannot do justice to what Hodgson has to say about the relationship between experience and 
time in the current context. See Andersen (2017) for a discussion of how Hodgson’s writing 
relates to current debates regarding temporal experience; see Mander (2014) for a detailed 
account of Hodgson’s philosophical position as set out in his The Metaphysic of Experience (1898). 
35 Such as Husserl’s (1905) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Spicker (1973) 
offers a detailed comparison of the writing of Husserl and Hodgson, noting how much of 
Hodgson’s work anticipates ideas taken up by Husserl. 
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Hodgson suggests that the empirical present moment is all that is available for 
analysis, and that this moment, which is presented in experience, is of some 
temporal extent.36 Such claims about the time presented in experience are taken 
up by James in his discussion of the specious present. 
 
Both Kelly and James make claims about the minimum temporal extent an 
experiencing subject is aware of in reflection upon her experience, and a maximal 
temporal extent. Regarding the former James claims, like Hodgson, that the 
mathematical present is an ideal abstraction which is never realised in sense. In 
bringing out the sense in which there is an upper temporal limit to what is given 
in ongoing experience, James appeals to Kelly and his example of a bar of music 
(quoted previously). The point to draw out for present interest is simply the idea 
that what is presented in ongoing experience seems to be of some limited 
temporal spread; that all the notes of a bar of a song seem to be contained in the 
present, but that all of the notes of the song (which is of a greater temporal 
extent) do not. This was also brought out, though focusing on visual experience, 
by the example at the beginning of the chapter. When watching a football match 
and a goal is scored, as you become perceptually aware of the ball in the back of 
the net you are no longer perceptually aware of the ball being passed at the 
halfway line, which occurred a few seconds earlier; over greater intervals of time, 
we appear to experience what we do in virtue of what is presented in experience 
over sub-intervals within that greater interval. What a subject is aware of in 
perception, what is presented in perceptual experience, is in this way temporally 
limited. This temporally limited interval is what the PSP picks out. 
 
                                               
Much like the conceptualisation of the specious present I am suggesting we can read 
in James, Miller (1984) suggests that Husserl’s ‘temporal field’ is not introduced in order to fulfil 
an explanatory role, such as accounting for our experience of motion. Miller claims that “[t]he 
limitations on our retentional and protensional spans [like the extent of the specious present]… 
have no significance for [Husserl’s] epistemological account of our temporal awareness” (Miller, 
1984: 174). To the extent that this is true of Husserl (and it would be beyond the scope of this 
paper to consider all that Husserl has to say in this context, or all that Miller has to say concerning 
Husserl), then his interests and concerns align more closely with those present in the discussion 
of the PSP – capturing the phenomenal character of experience and the interval a subject seems 
to be aware of – than the ESP – accounting for how we experience motion. 
36 This can also be read in how Hodgson says: “The lowest conceivable empirical moment of 
experience contains both time and feeling, and the lowest empirical moment in experience as it 
actually comes to us contains both sequence in time and difference in feeling” (Hodgson, 1898: 
64-5). 
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Contemporary theorists also, at least at times, take the notion of the specious 
present to be so characterised. Dainton says that “…a typical specious present 
is populated by experiences belonging to several (or all) of the sensory modes, 
along with bodily and emotional feelings, conscious thoughts, memory images, 
imaginings – all these (and more) can co-exist within the confines of a brief phase of 
a stream of human consciousness” (Dainton, 2013: 396; emphasis added).  This is a claim 
about a temporally limited interval presented in ongoing conscious experience. 
In a similar vein, Dainton also stresses the distinction between ‘present 
experience’ and the strict present, as it is presented by James, saying that the 
former is to be characterised as “a stable, invariant structural feature of our 
consciousness: it is that which remains unchanged while many and varied 
contents stream through it” (Dainton, 2013: 391; emphasis in original).37 This is to 
pick out the PSP, something to be appealed to in capturing the manifest image 
of experience.38 Granting that an interval is presented in experience, many 
debates in the contemporary literature can be read as disagreements over what 
accounts for the temporal extent presented.39 
 
To summarise, an appeal to the PSP can be read in the passages of Hodgson, 
Kelly, and James, quoted previously, and is motivated independently of the ESP. 
That a subject seems to be presented with a temporally extended interval (the 
PSP) is a claim about the phenomenology which stands in need of elucidation, 
rather than being an explanatory measure (the ESP) which is appealed to in order 
to account for some other feature of the phenomenology, such as perceptible 
motion. 
 
                                               
37 Despite making much of what I have called the ESP, Kiverstein also writes that “we can be 
directly and sensibly aware of events that take place within a short duration of time…” 
(Kiverstein, 2010: 166). He continues by saying that “our awareness extends a short distance 
through time… all events occurring within a specious present are experienced with the same 
force and vivacity…” (ibid.: 167). Kiverstein plausibly has the suggested interpretation of the 
specious present – the PSP – in mind when he makes reference of the ‘short duration’ of which 
we can be ‘directly and sensibly aware’. 
38 That we are perceptually aware of things occupying some limited interval of time, the PSP, is 
one way of interpreting Soteriou’s claim that “...the things we perceive are perceived as filling, 
occupying, or having some location within, an interval of time, just as the objects we see are 
generally seen as filling, occupying, or having a location within a region of space” (Soteriou, 
2011: 195). I will say more about the comparison between the PSP and the visual field in Chapter 
4. 
39 As highlighted in the Introductory Remarks, albeit briefly, this can be seen to be a point of 
contention in the debate between retentional and extensional theories of the specious present. 
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3. The relationship between the ESP and the PSP 
 
3. 1. On what follows from the ESP 
 
Having distinguished between two ways in which theorists might motivate an 
appeal to the specious present, it remains to be shown that the ESP and the PSP 
are conceptually distinct. In section 2.1. I said that some theorists have supposed 
that it follows from the ESP – from the very ability to perceive motion and 
change – that a brief duration must be presented in ongoing experience. While 
such a further claim might appear to be implicit in how the ESP has been 
characterised, it does not follow from the ESP. To grant that there are variables 
of some temporal extent that play an explanatory role in accounting for why we 
experience what we do is not yet to make a claim about the duration presented 
in experience; granting a role to something akin to the ESP, some theorists have 
argued that it does not follow that such a temporal extent need be presented in 
experience. This provides us with a pressing reason to distinguish the ESP from 
the PSP. 
 
Prosser (2016) has recently presented an attack on the idea that the 
phenomenology associated with the experience of motion/change entails that 
our experience does present a temporally extended interval.40 Prosser does not 
wish to deny that we experience motion/change. He looks to block the inference 
from the claim that there is a required rate of change (relative to a sensory 
modality) for some stimulus in order for it to be experienced as 
moving/changing to the claim that perceptual experience presents a subject with 
something of some temporal extension.  
 
Prosser argues that we only have to hold that experience presents an interval in 
order to account for the perceptual experience of motion/change if we make a 
further assumption: that in presenting a punctate state of affairs, the state of 
affairs must also be presented as static. Prosser objects that this is simply to 
assume that “[a]n instantaneous content cannot include anything that can only 
                                               
40 Also see Arstila (2018), Chuard (2011 and 2017), and Le Poidevin (2007). I critically engage 
with these theorists in Chapter 2, so I will keep my comments here brief. 
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be detected over a non-instantaneous interval”, but in making such an 
assumption one “conflates the properties of the stimulus that are necessary for 
motion detection with the content of the resulting experience” (Prosser, 2016: 
121-2). Drawing the distinction between the properties of the stimulus that are 
necessary in order for our perceptual mechanisms to detect motion and that 
which is subsequently presented in perceptual experience, Prosser says that one 
can maintain that a momentary state of affairs can be presented as dynamic. 
 
In what he takes to be a probative analogy, Prosser appeals to how we define 
instantaneous rates of change when talking about the velocity of moving bodies. 
In this case an object may need to be moving for some period of time if it is to 
be moving at all, but its velocity can be represented by an instantaneous vector 
rate of change. In a similar vein, Prosser grants that a stimulus might need to be 
moving for some period of time in order for a subject’s perceptual mechanisms 
to detect that the object is in motion, but he suggests that in this case there could 
also be a representation of motion at an instant. Keeping in mind the explanatory 
work the ESP is introduced to serve, Prosser sketches a proposal on which 
theorists can appeal to the ESP – where this is taken to be the relevant interval 
in perceptual processing (for example), that interval over which a stimulus needs 
to move a discriminable distance in order to be detected and subsequently 
represented as moving by a subject’s perceptual mechanisms – without thereby 
claiming that a non-zero temporal extent is presented as such in experience.41 
 
Within the context of accounting for the phenomenology of experienced 
motion/change, there appears to be a position in logical space where one can 
accept that there is a role for the ESP – for an explanatorily relevant interval of 
time – without accepting that this interval is presented in experience. This 
demonstrates that an appeal to the ESP does not entail that this interval is 
presented in experience. The ESP does not entail the existence of the PSP, the 
                                               
41 There is a possible ambiguity in talk of a non-zero temporal extent being presented as such. 
In the present context, one might suppose that an object may be presented as the kind of thing 
that has a non-zero extent, or may be presented as engaged in an activity, where engagement in 
such an activity occurs over time. Prosser could grant that this is presented in experience. This 
is not what I mean when I talk of a non-zero temporal extent being presented as such. In what 
follows, talk of a non-zero extent being presented in experience is to be understood as talk of 
an interval of time being presented in ongoing perceptual experience.  
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two are conceptually distinct. This does not speak to whether the PSP entails the 
existence of the ESP. 
 
 
3. 2. On what follows from the PSP 
 
In appealing to the specious present in the form of the PSP, a theorist maintains 
that reflecting upon what it is like to experience temporally extended 
occurrences reveals that such occurrences are perceived as filling and/or 
otherwise falling within some temporal extent. This can be compared with how 
a typical subject visually perceives spatially extended objects filling and/or 
otherwise falling within some spatial extent. Given that there is an interval 
presented in perceptual experience, this makes plausible the claim that in order 
to experience motion/change a discriminable amount of motion/change must 
be presented over this interval; that the conceptualisation of the specious present 
as PSP also fulfils the role of the conceptualisation of the specious present as 
the ESP. To demonstrate that this is so, consider the visuospatial analogy. 
 
In visual experience the objects of sight are presented within a spatial region 
which extends outwards from the subject’s position in space. Appeal to this 
spatial region is typically construed as an appeal to the (spatial) visual field. Of 
the spatial phenomena that we can experience, one is variation in colour over 
the spatial parts of an object. Yet, an appeal to the visual field is motivated 
independently of an account of how a subject comes to visually experience 
variation in colour over a given spatial extent.  
 
We could imagine theorists debating whether or not an experiencing subject 
must have a visual field of some spatial extent – whether it need extend along 
three axes, two, or merely one – in order to visually experience such variation in 
colour. Regardless of such a debate, given that we are independently motivated 
to endorse the claim that typical subjects do have a visual field of some spatial 
extent, we can ask about the implications this carries for the visual experience of 
variation in colour over the spatial parts of an object. To experience such 
variation in colour it is not enough for a subject to experience one shade of 
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colour at one location at one time, supposing this colour fills her visual field, and 
then to experience another (shade of) colour at a different location at a later 
time, say once the subject turns her head, again supposing that the second colour 
fills her visual field. This would be to experience different shades of colour at 
different locations at different times. In order to experience variation in colour 
over the spatial parts of an object, there needs to be some discriminable variation 
presented within the visual field.42 Irrespective of whether the visual experience 
of variation in colour entails that an experiencing subject has a visual field of 
some spatial extent, that a subject does have a visual field of some spatial extent 
carries certain implications for the visual experience of variation: that there must 
be a discriminable variation in colour over, or within, the spatial extent of the 
visual field in order for the subject to visually experience such variation. 
 
Given the independent motivation for endorsing the PSP, analogous 
considerations to those raised concerning the visual experience of variation in 
colour over a given spatial extent apply in the case of motion/change.43 To 
experience motion/change it is not enough for a subject to experience an object 
occupying a given location or displaying a given property at one time – over the 
interval of the PSP – and then to experience it occupying a distinct location or 
displaying a different property at a later time – over a distinct interval, the length 
of the PSP – as illustrated by Broad’s discussion of the hour-hand of a clock. 
                                               
42 There may be further complications. It may be that we have to take into account what is 
presented in the visual field over the interval of the PSP. To illustrate this thought, suppose that 
a subject is moving at a continuous rate perpendicular to an object (such as a wall) which varies 
in colour very gradually, keeping her gaze straight ahead at whatever portion of the object is 
perpendicular to her. It may be that if the subject remained stationary and looked at the object 
from a given location, she would not be able to visually discriminate any variation in colour 
(given the portion of the object which falls within her visual field). However, given that she is in 
continuous motion and the portion of the object she is visually aware of is changing it may be 
that she is able to visually discriminate some variation in colour as a result of what is presented 
in the visual field over the PSP. For simplicity I leave this complication aside when presenting the 
case above. 
43 It might be objected that the experience of motion is not analogous to the experience of 
variation; it could be claimed that experiencing variation in colour across an object is to 
experience different (shades of) colour(s) at different parts of the spatial extent, while 
experiencing motion is not merely experiencing a change in location of a stimulus over some 
temporal extent. Even if this is true, we need to be careful in what we claim are the relevant 
differences between the experience of motion and the experience of variation. Experiencing 
motion may not be reducible to experiencing a change in spatial location and yet it might 
nonetheless be something which seems to be occurring over time, where some discriminable 
amount of it has to be presented over (or within) the PSP in order for the subject to experience 
motion at all. If motion appears to be a particularly tricky case, focus instead on change more 
generally (such as the example of change in colour). In order to experience change some 
discriminable amount of the relevant change must be presented over (or within) the PSP. 
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Endorsing the PSP entails that there must be a discriminable movement/change 
over the temporal extent of the PSP in order for there to be the experience of 
motion/change. 
 
However long we spend stood in front of a deciduous tree in autumn, we do not 
experience the change in colour of a leaf from green to orange. The change is 
too slow for it to be discriminable over the PSP and so a typical subject will not 
experience the colour changing. Contrast this with a particularly vivid experience 
of a change, such as observing a cuttlefish or chameleon as they change colour. 
In cases such as these a typical subject will perceive the colours changing, rather 
than only inferring the colour change, because the change in colour is 
discriminable over (or within) the interval of the PSP. Once we endorse the 
notion of the PSP, there are certain clear cases in which the PSP can play such 
an explanatory role. 
 
In order to experience motion/change there needs to be some discriminable 
movement/change presented over the PSP. The PSP and the ESP are 
conceptually distinct; it does not follow from endorsing the ESP that one need 
endorse the PSP. It does follow from endorsing the PSP that one takes this 
interval to fulfil the explanatory role envisioned for the ESP. 
 
 
4. The ESP, the PSP, and variables in psychophysics 
 
With the PSP fulfilling a certain explanatory role, allowing us to mark a 
distinction between perceptible and imperceptible motion/change, this raises 
the question of whether the explanatory role performed by the PSP exhausts the 
ESP or whether there is some remaining explanatory residue. Is there something 
in the conception of the ESP which is not captured by that which follows from 
the PSP? For each sensory modality (at least, each modality within which we 
wish to say that we can experience dynamic phenomena such as motion and 
change) is there a further temporal unit of explanation – a single temporal 
measure, in that modality – the length of which plays an explanatory role in 
accounting for how a subject experiences occurrences as they fall within time? 
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There is little motivation for answering this question in the affirmative. To 
illustrate, consider another spatial analogy. 
 
We cannot perceptually discriminate the smallest spatial portions – spatial slices 
of zero extent at the limit – of a spatially extended object of experience.44 Upon 
acknowledging this claim, a theorist may question how big something has to be 
in order for the subject to perceptually discriminate it, or how greatly extended 
some stimulus must be in order for a subject to discriminate variation (in colour, 
for example) over it. While there are no doubt many ways in which such a 
question can form the basis of empirical research, it would not appear plausible 
to suppose that there will be a single spatial measure which such research could 
arrive at, regardless of other variables. We would need to consider, among other 
things, whether a subject is supposed to be visually or tactually discriminating 
this spatial measure. If it is the former, then the spatial measure we arrive at 
would presumably depend on the relevant lighting conditions, the distance of 
the object from the subject, the object’s spatial orientation relative to the subject, 
whether the object falls within peripheral or foveal regions, and so on. If it is the 
latter, then the relevant spatial measure would presumably depend on the part 
of the body which is coming into contact with the object (the elbow, the 
fingertip, or the tongue, for example), the orientation of the object relative to 
the subject, the relative temperature of the subject and object, and so on.  
 
The above considerations extend to cases where the issue of interest is a subject’s 
ability to discriminate between stimuli and their properties – for example, the 
relative colour or size of two stimuli. A theorist may question how different – in 
colour or size – two stimuli must be in order for the subject to perceptually 
discriminate between them. Once again, it would not appear plausible to 
suppose that there will be a single measure, expressible in terms of a difference 
in colour or size, which such research could arrive at regardless of other 
variables. If the concern is with a subject’s ability to visually discriminate 
between size, then whether the stimuli are presented at the same time or 
sequentially, whether they are close to one another (along left/right and 
                                               
44 I discuss the issue of the spatial and temporal resolution of what is presented in experience, 
and the related notion of a minimum sensible, in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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up/down axes), whether they are the same distance from the subject (along a 
near/far axis), the lighting conditions, and so on, will all be relevant to the 
measure arrived at.  
 
In discussions of perceptual discriminability in the various sensory modalities 
there are also frequently discussed temporal measures. For example, it is widely 
recognised that the sensory systems have different temporal resolutions for the 
detection of non-simultaneity.45 Let’s suppose that a theorist sets out to 
empirically determine some of the relevant perceptual minima and maxima. The 
theorist presents subjects with a hand rotating around a clock face – were the 
speed of rotation can be increased or decreased in minor increments – and, on 
the basis of subjective reports, seeks to determine what changes are and are not 
perceptually discriminable by subjects. One might suppose that, when 
concerned with whether or not a subject will experience the hand as moving in 
any given case, there is more to consider than the temporal extent of the PSP. 
This is certainly true, for example the theorist would need to know what the 
minimum distance is by which two positions of the hand must be separated in 
order for this change in spatial location to be visually discriminable.  
 
It does not appear plausible to suggest that such an experiment could determine 
a role for the ESP distinct from that fulfilled by the PSP. For illustrative 
purposes, suppose the PSP is 500 milliseconds long. Suppose we also find that 
when a given hand is rotated 5 degrees in 100 milliseconds, this change in 
location is visually discriminable. Does it follow that when the same hand is 
rotated 5 degrees in 500 milliseconds that this change in spatial location will be 
                                               
45 Wittmann summarises: “The highest temporal resolution (the lowest threshold of detection) 
is observed in the auditory system, where two short acoustic stimuli which are only 2–3 ms apart 
are detected as non-simultaneous. The visual and the tactile system have a lower temporal 
resolution with respect to non-simultaneity with thresholds of some tens of milliseconds” 
(Wittmann, 2011: 2). This highlights a difference across modalities in the temporal extent of 
what is known as the simultaneity threshold, though, as I have suggested, there is little reason to 
suppose that there is a single measure which we can specify in each modality as the interval 
below which a subject cannot discriminate between two stimuli, regardless of other variables. And 
this is not what Wittmann claims, he simply reports the shortest intervals over which non-
simultaneity is detected given some control for other such variables. (In this context it is also 
worth noting that detecting the non-simultaneity of two short events isn’t sufficient to for 
detecting the temporal order of those events. For a subject to be able to reliably report the 
temporal order of the presented stimuli, there must be a greater interval separating the two 
stimuli. In other words, for each modality the order threshold is greater than the simultaneity 
threshold.) 
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visually discriminable? Plausibly not. Slight changes may be discriminable if they 
occur particularly quickly but not if they occur more slowly (even within the 
PSP), just as differences in the relative size of two stimuli may be discriminable 
when they are close in space but not when they are at some degree of separation 
(even if the stimuli are simultaneously presented within a subject’s visual field). 
There are various interacting variables, and ratios between degree of difference 
and time over which that difference occurs, that will play a role in whether some 
change is or is not experienced as such.  
 
Suppose further the theorist finds that, over all of the intervals tested in the 
hypothetical experiment, the slightest rotation discriminable by subjects was 2 
degrees, i.e. regardless of the interval over which it occurred a rotation of 1 
degree was not discriminable as such. I have said that it does not follow that if 
the hand rotates by 2 degrees over the interval of the PSP, this will be 
discriminable. This might lead the theorist to ask what the maximal interval is 
over which the hand can move 2 degrees for this change to be discriminable. 
Whatever the answer is to such a question, it is not that the interval in question 
captures the ESP. Rather, such an answer provides an illustration of one of the 
relevant ratios between the degree of difference (spatial displacement) and the 
time over which that difference occurs, that determines whether or not the 
change is visually discriminable. The existence of such explanatorily relevant 
ratios/variables does not confer plausibility on the thought that there is a single 
temporal measure, in a given sensory modality, the length of which plays an 
explanatory role in accounting for the kind of occurrences (such as motion, 
change in location, change in colour, etc.) the subject experiences. 
 
Granting that there is a role for the PSP, the interval it picks out is also the 
relevant explanatory interval over which some stimulus must change a 
discriminable amount in order to be experienced as changing. We can grant that 
there will also be other minima and maxima to consider in perception, which 
may be explanatorily relevant to what is perceptible in a given case. However, 
this is not to say that there is an additional interval of interest, but that there are 
various ratios between the properties of a scene relative to a given experiencer – 
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such as relative size, colour, distance (spatial and temporal), and so on, between 
stimuli – which will be relevant to whether a given change is perceptible.  
 
 
5. Why has the ESP/PSP distinction been overlooked? 
 
Given the preceding focus on James and Stern, I will end by making some 
speculative remarks regarding why much of the literature on the specious present 
– within analytic, anglophone circles – has appealed to what I have called the 
Stern-inspired ESP rather than the PSP. With both James and Stern maintaining 
that an interval is presented experience (the latter appearing to take the ESP to 
entail the PSP), it is not surprising that subtly different conceptualisations of the 
specious present have been overlooked. I suggest that the time at which this 
notion was coined may also have much to do with the subsequent focus on the 
ESP (at the expense of the PSP). 
 
The notion of the specious present was first used in philosophical and 
psychological discussions at a time when one tradition of philosophical thought 
was coming to a close – at least in anglophone circles. At the beginning of the 
Twentieth Century, a new tradition develops in the realism of Moore and Russell 
in Cambridge.46 The philosophical landscape that emerged over this period is 
sometimes characterised by contrast with the phenomenological tradition in 
terms of the analytic-continental divide. The discussions of James and Stern (in 
addition to those of Hodgson and Kelly) can be seen to span these two traditions 
before the split. This is evidenced, in part, by the influence of James’ writing on 
both the analytic philosophers47 and the phenomenologists48 in the early 
Twentieth Century (continuing to the present day).  
 
                                               
46 While it might be common to trace analytic philosophy to Moore and Russell, this is not to 
say that its development was their doing alone. See Travis & Kalderon (2013) for discussion of 
the role of Cook Wilson and the Oxford Realists; also see other discussions in Beaney (2013). 
47 Russell’s The Analysis of Mind draws on and is influenced by James’ doctrine of ‘pure experience’ 
(Russell, 1921: 22-6). 
48 This is discussed by Drabinski (1993) and at length in Wilshire's (1968) William James and 
Phenomenology. Cairns (1976) also remarks that Husserl recommended to his American students 
that they prepare themselves for phenomenology via James's works on psychology and 
empiricism. 
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A possible diagnosis of why the notion of the PSP has fallen out of focus49 in 
anglophone analytic philosophy is that this conceptualisation of the specious 
present picks out a phenomenological datum, primarily of interest to those 
looking to characterise the phenomenal character of experience. The PSP is 
something appealed to when one sets out to do descriptive phenomenology. The 
ESP, on the other hand, is a notion which does further explanatory work in 
discussions of the philosophy of perception. It is plausible that theorists of an 
analytic slant would favour a more analytic explanatory project, of accounting for 
our experience of motion, hence the subsequent focus upon the ESP. (Yet, this 
is not to say that such theorists had in mind that there were two such 
conceptualisations and deliberated on which notion of the specious present to 
operate with.) 
 
It may be that the dominance of the analytic explanatory project and the failure 
to distinguish between the two conceptualisations of the specious present – 
focusing on the ‘Stern-inspired’ ESP – has led to the erroneous supposition that 
the ESP entails the PSP. It could turn out, as a point of historical fact, that 
several of the authors who began to popularise the notion of the specious 
present at the beginning of the Twentieth Century were not aware of Stern’s 
discussion. It is to be granted that the popular understanding of the specious 
present in terms of the ESP – in addition to the PSP – could be read in James 
(and Kelly) by those writing after his Principles of Psychology. To a certain extent, 
this is a moot point. Whether or not Stern’s writing had an influence on theorists 
discussing temporal experience – and appealing to the specious present – in the 
early Twentieth Century is matter of historical accuracy, but the larger concern 
for present purposes is with the very drawing of the distinction between the ESP 
and the PSP. 
 
Some of the insights of authors such as Hodgson, James, Kelly, and Stern, may 
have been obscured as a result of the narrowing of interests in the traditions 
which emerged following their writing. This demonstrates the importance of 
considering the context and intellectual climate of the time at which authors 
                                               
49 See Andersen (2017) for the related discussion of the dramatic extent to which Hodgson has 
also fallen out of focus, with very few contemporary theorists appealing to his rich discussions 
of experience and time. 
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were writing – rather than viewing it through the lens of one’s own concerns – 
or else key insights and distinctions can be easily overlooked (whether or not 
this is the cause of the popular notion of the specious present running the ESP 
and the PSP together). The diverse interests of theorists writing at the end of 
the Nineteenth Century and beginning of the Twentieth Century, when read for 
their own sake, can be of great utility in ongoing debates in the philosophy of 
mind, as evidenced by the distinction between the ESP and the PSP. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter began with the example of watching a football match. When 
watching the footballers on the pitch, I drew attention to two features of the 
experience. Firstly, a subject experiences the football players moving, she 
experiences motion. Secondly, when she is perceptually aware of the ball in the 
back of the net she is no longer perceptually aware of the ball being kicked at 
the halfway line, which occurred a few seconds earlier; what she is aware of in 
perception, what is presented in her perceptual experience, is in this way 
temporally limited. With reference to the writing of James and Stern, I 
demonstrated that an explanatory account of these two features – the experience 
of motion and what is given in ongoing experience being (in a certain sense) 
temporally limited – is supposed to arise from a single phenomenon: the 
specious present. 
 
The main aim throughout this chapter has been to elucidate the notion of the 
specious present, to explain why it is widely held to be part of the explanation 
of the two aforementioned features of our experience, and to argue that the 
widely held view over-simplifies matters. I argued that contemporary and 
historical theorists frequently appeal to the specious present under two guises 
without explicitly distinguishing between them. Firstly, the specious present can 
be understood as an interval of a given temporal extent which is to be put to 
work in an explanatory account of perceptible and imperceptible motion: the 
ESP. Secondly, the specious present can be understood as an interval of time 
presented in experience: the PSP. This latter terminology is introduced as a 
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placeholder for an aspect of the phenomenology which needs to be given an 
account of, rather than being introduced in order to do some explanatory work.  
 
I have argued that while granting a role for the ESP does not entail that an 
interval is presented in experience, once we grant a role to the PSP this does 
entail that the interval presented in experience will fulfil the explanatory role of 
the ESP. This is important to recognise when we consider arguments for and 
against the claim that there is a specious present; I consider such arguments 
further in Chapter 2. I ended by offering one explanation of why the ESP has 
become the orthodox interpretation of the specious present at the expense of 
the PSP, resulting from the analytic-continental divide which emerged in early 
Twentieth Century philosophy.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Minima Sensibilia: On the Temporal Breadth of 
Experience 
 
 
“[W]e imagine that consciousness comes to us in drops, minima sensibilia; and involve ourselves 
in the puzzle, How is time-perception possible? It is like pouring a glass of water away in drops, 
and then asking how such drops can be united into a mass of water.” – A letter from Shadworth 
Hodgson to Josiah Royce; quoted by Clendenning (1999: 88). 
 
“We normally take experience in larger chunks, and if we try to pulverize it by focusing attention 
on particles within ... we usually find ourselves puzzled and uncertain” (Goodman, 1977: 203). 
 
 
In our wakeful conscious lives, the experience of time and dynamic temporal 
phenomena – such as motion and change – appears to be ubiquitous. How is it 
that temporality is woven into our conscious experience? Is it through perceptual 
experience presenting a series of instantaneous states of the world, which 
combine together over time – in a sense which would need to be specified – to 
give us experience of dynamic temporal phenomena? Or are temporally 
extended occurrences presented in experience as such?  
 
Following the discussion of the specious present in the previous chapter, the 
main interest in the present chapter is to develop and defend the following claim, 
which I take to be a claim concerning the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience: that the experiencing subject is minimally presented with something 
of some non-zero temporal extent as such, or to put it another way, that she is 
presented with something spanning an interval of time (the Duration Claim).50 
This entails a denial of the claim that perceptual experience presents what is the 
                                               
50 The Duration Claim is part of what supports an appeal to the specious present under the guise 
of the PSP, but the two are not identical claims. It does not follow from the Duration Claim that 
there is any in-principle upper temporal limit to what is presented in ongoing perceptual 
experience, though such an upper temporal limit is part of what motivates an appeal to the PSP.  
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case at an instant in isolation.51 In order to develop and defend the Duration 
Claim, I consider and dismiss recent proposals – from Chuard (2011 and 2017), 
Prosser52 (2013, 2016, and 2017), and Arstila (2018) – that would reject it. I will 
refer to such proposals as snapshot models of temporal experience. Prosser and 
Arstila build upon Le Poidevin’s work (2007) and develop variations of what will 
be referred to as the dynamic snapshot model of temporal experience (DSM).  
 
Snapshot models of temporal experience tend to be considered minority 
positions in current debates. In a nutshell, on such a model the phenomenal 
character of experience over time is to be characterised in terms of a sequence 
of independent snapshots of the world.53 As illustrated in the previous chapter, 
since the writing of James and Stern it has been widely accepted that, in order to 
experience motion, a subject must have an experience which presents a non-
zero temporal extent. As a result, the experience of motion has been thought to 
give rise to a phenomenological argument for the Duration Claim (outlined in 
section 1). Chuard can be read as disputing this and arguing that the 
phenomenology can be accounted for without endorsing the Duration Claim. I 
argue that the snapshot model Chuard proposes comes up short (in section 2). 
The DSM can be read as an attempt at responding to the phenomenological 
argument for the Duration Claim and to explain the experience of motion 
without endorsing the Duration Claim (outlined in section 3). 
 
I argue that the dynamic snapshot theorist does not provide us with a plausible 
alternative model of temporal experience; as a proposal concerning the 
phenomenal character of experience the DSM is left unmotivated. This 
argument has three fronts: I argue that the findings from cognitive science 
discussed by Prosser and Arstila do not provide independent support for the 
                                               
51 I will explain the significance of saying an instant in isolation in what follows (see section 5), 
but briefly, in order to be aware of something in isolation a subject need not be aware of anything 
else, or anything of a greater extent. 
52 Prosser offers a variant of the dynamic snapshot model, though he does not unequivocally 
endorse it. In what follows, I will refer to the account put forward as Prosser’s proposal, though 
it is to be acknowledged that it is a proposal that he is not ultimately satisfied with. 
53 Unless otherwise explicitly stated, I will write assuming that snapshot theorists appeal to a 
‘snapshot’ in order to pick out an experiential presentation which is neutral about the duration 
of the presented state of affairs, rather than presenting a state of affairs as obtaining for an 
extensionless instant, or point in time. On the conception of instants as extensionless, see Sorabji 
(1983: 8) and Moore (2001: 158). 
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DSM (in section 4); neither does reflection on the phenomenology (argued for 
in section 5); nor do considerations from certain theoretical claims in the 
literature (argued for in section 6). We are left without good reasons to adopt a 
snapshot model of perceptual experience and with good reasons to endorse the 
Duration Claim. 
 
 
1. A phenomenological argument: from the perception of motion 
 
Consider seeing fallen leaves blowing in the wind, seeing a dog chasing a ball 
across a field, or – to stick with the traditional example in the literature – seeing 
the second-hand of a clock sweep around the clock face. In all of these cases we 
take ourselves to experience something in motion, where some appeal to motion 
is required if we wish to do justice to what it is like for us perceptually. (For 
simplicity, in the present chapter I will continue to focus on visually perceived 
continuous motion/change.) If our experiential lives consist of a sequence of 
discrete experiences, each presenting something akin to an instantaneous state 
of affairs – such as a thrown ball at a position in its trajectory – it would appear 
to follow that we could not perceptually experience motion. That is, if all we 
experience – all that is presented in experience – is a static state of affairs at one 
time, followed at a subsequent time by a subsequent presentation of a static state 
of affairs, we should not perceptually experience motion. All that would be 
experienced is one static state of affairs at a time. 
 
When proposed as an account of the phenomenal character of experience, the 
snapshot model can appear hopelessly confused. Without saying more, far from 
providing an account of the phenomenology such a view is at odds with the 
perceptual phenomenology. Against such a view, our experience of motion is 
often thought to give rise to an argument for the claim that experience must 
present some non-zero temporal extent. As discussed in the preceding chapter, 
a succinct presentation of this line of argument against the snapshot proposal 
can be constructed from Stern’s (1897: 321-323) writing on temporal experience. 
Stern highlights what is prima facie an inconsistent triad of claims about our 
experience: 
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1. The Snapshot Claim: Experience over time consists of a sequence 
of snapshots, each of which is neutral on whether it presents 
anything of a non-zero temporal extent (or – though this is a more 
committal claim – a snapshot only presents instantaneous content).54 
2. The Static Claim: Any snapshot must be static; we cannot 
experience motion/change in a single – non-temporally extended – 
snapshot presented in experience. 
3. The Motion Claim: Reflection on the phenomenology of 
experience contradicts the idea that we have to infer motion and 
change, we perceptually experience motion and change. 
 
This triad of claims also appears to be captured in a succinct paragraph by 
Dainton when he discusses the visual experience of a bird swooping across the 
sky, although in Dainton’s discussion such a clear distinction is not drawn 
between what I am calling the Static and the Snapshot Claims: 
 
“Even the briefest discernible phases of these visual experiences have a content 
that presents (or represents) a bird in motion [the Motion Claim]. This is one reason 
for supposing that such contents cannot be reduced to contents that are entirely 
static and motion-free [a denial of the conjunction of the Snapshot Claim and the 
Static Claim]: motion is a fundamental and irreducible feature of much visual 
experience…” (Dainton, 2014: 109).  
 
We appear to have a phenomenologically motivated claim, that we do experience 
motion/change, and two other claims which conjunctively make this impossible. 
That is, those accepting the Static and Snapshot Claims must, Stern thinks, deny 
that we can experience motion/change (see Stern, 1897: 321). Stern’s proposed 
solution – and where most proponents of the specious present follow55 – is to 
reject the Snapshot Claim. 
                                               
54 Stern refers to this as the dogma of the momentariness of consciousness. Using the 
terminology of ‘atomic contents’, rather than snapshots, Grube expresses this claim as follows: 
“basic experiences only represent events, or properties instantiated in events, that have a 
duration at or below the coincidence threshold, which precludes the representation of 
perceivable temporal relations between non-simultaneous events” (Grube, 2014: 18). 
55 See, for example, the specious present theories of: Broad (1938); Dainton (2001, 2006, 2008, 
and 2014); Foster (1979, 1962, and 1991); Hoerl (2009, 2013); Grush (2007); James (1890); Lee 
(2014a, 2014b, and 2014c); Phillips (2010, 2011a, 2014a, and 2014b); Rashbrook (2013a); and 
Russell (1992). 
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If we wish to do justice to the temporal phenomenology (that we seem to 
perceptually experience motion and change), then it appears we can dismiss the 
snapshot model as being at odds with the datum. This is not to deny the 
possibility of there being further considerations which could, on reflection, force 
us to adopt an error theory,56 but in the absence of such considerations, or 
without arguments to support them, we can reject the Snapshot Claim and 
endorse the Duration Claim. Yet such an approach is not universally accepted, 
and the utility of posing the argument as a response to an inconsistent triad of 
claims is revealed when considering how some theorists have sought to maintain 
the Snapshot Claim.  
 
 
2. Chuard’s snapshot model of temporal experience 
 
Chuard (2011 and 2017) makes a case for what he calls the snapshot conception 
of temporal experiences. Minimally, the view he espouses is a combination of 
two claims. Firstly, “our streams of consciousness only contain short-lived 
experiential events, arranged in succession” (Chuard, 2017: 121); secondly, “no 
temporal relation between non-simultaneous perceived events figures in the 
content of any such short-lived experiential event” (ibid.). It isn’t clear that such 
a view need be committed to any claim about ‘instants’ as such. It need only be 
that perceptual experiences present no temporal information – what is presented 
in ‘a short-lived experiential event’ is a static state of affairs – as this, I take it, is 
the import of the claim that there is no temporal relation between non-
simultaneous perceived events presented in perceptual experience. 
 
Chuard is quick to clarify that he does not wish to “rule out the continuous and 
dynamic phenomenology we can introspect when hearing melodies or seeing 
changing facial expressions” (ibid.). He continues speaking of the distinctive 
phenomenology “when seeing motion” (ibid.: 125). It would therefore be 
uncharitable to interpret Chuard as endorsing the Snapshot and Static Claims 
while rejecting the Motion Claim, thereby taking his talk of ‘seeing motion’ to 
                                               
56 Reid appears to have something like this in mind when he claims that perception (the 
operations of the senses and consciousness, in his terms) is limited to the present instant (Reid, 
1785, Essay III. Chap.V).  
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be a slip of the tongue on his part. Yet, insofar as there is such a thing as 
perceptually experiencing motion, it isn’t clear that Chuard manages to provide 
an account of it.  
 
In an effort to go beyond an error-theory of perceptual experience – which 
would deny that we do perceive motion/change, even if it strikes us as plausible 
that we do – Chuard says that “the phenomenology we seem to introspect… 
[when we experience motion] reduces to those features of successions of 
snapshots… the experiential properties of snapshots, their temporal 
arrangement, the gradual transitions in their successive contents, our memories 
of previous experiences, and inability to detect gaps and jumps” (ibid.). Yet he 
also insists that memory is not what accounts for the phenomenology when 
experiencing dynamic phenomena, such as motion. He says: “Memories, too, 
play a role: not in accounting for the dynamic phenomenology of sequences of 
snapshots, but our cognitive access to [the phenomenology]…” (ibid.). There is 
a potential confusion here, as – depending upon what cognitive access refers to57 – 
it is not obvious what it would be for there to be phenomenology a subject did 
not have cognitive access to. If memory plays a role in accounting for our 
cognitive access to the phenomenology on Chuard’s account, the reader might 
suppose that memory just does play a role in accounting for the phenomenology. 
At least for the sake of argument, in what follows I will go along with Chuard’s 
statement to the contrary (unless explicitly stated otherwise). 
 
We are left with a view on which the experience of motion is to be accounted 
for in terms of “the experiential properties of snapshots [where ‘no temporal 
relation between non-simultaneous perceived events figure in the content of any 
such short-lived experiential event’], their temporal arrangement, the gradual 
transitions in their successive contents… and inability to detect gaps and jumps” 
                                               
57 If cognitive access is taken to refer to some form of psychological awareness, were this need 
not entail belief, then it might be thought that for there to be such phenomenology there must 
just be such awareness (without this awareness, there would be nothing it is like for the subject). 
However, if cognitive access refers to the subject holding a belief concerning what it is like for 
her, then it may be thought that there can be such phenomenology without the subject holding 
a belief about it; where memory may play a role in forming such a belief. 
53 
 
(ibid.).58 In this view Chuard appears to closely parallel the view of Locke59 
(1690), whom he quotes approvingly as saying that, when seeing motion, we can 
introspect “a constant train of successive ideas” (1690, 14, 6).60 Following Locke, 
Chuard appears to commit himself to a view whereby the experience of motion 
is to be accounted for on the basis of a succession of experiences (/ideas), whose 
temporal structure resembles that of the events a subject appears to perceive.61 
 
Returning to the triad of claims highlighted by Stern, Chuard appears to deny 
that it is inconsistent to appeal to the Static Claim, the Snapshot Claim, and the 
Motion Claim. Yet it is not clear why our experiences, if they are successive 
snapshots presenting static scenes in the way in which Chuard describes, should 
ever lead to the apparent phenomenological datum – the experience of 
motion/change. Chuard tries to account for the experience of motion/change 
through appeal to the temporal arrangement of the snapshots and the gradual 
transitions in what they successively present. Such an account faces a dilemma. 
On the first horn, Chuard would need to grant a role for memory in order to 
explain our awareness of motion – despite his protests to the contrary – where 
this would appear to entail denying that we strictly speaking perceive motion;62 
even then, he would appear to be left unable to explain the distinction between 
perceptible and imperceptible motion. On the second horn, Chuard would need 
to introduce something like an inner-perceptual mechanism which is presented 
                                               
58 Without appealing to a role for memory, Chuard offers a position on which “all there really 
is, is just a succession of short-lived or instantaneous sensory experiences… The 
phenomenology of temporal awareness is to be fully explained, on this view, as a result of the 
successive phenomenology of single experiences enjoyed in close succession” (Chuard, 2011: 9-
10). 
59 One may also find the idea in Locke that we come to experience motion through a 
combination of perception and memory (an idea which is taken up by Reid, in his critique of 
Locke, who recognises that this must push us to denying that we strictly speaking perceive 
motion). However, this appears to be ruled out by Chuard’s explicit claims about the absence of 
a role for memory in our experience of motion. 
60 We might question the introspective evidence Locke and Chuard appear to be appealing to 
here, as they seem to be suggesting that when we reflect upon the nature of our experience, we 
become aware of a series of discrete particular experiences/ideas. This may encounter resistance 
from those theorists, such as Tye (2003), who would deny that we could become aware of any 
properties of the experience itself on the basis of claims about the transparency of experience. 
61 This should be read as the claim that if A occurs before B, and B before C, then the experiential 
snapshot presenting A occurs before the snapshot which presents B, and so on. It is not to claim 
that the subject’s experience and the occurrences she is experiencing structurally match in all 
relevant temporal properties, such as duration. Experience is said to occur in discrete snapshots, 
whereas the occurrences one is experiencing may be thought to be continuous. 
62 This is the case if we assume that memory – and what is presented in experiential recollection 
– is to be characterised as a mental occurrence distinct from perceptual experience. I will clarify 
what the appeal to memory might amount to in what follows. 
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with successive experiential snapshots. As well as being a questionable postulate, 
this would result in a problematic regress rather than an explanatory account. 
 
The first horn. One way to understand the claim that the temporal arrangement of 
snapshots – and the gradual transitions in what they successively present – leads 
to an awareness of motion is by introducing a role for memory. Recall that, on 
Chuard’s view, no temporal relation between non-simultaneous perceived 
events can figure in any given perceptual snapshot. Therefore, in order to be 
aware of motion and any other change over time, it is not sufficient to merely be 
aware of the simultaneous events presented in a single snapshot in isolation. 
When invoking an awareness stretching across such snapshots, we appear to 
reprise a role for memory.  
 
We could mean one of several things when we claim that there is such a role for 
memory. Firstly, and perhaps most obviously, we could take ourselves to be 
singling out episodic memory, claiming that motion is experienced because of a 
comparison that is drawn between what a subject episodically recalls and what 
she is currently perceiving. Appeal to the temporal arrangement of the snapshots 
and the gradual transitions in what they successively present would, on this 
understanding, require holding that memory plays a role in contrasting what an 
earlier perceptual snapshot presented with what is currently presented in 
perceptual experience. On this construal of the role fulfilled by memory we 
cannot strictly speaking be said to perceive motion, as Reid recognised. As 
Chuard wishes to allow that we do perceive motion, we can reject this 
interpretation. 
 
Secondly, we could take the relevant form of memory to be something which 
operates alongside perceptual experience in order for temporally extended 
occurrences to be presented in ongoing experience under different temporal 
modes of presentation. On this understanding, a subject is perceptually 
presented with an experiential snapshot (as that which is present or occurring now) 
in addition to be experientially presented – through this form of memory – with 
what was perceptually presented immediately previously (though this is, unlike 
what is perceptually presented, presented as having occurred immediately 
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previously/pastishly). Through what a subject perceived immediately previously 
being retained, in this sense, a subject may be said to experience motion. 
However, if such a proposal can account for the phenomenology, it does so by 
becoming unrecognisable from a retentional63 account of temporal experience. 
This abandons the core of the snapshot model as the subject is now said to be 
experientially presented with some positive temporal extent, albeit under 
differing temporal modes of presentation. As a result, we can reject this 
suggestion from current consideration. 
 
Finally, an appeal to memory could be made on the snapshot proposal in order 
to highlight a role for the causal influence of prior experiential snapshots on 
subsequent experiential snapshots. This is not to be confused with the causal 
role we may believe different stages of visual perception play in a subject coming 
to experience some state of affairs, were – roughly – we may think of a first stage 
(light hitting the lens) causing and then giving way to a second (the lens focusing 
the light onto the retina), and then to a third (an electrical impulse travelling 
from the retina along the optic nerve), and so on. Rather, the suggestion may be 
that what is presented in an experiential snapshot may be retained in some form, 
where this may be exploited at a later time. Rather than thinking that the 
information/experiential snapshot has played its role and is done, it may be 
claimed that there is an important sense in which it is still available in working 
memory (in contrast to the stages in the simplified model of how our eyes work, 
above). Through being retained, in this sense, a previous experiential snapshot 
may exert some causal influence on a later experiential snapshot, resulting in the 
latter presenting a stimulus as being in motion. On this reading we are presented 
with an account which appears to be a version of the dynamic snapshot model 
of temporal experience; as such, we can delay evaluating whether or not this 
proposal is successful until the subsequent discussion of the DSM (in sections 
3-6). 
 
When granting a role for memory, a theorist would also have to explain how her 
account is fit to face a further challenge. Recall how Broad highlights the 
                                               
63 On a retentional account, the experiencing of motion/change occurs within experiential 
episodes lacking temporal extension – or having minimal temporal extension – which present 
greater temporal intervals (see the brief discussion in section 1 of the introduction). 
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difference between our experience of the second-hand and the hour-hand of the 
clock. This highlights a commonly accepted distinction between perceptible 
(experienced) motion and imperceptible (inferred) motion. How we construe 
the role fulfilled by memory will, on this first horn, alter the account’s 
explanation of the difference between the case of the hour-hand and the second-
hand.  
 
On the first proposed understanding of a role for memory, one worry is that 
Chuard’s snapshot model would predict that there is no in-principle distinction 
between our experiential awareness of the movement of the hour-hand and the 
second-hand – that both should be experienced as moving. The awareness of 
motion in the case of the second-hand would be explained in virtue of seeing 
the second-hand at different points in its rotation – within some relative degree 
of spatial proximity – at different times, while remembering its earlier location(s); 
but, of course, the hour-hand will also have been seen at different (discriminable) 
points in its rotation at different times while its earlier location(s) is remembered. 
Hence, we should expect to be experientially aware of the hour-hand as moving 
in some sense, be it experienced as moving uniformly, like the second-hand 
(albeit more slowly), or only when it comes to occupy a discriminable spatial 
location in its rotation (where this may be an experience of discontinuous or 
‘jumpy’ motion, but an experience of motion nonetheless). 
 
An account which makes use of the second or third readings of the role of 
memory may allow Chuard to avoid this problem. There would, on these 
readings, be a difference between the case of the second-hand, when change is 
discriminable between two successive snapshots (where there is no felt gap), and 
the case of the hour-hand, when change is only discriminable after many 
snapshots (where there is a felt gap). While these readings may allow us to 
explain the distinction between perceptible and imperceptible motion, they both 
risk abandoning the version of snapshot model that Chuard appears to favour.  
 
On the first horn of this dilemma the role fulfilled by memory appears to have 
one of three possible consequences: that we cannot, strictly speaking, perceive 
motion; that we abandon the core of a snapshot model, becoming a retentional 
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model of temporal experience instead; or that we allow a role for the causal 
influence of prior experiential snapshots on later experiential snapshots (a 
suggestion to be developed in the subsequent section). 
 
The second horn. The only way in which a theorist can explain how the temporal 
arrangement of snapshots – and the gradual transitions in what they successively 
present – can lead to an experience of motion without appealing to some form of 
memory, appears to be by introducing an inner-perceptual mechanism (or 
homunculus). If motion is not presented within a single snapshot – and recall 
that, for Chuard, it seems it cannot be – the experience of motion could only 
arise through a series of such experiential snapshots. For such a series of 
experiential snapshots to be experienced, we need to posit an experiencer.  
 
To be clear, in this context to be experienced does not merely mean to be lived 
through, or to be an event of which one is the subject, which would be to use 
Hinton’s very general notion of experience (Hinton, 1973). We want to account for 
the phenomenology of motion, for the distinctive phenomenology which arises 
from perceiving smooth succession, rather than merely claiming that a subject 
lives through such a succession. There are serious questions about how such 
experienced motion is supposed to arise on a snapshot model, which Chuard 
recognises: 
 
“It’s here that the snapshot view resorts to cinematic metaphors: not by assuming 
some sort of projector, let alone some ‘Cartesian’ spectator, but only in the sense 
that the pace of successions of experiential states… is crucial in accounting for 
their phenomenology…” (Chuard, 2017: 125). 
 
In the analogy with cinema, through experiencing a series of static snapshots, 
presented at the relevant pace, we are said to experience motion. Yet, for there 
to be a probative analogy with the case of cinematic depiction, there would have 
to be an inner-perceptual mechanism directed at the successive experiential 
snapshots, for which the pace of successions makes some difference.   
 
Chuard’s insistence that we needn’t introduce a spectator serves as little 
consolation. As spectators, the pace of the transitions and the similarities in what 
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is presented by successive snapshots explains why we experience motion in the 
cinematic case when supplemented by contingent facts about our visual 
mechanisms. There is an empirical story to be offered concerning our visual 
apparatus which explains why the pace of successive stills makes a 
phenomenological difference (experiencing seamless movement rather than 
merely experiencing depictions of bodies in similar – but slightly different – 
positions in succession). Only when positing such a spectator is there a probative 
analogy with the pace at which experiential snapshots are supposed to be 
presented, and the gradual changes in content, making a difference as to whether 
motion is experienced or not.  
 
We not only depend on the idea of some inner-perceptual mechanism observing 
experiential snapshots, on this reading of Chuard’s proposal, we also have the 
further question of how this inner-perceptual mechanism gives rise to the 
experience of motion. Suppose the snapshot theorist is happy to appeal to an 
inner-perceptual mechanism which is, in some sense, presented with some 
number of snapshots at a time. The inner-perceptual mechanism is in a sense 
thereby presented with occurrences of a non-zero temporal extent. If the 
theorist is willing to accept this in order to accommodate the experience of 
motion, it is tempting to think that we should provide this explanation one stage 
earlier and say that a non-zero temporal extent is simply what is presented in 
experience – rather than a single snapshot at a time – thereby rendering an appeal 
to an inner-perceptual mechanism redundant.  
 
Suppose that the snapshot theorist is not willing to invoke an inner-perceptual 
mechanism that is presented with some number of experiential snapshots (and 
thereby a non-zero temporal extent). To appeal to an inner-perceptual 
mechanism which is not presented with a non-zero temporal extent – it only 
being presented with a snapshot at a time – merely pushes the explanatory 
project a step further back. We would then require an explanation of how such 
inner-perceptual snapshots give rise to the experience of motion; to insist upon 
there being ‘snapshots all the way down’ would only present a problematic 
regress. To simply insist that we do not require such an inner-perceptual 
mechanism appears to result in the account providing no explanatory 
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contribution: the subject would simply be perceptually aware of a given static 
state of affairs at one time and another static state of affairs at a subsequent time. 
When we ask how this series of experiential static snapshots can give rise to the 
phenomenology associated with perceived motion, simply telling us that it is 
through their being presented at a pace is insufficient.  
 
The second horn of the dilemma can be summarised as follows. Without 
depending on the cinematic analogy we do not appear to be given any reason to 
think that such a series of experiential static snapshots would give rise to the 
experience of motion. In cinematic depiction the role of the perceiver is crucial, 
and yet Chuard appears to recognise that introducing a perceiver of experiential 
snapshots leads to a questionable theoretical posit (the inner-perceptual 
mechanism presented with some number of snapshots at a time) or a perilous 
regress (‘snapshots all the way down’). 
 
Chuard’s snapshot model falls foul of one of two horns. Without granting a role 
to memory, we appear to depend on a problematic analogy with cinematic 
depiction. Granting an irreducible role for memory we appear to have three 
alternatives. First: deny that we can perceive motion or change. Second: abandon 
the idea that no temporal relation between non-simultaneously perceived events 
figure in the content of any short-lived experiential event; this is no longer to 
offer a snapshot model. Third: hold that there is an important role for the causal 
influence of prior experiential snapshots on subsequent snapshots. In the 
following section I turn to consider the DSM; this can be read as an attempt to 
develop the latter proposal. 
 
 
3. The dynamic snapshot model 
 
In recent work Prosser (2013, 2016, and 2017) presents a DSM of temporal 
experience which accepts the Snapshot Claim, but – in an effort to accommodate 
the Motion Claim – rejects the Static Claim. The DSM is an interesting proposal 
in and of itself, as it presents an account of how the inconsistent triad of claims 
can be resolved which has gone under-appreciated throughout much of the 
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Twentieth Century (in part because the Snapshot and Static Claims are rarely 
explicitly distinguished between). In the current context the DSM is particularly 
interesting because it illustrates one way of blocking the Stern-inspired argument 
for the Duration Claim.  
 
As discussed briefly in Chapter 1, Prosser presses back against the argument for 
the Duration Claim from the inconsistent triad of claims, saying that such an 
argument assumes that “[a]n instantaneous content cannot include anything that 
can only be detected over a non-instantaneous interval”, but that this “conflates 
the properties of the stimulus that are necessary for motion detection with the 
content of the resulting experience” (Prosser, 2016: 121-2).64 That is, in more 
crude terms, it simply assumes that such an experiential snapshot would have to 
be static without argument. 
 
Prosser appeals to how we define instantaneous rates of change when theorising 
about the velocity of moving bodies. He suggests that, in an analogous way, that 
which is presented in perceptual experience could involve what is the case in the 
external world at a time, such as the spatial locations of various stimuli, as well 
as including something like an instantaneous vector rate of change assigned to 
those stimuli.65 Prosser argues that this experiential vector could feature in what 
is presented as being the case at a time, even if there needs to be a temporally 
extended external stimulus in order to produce this (perhaps requiring the causal 
influence of prior experiential snapshots on later experiential snapshots). 
 
Valtteri Arstila (2018) has independently developed a DSM of temporal 
experience, taking inspiration from discussions in the empirical literature (Di 
Lollo, 1980; Di Lollo & Wilson, 1978), as well as Le Poidevin’s (2007) discussion. 
Like Prosser, Arstila says that the motivation typically given for the Duration 
Claim is that, without it, experiences of continuous motion and change cannot 
                                               
64 Prosser says that arguments of the Stern-inspired form “…fail because they mistakenly assume 
that an experience with an instantaneous content can have, in its content, only that which could 
occur instantaneously” (Prosser, 2017: 148). 
65 It is worth noting that Prosser only needs something roughly analogous to this notion, but 
which has application in the experiential case. Prosser need not be read as suggesting that 
mathematically defined vectors feature in experience. 
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be accounted for.66 Against this, Arstila suggests that “the experience of motion 
[can be] explained in a framework where the contents can, subjectively speaking, 
be confined to an instant. This follows from the fact that… we can have an 
experience of motion without an object appearing to us as being in different 
places at different times” (Arstila, 2018: 290; emphasis added).67  
 
A common thread in Arstila’s and Prosser’s proposals is an appeal to Le 
Poidevin’s discussion of the waterfall illusion. The waterfall illusion is a 
particular type of visual illusion – a form of motion aftereffect – which a subject 
can experience after watching a moving stimulus for some period of time 
(remaining stationary and looking straight ahead), such as a waterfall, and then 
fixating her gaze on some stationary stimulus, such as a riverbank. At this point 
the stationary stimulus is described as seeming – illusorily – to be moving in the 
opposite direction to the originally perceived moving stimulus, while also 
seeming to stay in the same position.68 That is, the illusion is described in terms 
of the subject’s experience presenting an object/stimulus – the river bank – as 
remaining in the same spatial location while yet being in motion. Prosser follows 
Le Poidevin in suggesting that cases such as this demonstrate a potential role for 
two perceptual mechanisms: the perception of successive states of the world – 
like static snapshots – and the perception of pure movement – adding dynamism 
to the static snapshots. 69 Prosser suggests that the latter might operate 
independently of the aforementioned perception of successive states. 
                                               
66 Arstila argues that even if the specious present – or, any account endorsing the Duration Claim 
– is supposed to describe the phenomenology, rather than explaining it, the dynamic snapshot 
model he offers undermines this motivation for appealing to the Duration Claim (see Arstila, 
2018: 297). I argue that this is not the case in sections 4, 5, and 6. 
67 Distinguishing his view from that of Prosser and Le Poidevin, Arstila claims that “all temporal 
phenomenology can be explained … by appealing to the existence of automatic, encapsulated, 
and domain-specific mechanisms” (Arstila, 2018: 290). From here onwards, unless explicitly 
indicated otherwise, I focus upon what is common between Arstila’s and Prosser’s DSMs. 
68 Gregory (1966) describes such illusory cases as ‘paradoxical’. Discussing a number of 
aftereffects, he reports: “The illusory movement may be paradoxical: [a stimulus] may expand 
and yet not get any bigger. Or, shrink but not get any smaller. It is changing and not changing. This 
sounds impossible, and it is impossible for real objects; but … what holds for real objects may 
not hold for perception once we suffer illusions” (Gregory, 1966: 109; emphasis in original). 
69 Empirical support can be found in sources such as Nakayama and Tyler (1981), who try to 
isolate visual movement sensitivity from visual position sensitivity in a series of psychophysical 
studies. On the basis of their results, the authors conclude that “[b]ecause differential motion 
sensitivity is so much better than position sensitivity when the comparison is made over [what 
is, within the study, considered to be] very large distances… it is unlikely to be derived from the 
psychophysically measured position sensitivity… [and it is] best seen as a system wired in parallel 
to position sensitivity” (Nakayama & Tyler, 1981: 432). However, further empirical studies 
appear to suggest that, though there may be something akin to a mechanism for detecting pure 
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Postulating two distinct perceptual mechanisms, the waterfall illusion can be 
explained in terms of the mechanism for perceiving pure movement operating 
while the subject looks at a stationary state of affairs. This gives rise to the 
illusion that the riverbank is in motion while remaining in the same spatial 
location. Regardless of whether an interlocutor is satisfied with this explanation 
of the waterfall illusion, Prosser suggests that if there is such a mechanism for 
the perception of pure movement, then the perception of motion would not 
necessarily require some interval to be presented in perceptual experience.70 
 
The reasoning goes as follows: That there is such a system for perceiving pure 
motion entails that “experiencing motion does not essentially involve 
experiencing the object as being at different places at different times” (Prosser, 
2016: 124). The position of some stimulus (and hence any change in its position), 
and that it is in motion, would be independently specified by distinct perceptual 
mechanisms. As acknowledged in Chapter 1, a subject need not, therefore, have 
an experience presenting an object at two distinct spatial locations at two times 
in order to experience motion.71 As a consequence, Prosser argues that we 
needn’t suppose that experience presents a subject with some minimal interval 
in order to explain the experience of motion;72 we should not simply assume the 
Static Claim. 
 
If it has been assumed that in order to experience motion an experience must 
present an object at two discriminable locations at two times (plausibly within 
some other specified limits), proponents of the DSM use the waterfall illusion 
                                               
motion (irrespective of positional sensitivity), there may also be a role for the detection of motion 
based on positional sensitivity (Tayama, 2000, and Lappin et al., 2009).  
70 At least on a representational account of perceptual experience. Prosser says that this could 
also be accepted by other accounts of perceptual experience, though more might have to be said 
in this regard. 
71 It may be that the subject needs to be experiencing over a temporally extended interval of 
time, but what is presented in experience need not – for Prosser – be temporally extended. The 
former claim is acknowledged by Prosser, when he says: “It would, of course, take time for the 
brain to detect motion…” (Prosser, 2017: 149). 
72 I will argue that this does not straightforwardly follow (in section 4), but there might be a 
further problem here. Prosser appeals to distinct visual mechanisms for position sensitivity and 
motion detection in order to suggest that we may be experientially presented with a snapshot 
with a vector ‘painted’ onto it. Even if such distinct mechanisms could play an explanatory role, 
it is not clear that there are distinct mechanisms corresponding to each sensory modality, to be 
appealed to in all cases of experienced change; it is also not obvious that such mechanisms allow 
for an explanation of other visually perceived changes, such as changes in colour. 
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to reject this assumption, as reasoned above. Their riposte is to say that such a 
change in location is what is (usually) required in the world in order to lead to 
an experience of motion – this is necessary for the stimulus to be in motion and 
is typically required in order for a subject to experience motion – but it does not 
follow that this is presented in experience. 
 
It is worth stressing that, for all that has been said, the DSM might outline a 
possibility in logical space, but this is not to say that the reader is motivated to 
endorse this account rather than an account which endorses the Duration Claim 
(thereby rejecting the Snapshot Claim). In the following three sections, I argue 
that there is an absence of motivation for the DSM: that the empirical literature 
does not provide independent support for endorsing the Snapshot Claim; that 
reflection on the phenomenology and comparisons with the visuospatial case 
supports endorsing the Duration Claim and not the Snapshot Claim; and finally, 
that there are no persuasive theoretical considerations which pressure theorists 
towards endorsing the Snapshot Claim. 
 
 
4. Mechanisms and phenomenology: no support from cognitive science 
 
Arstila, Le Poidevin, and Prosser each argue that the perception of motion is not 
reducible to the perception of a change of spatial location, using empirical 
findings in order to suggest that there is “some degree of independence between 
the computation of motion and the computation of position” (Prosser, 2016: 
125). These theorists claim that there are distinct perceptual mechanisms for 
tracking the location of a stimulus and for the detection of motion; the further 
claim appears to be that such findings in cognitive science support an appeal to 
the DSM. I foresee two broad concerns with this argumentative strategy. 
 
Firstly, a proponent of the Stern-inspired argument need not disagree that there 
are such distinct mechanisms. It remains far from obvious what an empirical 
story on the level of such mechanisms can tell us about how we should 
characterise the phenomenal character of experience. This appears to be 
Flanagan’s (1998) point, when he says: “Suppose that neuroscientists discover 
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that consciousness is in fact realised like a movie reel consisting of individual 
images, the moments of consciousness, with small separations between them, 
the gaps. It is not clear that this would or should have any impact upon what we 
say about how consciousness seems from a first-person point of view” 
(Flanagan, 1998: 89). Accepting that there are two distinct perceptual 
mechanisms for tracking location and for detecting motion does not provide any 
independent motivation for endorsing the Snapshot Claim over the Duration 
Claim, as these are claims concerning phenomenology. The second issue 
concerns the appeal to the waterfall illusion.  
 
 
4. 1. The waterfall illusion 
 
The snapshot theorist asserts that cases such as the waterfall illusion 
demonstrate that the experience of motion can occur without the experience of 
a change in spatial location. However, granting that a subject need not be 
presented with an object changing its spatial location in order to experience 
motion, it does not follow that a subject could be perceptually presented with 
motion without being presented with an occurrence of a non-zero interval. 
Contrary to what Prosser and Arstila suggest, it simply does not follow that the 
experience of motion is not in and of itself something with a fundamentally 
temporally extended phenomenology; that motion/change as it is experienced 
seems processive, as something occurring over time. All that cases such as the 
waterfall illusion demonstrate is that motion can be experienced in the absence 
of an experience of a change in spatial location; it does not entail that motion can 
be experienced in the absence of an experience presenting a temporal extent.  
 
The dynamic snapshot theorist will want to insist that a subject can be 
perceptually presented with motion without being presented with a non-zero 
temporal extent. The disagreement here depends on how we are to cash out the 
phenomenology in cases of perceived motion as well as cases such as the 
waterfall illusion. The dynamic snapshot theorist appears to assume that the 
waterfall illusion is to be cashed out in terms of something like a stimulus being 
presented as occupying a position at a time, and subsequently being presented 
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as occupying that position at subsequent times, while seeming to be in motion 
at each time. This might not be quite right. We might instead characterise the 
waterfall illusion in terms of apparent motion and stasis over time; motion and 
stasis (apparent or veridical) being phenomena which seem processive and to be 
occurring over time.  
 
The pertinent issue concerns what could decide between these two ways of 
characterising the phenomenology. It would support the claim that motion 
seems to be processive and occurring over time if there is a distinction to be drawn 
– from reflection upon the perceptual phenomenology – between cases like the 
waterfall illusion and cases in which a subject veridically perceives motion. The 
snapshot theorist’s proposal is not well placed to account for such a 
phenomenological distinction, because in each case – the veridical experience of 
motion and the waterfall illusion – they would postulate an experiential snapshot 
which presents a subject with a spatial arrangement of stimuli and an experiential 
motion vector (assigned to certain stimuli). Whether there is a change in location 
or not – whether the experience is of motion and a change in location, or a case 
such as the waterfall illusion where there is motion without a change in location 
– would only be revealed across some series of snapshots.  
 
If the waterfall illusion is best described in terms of the riverbank seeming to be 
in motion while seeming to remain in the same spatial location, we have to say 
that there is something it is like for an object to be presented as remaining in a 
given spatial location or as changing its spatial location. Because the snapshot 
model appears to rule out the very possibility of a change of location being 
presented in perceptual experience, if this is the best way to characterise the 
phenomenology then the snapshot model would be poorly placed to account for 
the very illusion that is often used in order to motivate its introduction. It would 
be no help to characterise the illusion in terms of perceiving motion while also 
failing to perceive an object changing location. Talk about failing to perceive an 
object changing location would suggest that there can be success in perceiving 
an object changing location, which is something that the proponent of the DSM 
denies. Put another way, on the DSM all perceptual experience could be equally 
characterised as failing to perceive an object changing location; so this 
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characterisation cannot account for a phenomenological difference between the 
illusion and the veridical perception of an object in motion.73 
 
 
4. 2. Arstila and Di Lollo 
 
Arstila appeals to the empirical findings of Di Lollo in order to bolster his 
argument for the DSM. The relevant findings concern an experiment in which 
Di Lollo (1980, and Di Lollo and Wilson, 1978) presented subjects with twenty-
four dots/flashes on a five-by-five matrix. The subjects’ task was to identify the 
missing dot. In the most relevant experiment, the dots were shown in two 
flashes. The leading display comprised of twelve dots, chosen at random from 
twenty-five possible ones; after its offset an empty screen was displayed for 10 
milliseconds, followed by the trailing display comprised of twelve dots, chosen 
at random from the thirteen remaining possible dots, which was also displayed 
for 10 milliseconds. Di Lollo and colleagues investigated subjects’ success in 
identifying the missing dot when the duration of the leading display varied (10, 
40, 80, 120, 160, 200 milliseconds). 
 
The results showed that the subjects performed almost without error in the 
conditions where the leading display lasted 80 milliseconds or less; for longer 
leading display durations, the performance was markedly worse and decreased 
quickly. When the leading display lasted 120 milliseconds, almost eighty percent 
misidentified dots belonging to it. Di Lollo’s finding is that success in this task 
(which he takes to be dependent upon the perceptual availability of the stimuli74) 
depends on the interval separating the leading and trailing stimulus’ onset – the 
time that has passed since the stimulus was first presented/noticed – rather than 
                                               
73 Perhaps the snapshot theorist would wish to appeal to vectors for change in location, in 
addition to ‘motion’ vectors, in order to account for the waterfall illusion. If it makes sense to 
appeal to vectors for change in location and vectors for motion – and I am not convinced that 
appeal to location vectors in addition to motion detectors does make sense, as I am not 
convinced that a stimulus could seem to be changing its location without seeming to be in 
motion – perhaps the DSM can account for the waterfall illusion. But this alone has no positive 
dialectical force; it does not speak in favour of the Snapshot Claim as opposed to the Duration 
Claim. 
74 Di Lollo claims that performance in this task “depends critically on the simultaneous 
perceptual availability of all twenty-four dots” (Di Lollo and Wilson, 1978: 1607). This is 
accounted for by making perceptual availability a matter of processing that begins with the onset 
of a stimulus and takes a certain amount of time. 
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the interval separating the leading stimulus’ offset and the trailing stimulus’ 
onset. 
 
Arstila takes from Di Lollo the suggestion that “the presentation of a stimulus 
triggers sensory coding mechanisms responsible for processing and 
identification of the stimulus. These processes last roughly 100 milliseconds and 
the stimulus is perceptually available to a subject during that time” (Arstila, 2018: 
293). Di Lollo plausibly demonstrates a relationship between the duration of a 
visual stimulus and the duration of the perceptual availability of that stimulus for 
a subject. If we take perceptual availability to be determined by the stimulus 
onset (and duration of the stimulus), we might say that any given stimulus is 
perceptually available for minimally 100 milliseconds,75 and if the stimulus is 
presented for 100 milliseconds or more then it is simply perceptually available 
for the duration that it is presented. For example, a 10-millisecond presentation 
of a stimulus is perceptually available for 100 milliseconds, a 100-millisecond 
stimulus is perceptually available for 100 milliseconds, a 150-millisecond 
stimulus is perceptually available for 150 milliseconds.76 
 
Arstila takes this finding to be problematic for specious present theorists: “The 
doctrine of the specious present… seems to be committed to the view that what 
matters for the perceptual or intentional availability of the stimulus is its offset” 
(Arstila, 2018: 293). However, there are at least two readings of perceptual 
availability to be pulled apart; neither should worry the specious present theorist 
who is at pains to maintain the Duration Claim. First, if we take perceptual 
availability to be a matter of informational persistence,77 i.e. the persistence of 
representations posited in an information processing account of perception, 
then it is not clear what bearing the duration that this information persists for 
has on either the Snapshot or Duration Claims, these being claims concerning 
the phenomenology. Arstila may be assuming that the specious present is to be 
                                               
75 Arstila says “…if a stimulus lasts only 10 milliseconds, it is perceptually available for an extra 
90 milliseconds or so” (Arstila, 2018: 293). On the minimum duration of visual experience also 
see Efron (1970). 
76 This is an oversimplification and it is not precisely what Di Lollo’s findings support (for critical 
discussion see Coltheart, 1980: 20), but it is an acceptable model for the purpose of the present 
illustration. 
77 On the distinction between informational and phenomenal persistence, see Coltheart (1980) 
and Phillips (2011b). 
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appealed to on the level of information processing (see Arstila, 2018: 297), but 
this is not obviously how most theorists appealing to the specious present should 
be interpreted and importantly it is not how we are to understand the PSP or 
the Duration Claim in the present context. 
 
Second, if we take perceptual availability to be a matter of visual/phenomenal 
persistence, i.e. the duration a stimulus is presented as persisting in one’s 
perceptual experience, then this need not trouble the theorist wishing to 
maintain the Duration Claim either. We can maintain the Duration claim and 
grant that a stimulus, despite only being displayed on a screen for 10 
milliseconds, is presented as persisting for 100 milliseconds. We need to 
distinguish between the properties of the stimulus and that which is 
subsequently presented in perceptual experience (as Prosser says in his 
discussion). Since the Snapshot and Duration Claims are presented as claims 
about the latter, we might say that what matters is not the offset of the stimulus, 
but rather the ‘offset’ of that which is presented in experience. The specious 
present theorist can allow that stimuli displayed for 10 milliseconds are 
presented as persisting for 100 milliseconds in experience. Given that the leading 
display, though only displayed for 10 milliseconds, is presented in experience as 
persisting for 100 milliseconds, it may be presented in experience as overlapping 
in time with the trailing display (given a 10 millisecond delay between the offset 
of the leading and onset of the trailing display). We can therefore allow that all 
24 flashes will be simultaneously perceptually available for a finite interval; this 
may explain the subjects’ success in identifying the missing flash. This is a 
simplified model, but importantly all of the above could be granted without 
being in any tension with the Duration Claim. 
 
 
4. 3. Additional findings 
 
Aside from the studies Prosser and Arstila explicitly discuss, VanRullen and 
Koch (2003) may be read as an additional influence behind the DSM. Among 
other empirical findings, the authors appeal to a minimal interstimulus interval 
for which two successively presented stimuli are consistently judged – in 
69 
 
subjective reports – as being presented simultaneously78. The authors suggest 
that such stimuli, which are presented successively within this interval and are 
yet judged by subjects as being presented simultaneously, can be thought of as 
“occurring within a single discrete ‘epoch’ of processing time” (VanRullen and 
Koch, 2003: 207). However, regardless of the merit of this suggestion, the 
question of whether or not that which is presented in experience is temporally 
extended is orthogonal to the question of whether perceptual experience (or 
perceptual processing) is discrete or continuous. The Duration Claim is neutral 
as to whether what is presented in experience is presented continuously or in 
discrete pulses.  
 
Crick and Koch (2003) might be read as a further source of support for the 
DSM, insofar as they claim “… that conscious awareness (for vision) is a series 
of static snapshots, with motion ‘painted’ on them” (Crick and Koch, 2003: 122). 
Note, however, that this is followed immediately by the following claim. “By this 
we mean that perception occurs in discrete epochs” (ibid.). As said previously, 
the question of whether perception is discrete or continuous is orthogonal to 
the question of whether a temporal extent is presented in perceptual experience.  
 
The evidence that Crick and Koch cite in support of the claim that conscious 
experience (for vision) is a series of snapshots (Zihl et al., 1983, and Hess et al., 
1989) are clinical discussions of cerebral akinetopsia (visual motion blindness).79 
These discussions provide further empirical support for the claim that the visual 
experience of motion is dissociable from the visual tracking of location. Zihl et 
al. also demonstrate that cerebral akinetopsia cannot be attributed to an 
impairment in temporal acuity, as other temporal measures are not diminished80. 
Having already granted that the experience of motion is dissociable from an 
experience of a change of location, this evidence does not speak in favour of 
either view regarding the temporal extent of that which is presented in 
                                               
78 This is to say that the stimuli were presented successively in the experimental paradigm. I do 
not mean to claim that they are presented as successive in experience and are yet judged by the 
subject as being experienced simultaneously. 
79 See Zeki (1991) for a review of the syndrome. 
80 One example of a temporal measure that is not impaired in the motion blind subject is the 
critical flicker fusion measure. As discussed by Hirsch and Sherrick (1961), the critical flicker 
fusion measure is the minimum temporal interval that must separate two visual stimuli in order 
for the perceptual experience of temporal order. 
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perceptual experience. Such clinical discussions of visual motion blindness do 
not provide support for the DSM, insofar as this is expressed as a proposal 
concerning the temporal extent, or lack thereof, of what is presented in 
perceptual experience. 
 
One final point worth considering is whether the empirical literature might 
weigh against the DSM. In Alan Johnston’s (2017) discussion of motion 
perception, he appeals to the wagon wheel effect in cinematic representation.81 
At a frame rate of 24 per second, stagecoach wheels can appear to the audience 
to rotate in the reverse direction to their true direction. This effect is explained 
by the fact that the shortest path between the spokes in subsequent frames is in 
the physically reversed direction. In unmediated viewing of rotating wagon 
wheels there does not appear to be a rate of rotation at which we typically 
experience such a reverse in direction.82 On this basis, Johnston says: “The idea 
that our visual experience is made up of a series of instants is not supported, 
otherwise the experience of the wagon wheel effect would be just as salient and 
persistent for wheels in the real world as it is for moving wheels seen in the 
cinema” (Johnston, 2017: 280).83 
 
If the wagon wheel illusion in cinematic representation is to be explained by the 
fact that the shortest path between the spokes in subsequent frames is in the 
physically reversed direction, then, assuming a snapshot model of temporal 
experience, we might expect that, in unmediated viewing of rotating wagon 
                                               
81 It might appear as though Johnston could support an appeal to the DSM, when he says that 
“measures computed at an instant can provide information about the recent past, present and 
the future” (Johnston, 2017: 278). Yet he takes this to be a claim about computation and not 
about the visual representation which results from any such computation, and so does not appear 
to take this claim to support an appeal to DSMs. 
82 This claim is consistent with evidence that some rotating patterns can appear to reverse their 
direction of rotation under some conditions. As put by Johnston: “Real wagon wheels do not 
typically appear to reverse at a particular rate of rotation, so it is unlikely that the retinal image is 
temporally sampled in any direct sense (Kline et al., 2004). However, rotating patterns can appear 
to reverse their direction of rotation in some conditions (Schouten, 1967; Purves et al., 1996; 
VanRullen et al., 2005). These reversals are not sustained but rather alternate with periods of 
forward motion” (Johnston, 2017: 279). 
83 VanRullen and Koch say that “motion reversals are difficult to explain without assuming a 
discrete processing component acting during, or before, the perception of motion” (VanRullen 
and Koch, 2003: 208). One can accept such an assumption regarding components of the 
perceptual processing without thereby assuming the Snapshot Claim. As put previously, the 
Duration Claim is neutral on the issue of whether what is perceptually presented is presented 
continuously or in discrete pulses. 
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wheels, there would be a rate of rotation at which the shortest path between the 
spokes in subsequent perceptual snapshots is in the physically reversed direction. 
This does not appear to be the case. That there is no particular rate of rotation 
at which we typically experience such a reverse in direction in unmediated 
reviewing reveals an absence of evidence in favour of the DSM where one might 
expect to find it. While the waterfall illusion is often taken to motivate an appeal 
to the DSM, the absence of the wagon wheel illusion, in unmediated viewing, 
appears to weigh against such an appeal. 
 
Findings arising from the empirical literature do not support a version of the 
DSM over an account which endorses the Duration Claim. That there may be 
two distinct perceptual mechanisms – one for tracking location and one for 
detecting motion – does not tell us how we are to characterise the 
phenomenology. It does not follow from the claim that a subject can experience 
motion without experience presenting a stimulus changing its spatial location 
that a subject can experience motion without experience presenting some 
temporal extent. If anything, reflection on the phenomenology in cases of 
perceived motion supports adherence to the Duration Claim; the Snapshot 
Claim remains unmotivated. 
 
 
5. Minima sensibilia: no support from phenomenology 
 
One may wonder whether the DSM is supported by reflection on the 
phenomenology, if not by the empirical literature.84 I argue that quite the 
contrary is true; reflection on the phenomenology reveals an absence of evidence 
for the Snapshot Claim where one would expect to find it. As a result, there is 
                                               
84 It may be thought that claims such as those from Chuard and Locke (see section 2) suggest 
that such support is there to be found. This also appears to be implicit in how Kelly sets up what 
he calls the puzzle of temporal experience: “How is it possible for us to have experiences as of 
continuous, dynamic, temporally structured, unified events given that we start with (what at least 
seems to be) a sequence of independent and static snapshots of the world at a time?” (Kelly, 
2005: 210). It is not forced upon us to start as Kelly does. I argue that it is incorrect to claim that 
we seem to be presented with a sequence of independent and static snapshots of the world; this 
would also appear to go against the motivation we have for invoking the metaphor for our 
ongoing experience as ‘stream-like’ (see James, 1890: 159, and Rashbrook, 2013b, for 
discussion). 
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no compelling reason, from reflection upon the phenomenology, to posit such 
experiential snapshots.  
 
When theorizing about temporal experience, Prosser warns us not to confuse 
the properties of the stimulus necessary for detection by one’s perceptual 
mechanisms with the properties presented in experience. Although there may 
need to be a temporally extended stimulus in order for a subject to subsequently 
undergo an experience presenting motion (and plausibly in order for there to be 
an experience presenting anything, be it light, a sound, or a tactual sensation), 
Prosser says that it does not follow that there must be a temporal extent 
presented in experience. Regardless of whether or not this follows, we might 
wonder how plausible the alternative is. To demonstrate, consider what we can 
say about the visuospatial analogue.  
 
The visuospatial variant of Prosser’s warning would be as follows. Though it is 
plausible that there must be a spatially extended stimulus in order for a visual 
experience of a phenomenon such as variation in colour over some spatial 
extent, it does not follow that experience presents a spatial extent. Rather than 
holding that a subject has an experience presenting some variation in colour over 
the surface of a desk (a spatially extended object), the suggestion could be that a 
subject has many experiences (at the same time), each presenting something akin 
to a colour at no spatial extent (or at some minimal spatial extent). Call this a 
form of phenomenal atomism,85 where together a number of experiences each 
presenting no spatial extent – or some minimal extent – account for the subject’s 
perceptual phenomenology (even if this is pretheoretically described as an 
experience of variation in colour over a spatially extended desk). Irrespective of 
                                               
85 I use the terminology of ‘phenomenal atomism’ to pick out a view on which the experience 
of some particular thing, spatially or temporally extended (such as the desk, or the wave of a 
hand), is to be accounted for in virtue of multiple experiences each presenting no positive extent, 
or the extent of the minimum sensible. Such an appeal to experiential/phenomenal ‘atoms’ is 
also made, and put to a similar purpose in a discussion of snapshot models, by Grube (2014). 
However, in the context of the current discussion I believe that Grube grants too much to the 
snapshot theorist (particularly, allowing that Chuard’s appeal to the pace at which snapshots are 
presented and the gradual transitions in content is sufficient to account for the experience of 
motion/succession). The lack of an explicit distinction between the properties of the stimulus 
necessary for perceptual detection and the properties subsequently presented in experience may 
also leave Grube open to a counter-argument from Prosser (along the lines of the argument 
Prosser offers against the Stern-inspired argument, above). This is something I pre-empt in the 
line of argument I offer, in a manner I imagine Grube would be happy with. 
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what follows from the possibility of perceiving variation in colour over some 
spatial extent, what would be the motivation for denying that experience 
presents a spatial extent? It does not appear as though there is any motivation 
for supposing the alternative picture of phenomenal atomism.  
 
In fact, there is motivation for not supposing such phenomenal atomism, which 
is evident when we turn to consider the spatial minimum which can be discerned 
in isolation. In addition to there being a question concerning the minimum size 
necessary in order for a stimulus to be detected by a subject’s perceptual 
mechanisms, there is also a question regarding the minimum sensible 
perceptually presented in isolation. We can see objects such as books and desks, 
these provide a good example of the “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods” 
– to use Austin’s (1962: 8) terminology – that philosophers of perception 
regularly discuss. Yet (and this is a different claim to that of perceptual acuity) 
we cannot discern extensionless spatial points/slices in isolation when reflecting 
on our experience, when visually perceiving a book or desk for example. We are 
only introspectively aware of such extensionless slices insofar as we are aware of 
some extended chunk. We can nonetheless be said to be visually aware of the 
edge of the desk – taking the edge to be an extensionless line, where the desk 
stops – but only insofar as we are visually aware of some portion of the desk and 
plausibly some portion of the space beyond this. 
 
Reflecting on the previous example we can make a negative claim in descriptive 
phenomenology: we are not introspectively aware of anything point-like (or line-
like86) in isolation, when we reflect upon our experience. Whatever the minimum 
sensible – the minimum presented in isolation – is, there is no introspective 
support for suggesting that it is of no spatial extent. Furthermore, it is important 
to recognise that whatever estimates empirical studies could offer of the extent 
of the visuospatial minimum sensible, this does not lend plausibility to the claim 
that in visual experience a subject has many experiences (at a time), each 
presenting this minimum (spatial) sensible. As stressed above, there is no 
compelling reason to accept the sort of phenomenal atomism which would 
follow from this claim. Considering the minimum visuospatial sensible gives us 
                                               
86 As put by Moore, points, lines, and surfaces are not of any extension (see Moore, 2001: 158). 
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reason not to posit experiences presenting no spatial extent; and there is no 
additional compelling reason to posit discrete experiences each presenting the 
minimum visuospatial sensible. The simplest hypothesis, consistent with what 
one experiences and the awareness of one’s experience afforded by 
introspection, is that there is an experience87 presenting something spatially 
extended – such as a visual experience of variation in colour over the surface of 
a desk. Similar claims hold in the temporal case. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, in his discussion of the perception of time James 
claims that the mathematical present – an extensionless instant – is “never 
realized in sense” (James, 1890: 406); one plausible interpretation of his claim is 
that an experiencing subject is not experientially aware of an isolated instant. 
This is not to claim that some events will be so brief – perhaps instantaneous – 
that we may not perceive them, it is not a claim about a necessary temporal 
feature of the stimulus in order for it to be perceived, and it is not a claim about 
the interval which must separate two events in order for us to experience them 
as successive (to be able to discriminate between their relative temporal 
locations). Rather, James’s thought can be expressed as the following negative 
claim: we cannot, in introspection upon what is presented in our experience, 
discern below a certain positive duration in isolation.  
 
The qualification ‘in isolation’ is important. In order to be aware of something in 
isolation a subject need not be aware of anything else, or anything of a greater 
extent. On the account to be offered, we need not deny that there is something 
it is like for a subject at a time, or at a point in space (point of the subject’s visual 
field), as long as we hold that there is only something it is like at that time, or 
point, in virtue of what it is like over that time, or across that point. Considering 
our experience of spatially extended phenomena, I said that a subject can be 
visually aware of the edge of the desk as such – taking the edge to be an 
extensionless line – but only insofar as she is visually aware of some portion of 
the desk and plausibly some portion of the space beyond this. An analogous 
example in the temporal case may be the onset or offset of a sound. In this case 
a subject can be said to hear the onset of a sound as such, but only insofar as 
                                               
87 I’ll return to the issue of how we are to think of token experiences in Chapter 3. 
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she is auditorily aware of some preceding interval of silence and some 
subsequent interval of the sound.88 We can accept that something is presented 
in experience as occurring at a time, such as the onset of a sound, but it is so 
presented in virtue of what is presented in experience as occurring over that 
time. This is what I take the DSM (and its spatial analogue) to deny.89 
 
To demonstrate that we cannot, in introspection upon what is presented in our 
experience, discern below a certain positive duration in isolation, and how a 
proponent of the DSM may respond, we can turn to Phillips’ discussion of 
perceiving constant motion (Phillips, 2011a: 821). For our purposes, we can cast 
what he says in terms of perceiving a constant change in location. One of the 
changes we typically take ourselves to experience is a change in location. That is, 
in addition to the experience of pure motion, we can also experience a stimulus 
as constantly changing its spatial location – with the discussion of the waterfall 
illusion demonstrating that the former is dissociable from the latter. If we grant 
that we can see a clock hand (which sweeps around the clock face, rather than 
ticking) as constantly changing its location, we can take it from Phillips that it 
must be that during all sub-periods of its movement we experience it as changing 
its location.  
 
On the plausible assumption that our powers of discrimination are finite, there 
are some periods of time over which we see the clock hand sweeping out an 
angle only just large enough for our powers of visual discrimination to discern.90 
In such a case we cannot perceive finer-grained facts about the change. To put 
                                               
88 James proposes this thought through his example of “silence … broken by a thunder-clap” 
(James, 1890: 159). James says the following about his example. “Into the awareness of the 
thunder itself the awareness of the previous silence creeps and continues; for what we hear when 
the thunder crashes is not thunder pure, but thunder-breaking-upon-silence-and-contrasting-
with-it. Our feeling of the same objective thunder, coming in this way, is quite different from 
what it would be were the thunder a continuation of previous thunder” (ibid.). 
89 For example, this appears to be explicit in Prosser’s claim that: “According to the dynamic 
snapshot theory, what is experienced as happening at t is in no part constituted by what is 
experienced as happening at other times close to t” (Prosser, 2017: 150). 
90 Regarding the minima that can be perceptually discriminated, it might be thought that 
reflection on auditory experience provides a strong counter to the DSM: that we cannot make 
sense of any auditory content which does not seem to possess a temporal extent (see Judge, 
2018: 232, for example). I do not wish to press this point here, as proponents of the DSM do 
claim that we can appeal to the DSM for other modalities (see Prosser, 2016: 134) and simply 
denying this claim may result in a dialectical standoff. Another reason not to put too much 
weight on an appeal to the auditory case is that the proponent of the DSM might claim that it is 
solely a view concerning vision as Crick and Koch (2003) do. 
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this in Phillips’s terms: “the content of our experience at these timescales [below 
the minimum change we can discern] is of some [change] continuing to unfold” 
(Phillips, 2011a: 821; emphasis in original). In these circumstances, we see the hand 
changing its location constantly, without perceiving its determinate time-course. 
It is not that we are aware, at immediately subsequent times, of the stimulus as 
occupying a determinate discrete location. Rather, we are aware of it as 
constantly changing its location. 
 
Faced with such a case, a snapshot theorist would have to either deny that we 
are so introspectively aware of constant change (in location), taking each 
experiential snapshot to present a given spatial arrangement of stimuli which a 
subject can become aware of as such,91 or she would have to appeal to acuity 
measures in our introspective awareness of our own perceptual experience. A 
problem with the first response is that the subject appears to be attributed 
implausibly fine-grained powers of discrimination. On this response the subject 
would appear to be attributed with introspective awareness of any given 
experiential snapshot, of some state of affairs at a time (rather than over some 
minimal interval). On the second response, it could be said that perceptual 
experience over time consists of a series of experiential snapshots, but in 
reflecting upon our experience we are only ever aware of some series of such 
snapshots. As a result, the temporal minimum we can be introspectively aware 
of may include a stimulus changing its location – revealed over some series of 
snapshots – even though this is not what is presented in a given perceptual 
snapshot. This avoids attributing subjects with implausibly fine-grained powers 
of introspective discrimination, but it is not obvious what there is to motivate 
the drawing of such a distinction between what is presented in experience and 
our introspective awareness of what is presented in experience, apart from an ad 
hoc defensive manoeuvre.92  
 
                                               
91 It need not follow that the stimuli are presented as determinately located in such an experiential 
snapshot, but regardless of whether the spatial relations are presented with some degree of 
indeterminacy, it follows that we cannot perceive a stimulus changing its spatial location. 
92 This would appear to require a distinction between what it is like for experiencing subjects, and 
what it seems to be like for them. Against the drawing of such a distinction, see Tye (2009: 260); 
and Nanay (2010a: 268). 
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Prosser appears to take the first route while trying to avoid the attribution of 
implausibly fine-grained powers of discrimination to experiencing subjects. 
When it comes to the issue of the temporal minimum a subject can discern, 
Prosser says: “if Δt is the minimum discriminable duration we should say that all 
durations shorter than Δt are experienced as being of indeterminate duration 
within the range between zero and Δt. … Perhaps, then, we should say that… 
the experienced present is… an interval of indeterminate duration between zero 
and Δt” (Prosser, 2016: 135; also see 145-6). There are two problems with this 
explanation, one concerning the sub-intervals of the minimum discriminable 
duration; another concerning the relevance of the minimum discriminable 
duration when individuating between experiences. 
 
First, it is not clear in the context of Prosser’s discussion why Δt is not simply 
taken to be the temporal minimum sensible. Suggesting that what is presented 
in experience is an interval of indeterminate duration between zero and Δt 
appears to bring unnecessary additional commitments (and it would appear as 
though something must be experienced to be at least of the duration of Δt, or 
else Δt would not be the minimum discriminable duration). If the 
phenomenology can speak to there being a change (in position, for example) 
over Δt – as I have suggested – then this leads us to a rejection of the Snapshot 
Claim and an endorsement of the Duration Claim.  
 
As his argument is presented in the context of a discussion of the specious 
present (Prosser, 2016: 134-135), Prosser says that such minima do not vindicate 
appeal to a specious present, which is generally characterised as being of a greater 
temporal extent than such minima. However, and this is the second problem, 
given that there are such temporal-minima it does not follow that what is 
presented in perceptual experience is limited to the temporal extent of such 
minima. Compare to how the visual field is not limited to the spatial extent of 
such visuospatial minima. When some subject experiences a temporally 
extended occurrence, such as the second-hand sweeping around the clock face, 
we can ask whether there is an experience of something temporally extended, or 
whether there are many experiences (successive in time) each presenting no 
temporal extent or presenting the extent of the minimum sensible. In the 
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temporal case there is an absence of introspective evidence for supposing that, 
when some subject experiences a temporally extended occurrence, there are 
many experiences (successive in time) each presenting no temporal extent, or 
the extent of the minimum sensible; this is analogous to the visuospatial case. 
The simplest hypothesis, consistent with what one experiences and the 
awareness of one’s experience afforded by introspection, is that there is an 
experience presenting something temporally extended – an experience of the 
temporally extended occurrence.  
 
To summarise: if over Δt what is presented in experience speaks to there being 
a change (in position, for example), then this motivates appeal to the Duration 
Claim and rejection of the Snapshot Claim. Furthermore, as in the visuospatial 
case, whatever we say regarding the temporal minimum sensible, this does not 
lend plausibility to the claim that in experiencing a temporally extended 
occurrence a subject has many experiences (successive in time), each presenting 
the temporal extent of the minimum sensible. There is no more compelling 
reason from reflection upon the phenomenology to accept this sort of 
phenomenal atomism in the temporal case than in the spatial case. Issues 
concerning the phenomenology and ontology of experience over time will be 
returned to in Chapter 3, in the current context we can conclude that reflection 
on the phenomenology provides no support for the Snapshot Claim. 
 
 
6. Miller’s PPC and PSA: no theoretical pressure 
 
It is plausible to suggest that those theorists who are disposed to treat snapshot 
models as an intuitive starting point in theorising about our experience of 
temporal phenomena are motivated to do so by something more basic than 
explanations arising out of the empirical sciences. Although I have argued that 
reflection on the phenomenology does not motivate an appeal to experiential 
snapshots, one remaining alternative is that theorists feel that there is theoretical 
pressure which motivates appeal to the Snapshot Claim. In what follows I 
suggest that there is one place in which theorists might suppose that there is 
such pressure, but upon closer inspection this pressure dissipates. 
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Many theorists have found plausible the idea that a subject’s experience seems – 
to the subject – to be concurrent with that which it is an experience of. This is 
often expressed in terms of Miller's (1984) Principle of Presentational 
Concurrence (PPC). As put originally by Miller: “the duration of a content being 
presented is concurrent with the duration of the act of presenting it… the time 
interval occupied by a content which is before the mind is the very same time 
interval which is occupied by the act of presenting that very same content before 
the mind” (Miller, 1984: 107; emphasis in original). In experiencing temporally 
extended phenomena our experiences seem concurrent with the temporally 
extended phenomena they are experiences of (insofar as PPC is a 
phenomenological claim). Endorsing PPC, a theorist might endorse the claim 
that at a time some subject experiences what seems, to the subject, to be the case 
at that time. (Note that this alone is not equivalent to the claim that there are 
experiential snapshots.93 One could accept the former without thereby endorsing 
the Snapshot Claim94 – for example, if one takes what occurs over temporally 
extended intervals to have some form of metaphysical and explanatory priority 
over what occurs at instants falling within those intervals.95) 
 
One source of the apparent intuitive pull towards a snapshot model might be 
found if we take PPC together with Miller’s further notion of The Principle of 
Simultaneous Awareness (PSA). Miller says, regarding hearing successive tones 
as forming a melody, that “the continuous occurrence of the aural sensation 
during [the time over which the melody is experienced] cannot by itself account 
for my continual awareness of a tone as enduring during that interval of time…” 
(ibid.: 108; emphasis in original). This leads Miller to claim that “[a]n awareness of 
succession derives from simultaneous features of the structure of that 
awareness” (ibid.: 109). His claim is that a succession of awarenesses cannot on 
its own account for an awareness of succession; in order to experience some 
                                               
93 Though it may be that some theorists slide in their reasoning here, supposing that we must 
have something like an experiential snapshot, at a time, which presents something which seems 
concurrent with the experience. This is to assume that a characterisation of how things are for 
the subject is homogenous down to instants (how things are for the subject over some interval 
is to be cashed out in terms of how things are for the subject at the instants which fall within 
the interval); I argued against such an assumption of phenomenal atomism in section 5. 
94 This is what extensional theories of temporal consciousness can be characterised as claiming 
(see Dainton, 2016). 
95 See Soteriou (2013, esp. Chapters 4 and 6) and Phillips (2014a). 
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phenomenon as a temporally extended phenomenon, we must do so at some 
moment.96 
 
Snapshot theories of temporal experience might be presented in a prima facie 
plausible light because of how they meet both of Miller's claimed data regarding 
temporal experience: PPC and PSA (and are the only one of the main three97 
types of model of temporal experience to do so). Insofar as theorists are either 
explicitly or implicitly influenced by PPC and PSA, the snapshot model can gain 
some plausibility from being a model on which one can readily accept both,98 
where a momentary experience presents what is the case at a moment. While 
there may be much to criticise in the rough characterisations of PPC and PSA I 
have offered, I will keep my comments brief.  
 
Does it positively appear as though the occurrences we experience unfold over 
the same interval, concurrent with our experience of those occurrences? Over 
longer timescales, an affirmative answer certainly has prima facie plausibility. I 
can recall the ball being kicked and now see it in the goal, and I am confident in 
saying that I experienced it being kicked earlier – hence why I am now in a 
position to recall it – and that I am now seeing it in the goal (supposing this is 
several seconds later). Prosser questions what evidence we have for supposing 
such structural matching over shorter timescales, saying that in such cases “I do 
not think introspection can be assumed to be reliable. I find I have no clear 
feeling about the timing of the experiences in cases in which I am aware of the 
second event before I have had time to react to the first event. One can certainly 
say which of two events occurred first (provided they occurred at least 30ms 
apart); but it is much harder to see what one’s introspective evidence could be 
for the claim that one or other experience occurred first” (Prosser, 2016: 146). 
Prosser’s suggestion is that over short timescales we may be perceptually aware 
                                               
96 This also appears to be the motivation behind the ‘divergence’ principle Frischhut appeals to. 
“Divergence: In order to have experiences as of temporally extended items at all, the duration 
of experience in which an item X is represented must diverge from the duration that X is 
represented as occupying” (Frischhut, 2014: 36). 
97 In Dainton’s (2016) terms: extensional, retentional, and cinematic/snapshot theories (the 
former two endorsing something akin to the Duration Claim). Roughly, extensional theories can 
be characterised as accepting PPC but rejecting PSA, while retentional theories can be 
characterised as accepting PSA and rejecting PPC. 
98 See Dainton (2016) for an overview of these issues; see Phillips (2014a) for a discussion of 
some of the theoretical problems surrounding the appeal to PSA. 
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of the temporal structure of the occurrence being experienced, but we are not 
independently aware of the temporal structure of that perceptual awareness. As 
a result, the two cannot be fruitfully compared. 
 
Prosser’s suggestion can be supported. In a discussion of the transparency of 
perceptual experience, Hoerl similarly says: it “isn’t that both of these locations 
[the apparent temporal location of the object of perceptual experience and the 
apparent temporal location of the perceptual experience itself] figure in the 
phenomenology of experience, and are experienced as being identical, but rather 
… there is no such thing as the felt temporal location of the experience forming 
part of the phenomenology of experience. There is just no scope within a 
description of our experience of temporal properties for a distinction between 
those experienced properties themselves and a point in time from which they are 
experienced” (Hoerl, 2018: 143).99 This is to say that we are not in a position to 
affirm PPC when we are concerned with such short timescales. To make such a 
positive claim would require an awareness of the temporal properties of our 
perceptual experience that it is plausible to suggest we lack. 
 
This is not to deny that PPC could be stated in a more plausible form. We could, 
for example, state it as a negative claim: that we are not aware of any divergence 
between the temporal structure of the occurrence being perceived and the 
temporal structure of that perceptual awareness. We might take this to be related 
to the sense in which “one’s perceptual access to an interval of time doesn’t 
seem to one to be perspectival” (Soteriou, 2013: 131), in contrast to one’s visual-
perceptual access to a region of space. If we construe PPC in these terms (or 
only take it to be a positive claim about greater timescales100) we need not deny 
it. Yet once the PPC is qualified in this way it no longer provides theoretical 
                                               
99 See Frischhut (2014) for similar considerations, phrased in terms of the relation between the 
temporal duration of an experience and the temporal duration of what is (re)presented by that 
experience. The notion of temporal transparency will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 
3, section 1. 
100 One might think that Hoerl’s point is entirely general and so may be in tension with the claim 
that such matching can supported over longer timescales. But note that Hoerl’s point here is one 
concerning perceptual experience. It is entirely consistent with Hoerl’s point that at a later time, 
t10, when a subject is perceiving some state of affairs, she can recall what occurred earlier, at time 
t1. When depending upon recollection, she can judge that what she is now perceiving, at t10, 
seems to be occurring as she is perceiving it in contrast to what she earlier perceived, at t1, which 
she is now recalling. Over such timescales, with an appeal to what one can recall and what one 
is perceptually aware of, there is a sense in which there seems to be some such matching. 
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support for an appeal to the DSM. Versions of the three main models of 
temporal experience may be characterised in such a way as to satisfy such a 
negative claim (or a claim about structural matching over greater timescales). As 
a result, the DSM does not gain any theoretical plausibility over its competitors 
by virtue of accommodating the PPC, so understood. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
Temporally extended occurrences are presented as such in experience, rather 
than instantaneous states of affairs. This is a denial of what lies at the core of the 
snapshot models of temporal experience: the claim that perceptual experience 
presents no temporal content, or that it presents what is the case at an instant in 
isolation. Having presented the traditional argument against snapshot theories – 
that they fail to account for the experience of motion/change – in the form of 
an inconsistent triad, I turned to consider Chuard’s snapshot model of temporal 
experience. I argued that Chuard’s position might not allow us to move beyond 
the traditional argument. To avoid the criticism raised, I suggested that the most 
charitable interpretation of Chuard’s position would present his proposal as a 
DSM. The DSM is partly motivated, by Arstila and Prosser (following Le 
Poidevin), by appeal to temporal illusions such as the waterfall illusion and the 
role envisaged for two independent perceptual mechanisms, one tracking the 
spatial location of stimuli and the other detecting motion. I provided a three-
part argument against an appeal to the DSM. 
 
First, I argued that the findings from cognitive science discussed by the authors 
do not independently support the DSM. It does not follow from cases such as 
the waterfall illusion – where there is an experience of motion in the absence of 
an experience of a change in location – that motion is not to be characterised as 
something which is experienced as occurring over time. Second, I argued that 
reflection on the phenomenology does not support endorsing the DSM. There 
is an absence of evidence for supposing that, when some subject experiences a 
temporally extended occurrence, there are many experiences – experiential 
snapshots, successive in time – each presenting no temporal extent. The simplest 
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hypothesis, consistent with what one experiences and the awareness of one’s 
experience afforded by introspection, is that there is an experience presenting 
something temporally extended – an experience of the temporally extended 
occurrence. Third, I ended by arguing that considerations from theoretical 
claims in the literature do not support an appeal to a snapshot model of temporal 
experience either.  
 
I have not, of course, been able to discuss every possible motivation behind an 
appeal to a snapshot model of temporal experience. However, I have 
demonstrated that there is a lack of supporting evidence for such a proposal 
where one would expect to find it. As such, we can dismiss snapshot models of 
temporal experience and endorse the Duration Claim. Having argued that we do 
not have compelling reasons for accepting the Snapshot Claim – arguing that, 
on the contrary, experience presents a positive temporal extent – this raises the 
question of whether there is an upper temporal limit to what is presented in 
experience. This question is a focus of Chapter 3. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Time of Our Lives: Experiencing over Time 
 
 
“Where or How are the limits of an empirical present moment to be drawn, or What are we to 
include in it? Taking this question to refer to limits actually found in experience… the answer 
is plainly this: It is any content of experience, simple or complex, from the moment of its rising 
into consciousness to the moment of its disappearance out of consciousness… The fact that 
particular contents of consciousness appear and remain in consciousness for a certain time, and 
then disappear from it, is a fact of immediate observation or experience” (Hodgson, 1898: 36). 
 
 
In the first chapter I outlined some of the ways in which the specious present is 
often characterised; in that chapter I brought out one particular conception of 
the specious present, which I refer to as the PSP. When theorists appeal to the 
PSP under the guise of the specious present, they do so in order to express the 
following thought. We are perceptually presented with things as they fall within 
a given interval (the PSP), such that we are aware of things within this interval 
in a way in which we are not aware of things which occur over a greater interval.  
 
In the preceding chapter I was concerned with sub-intervals of the PSP. I 
discussed snapshot models of temporal experience, which characterise our 
experience over time as a sequence of snapshots, each individual snapshot being 
neutral on whether it presents anything of a non-zero temporal extent. I argued 
that there is no motivation for supposing a snapshot model of temporal 
experience and maintained that perceptual experience minimally presents some 
non-zero temporal extent as such. Anything of a temporal extent of less than 
the minimum sensible (the minimum presented in isolation) is experienced in 
virtue of something greater being presented in experience. 
 
To offer an explanation of what is presented in experience as occurring at a time 
in terms of what is presented in experience as occurring over that time is not to 
answer all questions one might have about what is presented in experience over 
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time. In particular, this appears to leave open various questions concerning what 
we are to say about the phenomenology and ontology of experiencing over 
greater intervals of time. In particular, if there is no reason to think that there is 
a sequence of discrete experiential snapshots, are there nonetheless reasons from 
reflection on the phenomenology to think that there is a sequence of discrete 
experiences presenting some invariant temporal extent? Contemporary 
discussions of this question, and related issues, are often framed in terms of the 
relationship between the specious present and the stream of consciousness. 
 
In the current chapter, the issue of interest is how we are to characterise our 
experience of occurrences that unfold over intervals of a greater temporal extent 
than the PSP (call them super-intervals, in contrast with sub-intervals) – such as 
experiencing plays, concerts, and football matches. In order to arrive at a 
satisfying position, in the following three sections I will turn to consider three 
extant accounts of the ontology and phenomenology of experience over super-
intervals of time, from Tye (2003); Husserl (1905) and Kiverstein (2010); and 
Hoerl (2013). After presenting reasons to be sceptical of these existing 
accounts,101 I offer a phenomenological characterisation of the PSP through 
developing Russell’s construal of what is given in experience. Given the 
phenomenological characterisation of the PSP developed, we can characterise 
our experience of occurrences that unfold over super-intervals without arriving 
at any principled way of individuating between discrete experiences. I end by 
suggesting that the question as to what should count as a token experience on a 
particular occasion may be somewhat context or interest relative.102  
 
 
1. The stream of consciousness as an experience 
 
In his discussion of the unity of consciousness, Michael Tye (2003) says that it 
is a mistake to assume that there is a principled way to individuate between 
discrete experiences in the stream of consciousness. On the view Tye proposes, 
                                               
101 As will become obvious, I do not take myself to show that certain views of the ontology of 
experience are flawed from within, but rather that we can solve certain puzzles without making 
the ontological commitments of such views. 
102 Such a response, at least to Tye’s one experience view, is suggested in Bayne’s (2005: 498) 
review of Tye’s Consciousness and persons (2003). 
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there is a role to be played by something akin to the PSP over super-intervals. 
Tye says that the “experienced present – the so-called specious present – has a 
brief but finite duration. It allows us to experience an extended event, such as a 
continuing sound or a word… all in one as a whole” (Tye, 2003: 87). Tye takes 
an appeal to the specious present to be necessitated by reflection on the 
phenomenology. However, Tye wishes to stress that it does not follow that in 
order for there to be an experience of succession there must be a succession of 
experiences; to this extent, I am sympathetic with Tye’s claims. 
 
Considering an experience of a red flash which is succeeded by a green flash, 
Tye says: “Granted, I experience the red flash as before the green one. But it 
need not be true that my experience or awareness of the red flash is before my 
experience or awareness of the green one… In general, represented order has 
no obvious link with the order of representations. Why suppose that there is 
such a link for experiential representations?” (Tye, 2003: 90). Tye is here 
concerned with what is represented within a specious present; in this context he 
claims that our experience is transparent in at least the following sense: we are 
aware of the red flash being succeeded by the green flash, but we are not aware 
of a discrete experience of the red flash being succeeded by a discrete experience 
of the green flash.   
 
Tye appeals to the transparency of experience in order to suggest that while a 
change is represented in experience – from red flash to green flash – it need not 
follow that there is a change in representation.103 What we are aware of being 
successive, for Tye, is the flashes rather than one’s experience(s) of those flashes. 
Regardless of whether one wishes to grant (or take issue with) this claim, it is 
worth stressing that this is a claim which is so far only concerned with 
occurrences of a brief extent – within the PSP. Yet Tye goes on to make related 
claims about our experiences of occurrences of a much greater temporal extent. 
                                               
103 In similar fashion Frischhut says, from considerations on the basis of the transparency of 
experience, that “when we introspect our own experiences we only ever find the objects of 
experience, not features of the experience itself” (Frischhut, 2014: 53). However it should be 
noted that Frischhut does not clearly support Tye’s ‘one experience’ view, as she appeals to how 
we can introspect our own experiences over time (though if we were to think that there is ‘no 
access’ to one’s experience over and above one’s access to the objects of experience, it is not 
obvious what supports Frischhut’s appeal to ‘our own experiences’ over time). 
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Over super-intervals of time Tye says we cannot merely appeal to specious 
presents following on from one another in objective time, as this would not 
account, for example, for “the experienced continuity of the [continuing] sound 
[one hears] from one present to the next” (Tye, 2003: 92; emphasis in original). He 
says: “The basic intuition with respect to unity through time is surely that things 
and qualities we experience at successive times are experienced as continuing on or 
as succeeding one another” (Tye, 2003: 96; emphasis in original). Here he appeals 
to a further phenomenological datum – experienced continuity, over time – in 
order to cast doubt on an account of the ontology of experience over time which 
merely appeals to discrete specious presents, or discrete experiences, which 
follow successively from one another in objective time. 
 
We might question whether there is any ingredient of the phenomenology which 
is to be picked out as ‘occurrences seeming to follow one another with strict 
continuity’. Rashbrook (2013b) presses the point that we may be absent of an 
awareness of discontinuity, though this is not to say that we are aware of there 
not being discontinuity. Perhaps we would therefore best put matters more 
neutrally and say that we are not typically aware of our experience over greater 
intervals, where there is no break in consciousness, as discontinuous. Tye may 
wish for the stronger reading on which what is experienced is positively 
characterisable as seeming continuous, but, even on what I have called the more 
neutral reading, we might think that the absence of an awareness of any 
discontinuity still provides prima facie plausibility to a view which does not posit 
discrete successive experiences. (At least, any view which postulates such 
discrete experiences has the burden of explaining the absence of awareness of 
discontinuity.) 
 
Offering his positive view of the ontology of experience over super-intervals of 
time, Tye says: “The simplest hypothesis compatible with what is revealed by 
introspection is that, for each period of consciousness, there is only a single 
experience—an experience that represents everything experienced within the 
period of consciousness as a whole” (Tye, 2003: 97). The force of Tye’s claim is 
that the only experiences we have are entire streams of consciousness, which 
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span between breaks in consciousness.104 Tye says that his proposal is motivated, 
in part, by the difficulty we have in individuating experiences through time. 
“Consider an ordinary visual experience and suppose that it is exclusively visual. 
When did it begin? When will it end? As I write now, I am sitting in a library. 
Looking ahead, and holding my line of sight fixed, I can see many books, tables, 
people in the distance walking across the room, a woman nearby opening some 
bags as she sits down. Is this a single temporally extended visual experience? If 
not, why not?” (Tye, 2003: 98). Tye’s claim is plausibly related to Travis’ thought, 
that ‘experience’ is “a far from innocent count noun” (Travis, 2004: 57). The 
difficulty we have in arriving at any principled criteria for individuating between 
discrete experiences in the stream of consciousness, from merely reflecting upon 
the phenomenology, is taken by Tye to support his contention that the only such 
criteria are breaks in consciousness. 
 
Tye’s case for his ‘one experience’ view involves further argument and more 
nuance than I have space to consider. The worry with Tye’s view which I wish 
to focus on is as follows.105 Regardless of the plausibility of Tye’s claims when 
he is discussing brief durations, such as the transparency of experience over the 
duration of the PSP, it is plausible that his view leaves something out of the 
phenomenology when we are concerned with super-intervals of time. To 
demonstrate what Tye leaves out, we first need to acknowledge part of what he 
gets right. 
 
Tye is correct that perceptual experience is temporally transparent. While 
temporal transparency has been appealed to under a number of guises,106 for 
                                               
104 One of Tye’s concerns is whether there are modality-specific experiences, or rather a multi-
modal experience. I will not engage with this claim in the current context, though the conclusion 
I reach – that tokening particular experiences is context/interest relative – might be extended to 
this issue. 
105 Bayne highlights one implausible consequence of taking Tye’s claim that experiences are 
PANIC representations (representations with poised, abstract, non-conceptual, intentional 
content) together with Tye’s ‘one experience’ view (see Bayne, 2005: 498). Taking the two claims 
together, it would appear to follow that the contents of an entire stream of consciousness are 
conjointly poised for direct input into the reasoning system. Yet it appears to be very implausible 
to maintain that, in the morning, whatever I see later that evening is conjointly poised with what 
I currently see for direct input into the reasoning system. 
106 For variations on the claim that perceptual experience is temporally transparent, see Frischhut 
(2014), Phillips (2014a and 2014b), Rashbrook (2013a), Richardson (2014), and Soteriou (2013). 
See Hoerl (2018) for critical discussion of temporal transparency, where he says: “There is just 
no scope within a description of our experience of temporal properties for a distinction between 
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current purposes it can be presented as the following claim: the temporal 
location of an experiencing subject’s perceptual perspective on a given 
occurrence seems, to her, to be transparent to the temporal location of the 
occurrence she seems to perceive. This, as I take it, is to be understood as an 
expression of the negative claim that from simply reflecting on the perceptual 
phenomenology, the experiencing subject cannot distinguish between the 
temporal location from which she perceptually experiences a given occurrence 
and the temporal location of that occurrence which she seems to perceive. There 
are two contrast cases which can be considered in order to elucidate this 
temporal transparency claim.  
 
First, there is the sense in which “one’s perceptual access to an interval of time 
doesn’t seem to one to be perspectival” (Soteriou, 2013: 131). It doesn’t seem to 
the subject as though, through merely reflecting upon her perceptual 
phenomenology, she can mark out the temporal location of her perceptual point 
of view on an object or occurrence as distinct from the apparent temporal 
location of whatever object or occurrence it is that she seems to be perceptually 
aware of. This can be contrasted with how a subject can mark out the apparent 
spatial locations of objects she is visually aware of as distinct from the spatial 
location of her perceptual point of view on them (as visual experience presents 
its objects as distally located in space).107 Second, the temporal transparency of 
perceptual experience can also be contrasted with memory.108 When we recall an 
event, through reflection on the phenomenology we are (typically) aware that 
the event being recalled occurred at an earlier time than the time at which we are 
engaged in recollecting. We are not aware of any such distinction in the case of 
perceptual experience. 
 
                                               
those experienced properties themselves and a point in time from which they are experienced” 
(Hoerl, 2018: 143). Note that even on Hoerl’s view, the negative claim I make in the text holds. 
107 See Chapter 4 for a greater discussion of the distinction between the perceptual perspective 
an experiencing subject occupies in space and in time. 
108 Rashbrook (2013a) appeals to the distinction between episodic recall and perception to stress 
that we cannot discern a difference between the temporal location of ‘the perceptual experience’ 
and the object/s of ‘perceptual experience’, though we can discern such a difference in the case 
of episodic recall (the objects of which are presented ‘as past’). Because of contested issues in 
the literature about what, in actual fact, talk of ‘the experience’ – and its temporal location – 
refers to, I appeal instead to the subject’s perspective on such objects (of perception or of 
recollection). 
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Tye appeals to the transparency of experience in order to argue that we are not 
introspectively aware of a change in experience over time, though we can be 
aware of experienced change. This aspect of Tye’s view appears to leave 
something out of the phenomenology, failing to capture the sense in which what 
a subject experiences seems to change over super-intervals of time. Consider a 
subject seated in a theatre, watching a play. At the end of the play – assuming 
the subject did not leave the theatre at all, or lose consciousness, during the 
production – it will be true to say that the subject has experienced the whole 
play. However, contra-Tye, the subject’s perceptual experience is not temporally 
transparent to the two-hour extent of the play; she can judge that her perceptual 
experience of the end of the play comes after her perceptual experience of the 
play’s beginning (that this is not merely a change presented in experience).109  
 
In the final throes of the play, the subject is perceptually aware of a temporal 
part of the performance, but at this point the subject can recall earlier temporal 
parts. Recollecting earlier temporal parts of the play is not temporally 
transparent, the subject is typically well aware that what is being recalled 
occurred at an earlier time – that what she earlier perceived she is now recalling. 
In the example of the play, she recalls earlier experiencing the scene setting, and 
then experiencing the on-stage conflict, while she is perceptually aware of the 
resolution taking place. 
 
The above example demonstrates that it takes time to experience a whole play. 
It is not just that a change is perceptually presented to the experiencer, what she 
is perceptually presented with also changes (as illustrated by how she can recall 
what was previously perceived). This is another way of saying that over super-
intervals of time we experience what we do in virtue of what we experience over 
PSPs within that greater interval. If the play takes two hours to perform, it 
plausibly takes just as long to see the play. This is true even though we are not 
tempted to say that the subject sees the whole play at the moment the play ends. 
(That which is presented in a subject’s experience does not seem to swell in 
temporal breadth, until she is perceptually presented with a two-hour interval.) 
                                               
109 Also see the rejection of the Principle of Presentational Concurrence as it pertains to sub-
intervals of the PSP in Chapter 2, and the reasons given – and agreed with Prosser (2016) – for 
thinking that there may nonetheless be a sense in which the principle holds over super-intervals. 
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The subject experiences the whole play over two hours – i.e. over the time the 
play itself unfolds – rather than after two hours.110  
 
The latter claim can be understood in (at least) two ways. First, it could be 
understood as the claim that in virtue of watching the play unfold over the two-
hour period the subject can, at any time within this interval, be said to experience 
the whole play. Second, it could be understood as the claim that over the two-
hour period within which the play unfolds, the subject experiences what she 
does in virtue of what she experiences over the sub-intervals of this greater 
interval. Reflection on a contrast case provides support for the second 
understanding.  
 
Contrast experience with belief. In virtue of believing that the play lasts for two 
hours, it is true to say that at any time within the two-hour interval the subject 
believes that the play lasts for two hours. Her holding such a belief over that 
interval of time makes it the case that we can attribute the belief to her at any 
instant within that interval. We are not motivated to say the same of experience. 
It doesn’t appear as though the subject sees the whole play at any time within 
the interval over which the play unfolds. If the subject left the theatre at the 
intermission, it would be true to say that while in the theatre she did believe that 
the play lasts for two hours; it would not be true to say that while in the theatre 
she experienced the whole play. Falling into a dreamless sleep during the second 
half of the performance, the subject is no longer experiencing the play; yet it 
remains plausible that she still has the belief that the play lasts for two hours. If 
we stipulate that the subject does not leave the theatre and that she remains 
wakefully conscious and alert, it does not become more plausible to suggest that 
she has, throughout the whole play, an experience presenting the whole play, 
such that we can say that at any time within this interval she has an experience 
presenting the whole play. This is because over time what the subject experiences 
changes.  
 
                                               
110 See Soteriou (2018) for a more detailed discussion of this point, again in the context of Tye’s 
‘one experience’ view, and for more on the contrast between the manifest temporal profile of 
belief and experience (which I briefly discuss in the paragraphs to follow). 
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Tye appears to anticipate a response along the lines offered above. His 
alternative suggestion is that we are experientially aware of occurrences which 
change in some quality over time, but we are not aware of any change in 
experience over this time.111 In what he takes to be a probative analogy, Tye says: 
“Consider a movie depicting a complex series of events taking place during an 
extended period of time. … The movie can be boring at some times and exciting 
at others; for what it depicts at different times varies. Even so, there is just one 
movie, not many movies unified together into one encompassing movie” (Tye, 
2003: 99). We take a movie to represent a temporal extent and yet we do not 
take it to be made up of successive shorter movies; so too with experience, for 
Tye. There are two problems with this analogy. 
 
Firstly, suppose we think about traditional movies which involve a single 
overarching narrative. We might agree that we tend to think of such movies as 
being made up of different scenes, not successive shorter movies (let’s say sub-
movies). It doesn’t follow from this that we cannot think of – or that it would 
be incorrect to think of – a movie being made up of several sub-movies. If 
someone was to say that watching all of the Lord of the Rings movies successively 
was both watching three movies and watching one over-arching movie, on what 
grounds are we to disagree? Indeed, this might lead us to agree with Bayne’s 
suggestion that what Tye calls ‘experience stages’ are in fact “experiences in all 
but name” (Bayne, 2010: 23). Bayne continues: “I suppose that one could insist 
on distinguishing experiences from experiences stages, but I don’t see anything 
to be gained from doing so” (ibid.). We might then say that there is no prima 
facie problem with thinking of a movie as consisting of many sub-movies 
(perhaps of some minimal temporal extent); so too with experience. 
                                               
111 Though he is happy to talk of successive stages of experience, and successive specious 
presents, Tye argues that these stages are not experiences in their own right. Tye adopts a 
position on which there is a relation of direct phenomenal unity between experiential contents 
within the specious present, with a relation of indirect phenomenal unity between what is being 
experienced (within the specious present) and what was previously experienced in one’s stream 
of consciousness – as long as there were no periods of unconsciousness in the interim – through 
what he calls “chains of experienced succession” which “flow from one specious present to the 
next” (Tye, 2003: 100). This may call into question whether he is merely signposting that his use 
of the term ‘experience’ is idiosyncratic, such that it is not clear how much – dialectically – his 
appeal to the ‘one experience view’ does (as the relations of direct phenomenal unity would 
appear, in this context, to offer a way of picking out a privileged interval of a lesser extent that 
whole periods of consciousness). However, I will not discuss these issues any further in the 
current context; for more detailed discussion see Bayne (2005). 
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In a defensive move, Tye says that “experience stages are not experiences, any 
more than undetached cloud parts are clouds” (2003: 99). The thought appears 
to be as follows. We can acknowledge that undetached cloud parts do not 
(generally112) possess any markers by which we can readily pick them out as clouds 
in their own right. Similarly, Tye says that over super-intervals of time the 
temporally extended sub-intervals of one’s experience do not possess any 
markers by which they can be readily picked out as experiences in their own 
right. Tye takes this claim to call into question whether there is a principled way 
of individuating between experiences of a lesser temporal extent than an 
unbroken stream of consciousness. However, it might nonetheless be the case 
that there are interest/context relative concerns which allow us to refer to token 
experiences. We might be interested in picking out the experience one has when 
watching a play over two hours, an experience of acute pain which lasted for a 
couple of minutes, or the experience of foul-smelling milk which lasted for a few 
seconds while the fridge door was ajar. In any such case, some feature of the 
phenomenology might well allow us to pick out the experience of interest (I 
return to this suggestion in section 4.3.). 
 
The second problem with Tye’s analogy is that the question of whether movies 
are constituted by shorter movies is misleading, as what we call ‘a movie’ is 
partially a matter of convention. More to the point, assuming Tye’s 
representational view of perceptual experience, we say a movie, like an 
experience, typically represents occurrences unfolding over some interval of 
time. Does it follow that the movie does not itself consist of a succession of 
representations? Of course it doesn’t. We are very familiar with the traditional 
model of cinematic representation where a sequence of frames/snapshots, each 
representing a given state of affairs, together combine (being presented in quick 
succession) in order to represent a temporally extended state of affairs. I have, 
in Chapter 2, argued that we should not think of experience over time as made 
up of successive snapshots. But why not think that it is nonetheless made up of 
                                               
112 I say generally – although Tye would want to be rid of this qualification – because we might 
question whether this is always true. It is not uncommon (in Britain, at least) to have an overcast 
sky where some portions of the cloud cover is white and other portions are dark grey. We might 
suppose that the difference in colour would allow us to pick out a white cloud and a dark grey 
cloud, as clouds in their own right, while each also appears to be an undetached part of a larger 
cloud. 
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successive representations of some minimal positive temporal extent? The 
appeal to cinematic representation appears to do more to undermine Tye’s view 
than to support it.  
 
 
2. That which is presented at a time 
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that what is presented in experience as occurring at a time 
depends upon what is presented in experience as occurring over a greater 
interval of time; this led to the question of the temporal extent of the ‘greater 
interval of time’ we are to appeal to when characterising the subject’s experiential 
phenomenology. Tye can be read as offering a view on which there is a single 
experience in an uninterrupted period of wakeful consciousness (this being an 
ontological claim), where this (re)presents all that the subject experiences over 
that period of wakeful consciousness (this being a claim concerning the 
phenomenology). I have said that Tye’s ‘one experience’ view sits uncomfortably 
with the idea that, over super-intervals of time, what is presented in experience 
seems to change. In the current section (2) and the one which follows it (3) I 
will present two further accounts of our experience over super-intervals, which 
correspond to retentional and extensional proposals respectively (discussed 
briefly in the Introductory Remarks and further below). I argue that, when these 
two particular proposals are presented in their most plausible forms, each makes 
ontological commitments that do not have unequivocal support from reflection 
upon the phenomenology. Each proposal can be read as being motivated by an 
inference to the best explanation; I will end by offering a further proposal (in 
section 4) which I take to provide a better explanation as it does not bring with 
it the ontological baggage of these former accounts. 
 
Let’s return to the example of the play. I suggested, against Tye, that it is 
plausible that there is not merely a change presented in experience over the two 
hours; there is also a change in what one’s experience is presenting. We want to 
offer an explanation of how the subject experiences various occurrences over 
the two-hour period, over which the play is performed, in terms of what is 
successively presented in experience over time. This might motivate the thought 
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that, rather than focusing on the temporal extent of the stream of consciousness, 
we should look towards the other extreme: what is experienced at a time (and at 
successive times – by which I mean instants – that fall within the super-interval).  
 
One variation upon the previous suggestion can be immediately rejected. If the 
thought is that we can offer an account of the ontology and phenomenology of 
experience over time in terms of what is presented subsequently at each time, 
further supposing that what experience presents at a time is an instant of time, 
we arrive at one form of the snapshot model of temporal experience previously 
discussed and rejected. The rejection of the snapshot view does not 
automatically result in the rejection of a view on which the phenomenology is to 
be accounted for in terms of what is presented in experience at a time. One 
suggestion at this point may be that appeal what a subject experiences at a time 
– perhaps appealing to discrete experiences at subsequent times – provides the 
correct view of the ontology, though we will have to say that at a time experience 
presents some temporal breadth – rather than an instantaneous state of affairs – 
in order to accommodate the phenomenology.  
 
The following might present itself as a plausible line of reasoning (though I will 
argue that this line of reasoning is misleading in what follows). We appeal to a 
subject’s visual field in order to characterise how visual experience presents a 
certain region of space to the subject, from a given location at a given time; we 
might also say that the subject has a temporal field – the PSP – where this is 
appealed to in order to pick out how experience presents an interval of time to 
the subject at a given location at a given time. Views of this kind are not 
uncommon in the literature; I will focus on a proposal of this kind which can be 
read in Husserl’s (1905) On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, 
and which has been recently taken up by Kiverstein (2010). 
 
 
2. 1. Kiverstein’s Husserlian proposal 
 
Husserl does not offer a consistent account of the nature of time-consciousness 
throughout his works, but in his 1905 lectures he appears to offer a position on 
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which a subject, at a time, is aware of a greater temporal extent than that given 
time. (It is not uncontroversial how we should understand what it means to be 
aware of a greater temporal extent from a time of a lesser extent; in what follows 
I appeal to Kiverstein’s interpretation of Husserl.113) He can be read as offering 
a proposal on which a subject is, at a given time, perceptually presented with 
what seems to be occurring at that time, he calls this the ‘primal impression’, 
while the subject is simultaneously presented with some degree of what seemed 
to occur immediately previously and what seems to be due to occur immediately 
subsequently. He labels the latter two aspects of experience ‘retention’ and 
‘protention’ respectively. This is not to say that things that occur over some 
interval of objective time are presented as occurring simultaneously in 
experience, but it is to maintain that things that occur over some interval of 
objective time are – in a sense that needs to be specified further – simultaneously 
presented. 
 
Discussing the relationship between primal impressions and retentions, Husserl 
says that “[d]uring the time that a motion is being perceived, a grasping-as-now 
takes place moment by moment… But this now-apprehension is, as it were, the 
head attached to the comet’s tail of retentions relating to the earlier now-points 
of the motion” (Husserl, 1905: 32). Husserl dedicates less space to developing 
the notion of protention, but he does make clear that it is supposed to be the 
future-oriented counterpart of retention: “every process that constitutes its 
object originally is animated by protentions that emptily constitute what is 
coming as coming, that catch it and bring it toward fulfilment” (Husserl, 1905: 
54). For Husserl, these notions can only be understood in terms of the others, 
with retention and protention making irreducible reference to the primal 
impression, which is itself to be conceived of as the limit between the span of 
retentions and protentions.114  
 
                                               
113 Rather than being concerned with whether or not this interpretation is a faithful 
reconstruction of Husserl’s view in 1905, I will focus on why this way of interpreting Husserl 
might not ultimately provide a satisfying view of our experience over super-intervals.  
114 Husserl says that “the now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of a continuity of retentions, 
just as every retentional phase is itself conceivable only as a point belonging to such a continuum; 
and this is true of every now of time-consciousness” (Husserl, 1905: 35). 
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In so characterising retentions, protentions, and primal impressions, Husserl can 
be read as offering a model of experience on which, at a given time, the subject 
is aware of a brief interval of time.115 In order to further spell out how we are to 
understand the sense in which a subject is so aware of an interval of time at a 
point in time, and to illustrate how this relates to our experience over super-
intervals of time, we can turn to recent work from Kiverstein. When concerned 
with our experience over sub-intervals of the PSP, Kiverstein appeals to the 
notion of phenomenal unity, taken from Bayne and Chalmers (2003) (which is used 
in order to pick out what it is like to occupy two or more conscious states 
together116). Kiverstein suggests that the idea of phenomenal unity over time may be 
explained “in terms of an experience’s manner of representation” (Kiverstein, 
2010: 174). Referring to Husserl’s work on time-consciousness,117 Kiverstein 
says that “every conscious episode includes as a part of its manner of 
representation a retentional component that keeps hold of experiences from the 
recent past, and a protentional component that anticipates what might be 
experienced next” (Kiverstein, 2010: 175).118 
 
Kiverstein presents part of Husserl’s proposal as the claim that you are 
perceptually presented, at a time, with what seems to occur over an interval of a 
                                               
115 See Smith (2016, esp. ch.5) for a more detailed introduction to Husserl’s theory of time-
consciousness, at least as espoused in his 1905 lectures. 
116 While it is not the main issue to concern us in what follows, we do not hear enough about 
‘togetherness’, or what it is for contents to be experienced ‘together’ in the temporal case (as 
opposed to the case of across modalities), in order for this to be probative. Bayne and Chalmers 
characterise phenomenal unity as a relation which holds between experiential contents at a time, 
discussing experiential states and content pertaining to different sensory modalities (e.g. hearing 
the engine revving and seeing the smoke rise from underneath the car’s hood). It isn’t 
straightforward how to apply this notion of unity or togetherness to experiential contents over time. 
There is a sense in which it would be misleading to help ourselves to the notion of content being 
unified at a time when considering experiential occurrences of a distinctly temporal nature (such 
as experiencing something occurring before/after something else) – more will be made of this 
in what follows. If we are not entitled to appeal to things being unified at a time then it is not yet 
clear how talk of content being unified or ‘experienced together’ is supposed to work. 
117 Kiverstein also says “our awareness extends a short distance through time… all events 
occurring within a specious present are experienced with the same force and vivacity…” 
(Kiverstein, 2010: 167). More may have to be said about what this force and vivacity consists in, 
before we could comment decisively on whether this claim was shared by Husserl. More 
importantly, while there might be something correct in how Kiverstein appeals to a subject’s 
awareness extending through time, it doesn’t appear as though an appeal to ‘force and vivacity’ 
will help to demarcate some interesting temporal extent/limit in perceptual experience. This is 
because all of the occurrences that we experience, while watching the play, will presumably be 
experienced with this ‘same force and vivacity’ (in virtue of being experienced).  
118 Other contemporary theorists also hold that there is a role for this tripartite structure in 
perceptual experience, which can be supported by reflecting on the phenomenology. See, for 
example, Almäng (2014). 
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greater extent.119 This appears to allow for an explanation of how what is 
presented in experience as occurring at a time depends on what is presented as 
occurring over that time, insofar as it depends on what is presented as occurring 
over the interval of the PSP. That is, taking the claim that the temporal extent 
of the PSP is explained in terms of the temporal extent of the retentions and 
protentions, from the primal impression, at a time, together with the claim that 
retentions, protentions, and primal impressions are interdependent – that they 
only have substance in terms of each other – we might suppose that what is 
presented, at a time, as occurring by the primal impression depends, in part, on 
what is presented in retention and protention. 
 
Kiverstein also offers an explanation of how this proposal can be used in order 
to account for how over super-intervals of time, that which is presented in 
experience changes (there being, at each time, an experiential presentation of an 
interval of time). Kiverstein stresses that this is compatible with experience not 
seeming discontinuous. The continuity of experience over time “…is explained 
by the continuum of retentions and protentions that form part of the manner of 
representation” (Kiverstein, 2010: 180). This passage reveals that the span of 
retentions and protentions plays a dual role, for Kiverstein. They are used in 
order to explain how a subject is perceptually presented with a brief interval at a 
time and, in Kiverstein’s terms, the continuity of experience over super-intervals 
of time is also explained by the fact that the primal impression at any given time 
later recedes into retention, then being presented as recently past, before some time 
later disappearing from consciousness altogether.  
 
We can read two subtly different proposals in Kiverstein’s discussion which it 
will be useful to distinguish between. Firstly, we might suppose that Kiverstein 
                                               
119 We could interpret Kiverstein as being committed to the claim that you are only perceptually 
presented, at a time, with what seems to be the case at a time, but where what you experienced 
immediately previously and what you anticipate experiencing immediately subsequently modifies 
what is experienced as occurring at that time. This is one way of interpreting Kiverstein’s claim 
that “[w]hat you anticipate [and what was experienced immediately previously] determines in 
part the character of your experience now” (2010: 174). On this line, you experience – at a time 
– what seems to be the case at a point in time. However, this would be to commit Kiverstein to 
a variation of the snapshot model of temporal experience which I have argued that we have 
reason to reject. The interpretation presented in the text above is also the natural way of reading 
the claim that “[e]xperiences aren’t confined to durationless points in time… but can stretch 
across time to embrace temporally extended events. … [O]ur experiences can extend through 
time in this way because of their manner of representation” (Kiverstein, 2010: 180). 
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is proposing a modal retentional model of the PSP, to use Dainton’s (2016) 
terminology. On this reading, talk of different manners of representation is taken 
to have phenomenological import: some temporal extent of the PSP is presented 
as just past, the primal impression as present, and perhaps some temporal part as 
to come. This can be compared to how one might think that some portion of a 
subject’s visual field is presented as to the left, another portion as to the right, and 
some portion as straight ahead. Alternatively, we might suppose that Kiverstein is 
proposing a non-modal retentional model of the PSP, to again use Dainton’s 
(2016) terminology. On such a model, appeal to different manners of 
representation is not taken to have phenomenological import; rather, they might 
be thought of as theoretical postulates. Such postulates might be appealed to in 
order to account for some feature of the phenomenology (perhaps reflected by 
Kiverstein’s concern to explain how it is possible to perceive succession and 
change), rather than being ‘read off’ of the phenomenology.120 
 
One might further suppose that either characterisation of the PSP provides an 
account of how we are to individuate experiences: an experience, at a time, 
presenting the temporal breadth of the PSP.121 On this understanding of 
Kiverstein’s proposal, an experiencing subject would be attributed a succession 
of momentary experiences – each presenting some temporal extent – in order 
to explain how we experience events spread over super-intervals of time. 
However, this method of individuating between experiences is not forced upon 
Kiverstein. To offer an explanation of what is presented in experience at a time 
in terms of the PSP is not necessarily to suppose that an experience at a time 
presents the PSP. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
120 This is to interpret the proposal more in line with the non-modal tripartite accounts suggested 
by Grush (2007) and Lee (2014a, 2014b, and 2014c). 
121 Although this view is not decisively supported by Husserl, it could be read as part of the 
proposal Kiverstein presents. At least, given what Kiverstein says about retention and protention 
as manners of representation, this method of individuating experiences might be suggested by 
the claim that “[a]n experience unifies itself by means of its manner of representation” (Kiverstein, 
2010: 180; emphasis added).  
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2. 2. The limitations of the Husserlian proposal 
 
The proposal drawn from Kiverstein and Husserl appears to allow for one way 
of accommodating phenomenological claims at issue, but it is not a proposal we 
are independently motivated to endorse. The first point to raise is that the 
proposal appears to lack phenomenological support for the claim that an interval 
is presented in experience at a given time (albeit under different manners of 
representation); this view of the ‘temporal shape’ of experience also appears to 
carry further theoretical commitments. The second point is that the proposal 
appears to be motivated by an inference to the best explanation; in what follows 
I will offer an alternative.  
 
In order to demonstrate the lack of independent phenomenological support for 
the proposal, consider again the analogy with the visual field. We appeal to a 
subject’s visual field in order to characterise how visual experience presents a 
certain region of space to the subject, from a given location at a given time. In 
this visuo-spatial case, we have phenomenological support for supposing that 
visual experience presents us with a region of space which is of a greater spatial 
extent than our perspective upon that extent.122 From our perspective in space, 
we are visually aware of objects as distally located. In some cases, such as when 
stood before a building, we are also visually aware of objects as being of a greater 
extent (say along the horizontal and vertical axes) than the perspective one 
possesses upon the object. 
 
Unlike in the spatial case, we do not have phenomenological support in the 
temporal case for supposing that we are perceptually presented with a greater 
temporal extent from a point of view of a lesser temporal extent.123 An 
experiencing subject cannot distinguish, from reflection on the phenomenology, 
between the temporal location of that which is presented in perceptual 
experience, and the temporal location of the subject’s experiential perspective 
                                               
122 I say more about the analogies which can be drawn between our perceptual perspective in 
space and in time – and those which should not be drawn – in Chapter 4. 
123 It might also be pressed that reflection on the phenomenology of our ongoing experience 
does not support the claim that what is perceptually presented is so presented under something 
akin to differing temporal manners of presentation. For arguments against positing tensed 
perceptual content, see Dainton (2006); Hoerl (2009); Le Poidevin (2007); and Mellor (1998). 
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in/on time. This is to reaffirm the claim that perceptual experience is temporally 
transparent. It might be responded that the tripartite structure of experience on 
Kiverstein’s proposal is not supposed to have introspective support. Rather than 
being motivated by reflection on the phenomenology, the temporal manners of 
representation appealed to can be read as theoretical postulates. This is to take 
the non-modal reading of Kiverstein’s proposal. On this reading, Kiverstein’s 
proposal is to be motivated by an inference to the best explanation in the service 
of accounting for some feature of a subject’s perceptual phenomenology. To 
accept this proposal would therefore be to adopt a position which is not 
necessarily contradicted by reflection on other features of the experiential 
phenomenology, but which is not unequivocally supported by such reflection.  
 
Although I suggested that the proposal drawn from Kiverstein need not commit 
one to a principled way of individuating between discrete experiences, this is not 
to say that the proposal is without controversial ontological commitments. One 
such commitment is the very idea that, at a time, a subject is perceptually 
presented with an interval of time. Recall the distinction between retentional and 
extensional models of the PSP, briefly discussed in the Introductory Remarks. 
On the extensional model experiencing is itself said to be temporally extended, 
as is that which is presented in experience; there being an explanatory relation 
between the two. On the retentional model – which Kiverstein’s proposal 
appears to be a variant of – such an explanatory connection is denied; yet, unlike 
the snapshot model, that which is presented in experience is said to possess a 
non-zero temporal extension. A theorist may find the retentional model 
Kiverstein proposes unpalatable because of other commitments in discussions 
of temporal experience,124 or because of other commitments in the philosophy 
of mind quite generally. 
 
Hoerl (2017), for example, suggests that a given theorist’s view of the nature of 
perceptual experience might also incline her to reject, or to endorse, such a 
model of temporal experience. On a representational view of perceptual 
experience, where perceptual experience is to be (most fundamentally) 
                                               
124 She may, for example, wish to maintain that “experience of succession requires successive 
experience and so [she may] insist on an explanatory connection between the unfolding temporal 
structure of experience and its contents” (Phillips, 2018: 294). 
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characterised in terms of the way in which it represents things as being in the 
subject’s immediate environment, a distinction can be drawn between the 
vehicle and content of the experience. In this context the vehicle can be taken 
to be those properties of the subject’s perceptual state that are responsible for 
the very representing; the content can be taken to be those properties that are 
represented by the subject’s perceptual state. Hoerl suggests that such a view 
lends itself to a retentional model of the PSP. Given the content/vehicle 
distinction, on a representational view a theorist may hold that the vehicle, at a 
time, presents a temporally extended content; that at a time, a subject is 
perceptually presented with a given temporal interval.  
 
If a theorist does not avail herself of a representational view of perceptual 
experience, she may be suspicious of views postulating both vehicles and 
contents. Take a broad characterisation of an opposing view of the nature of 
perceptual experience to be the relational view, where perceptual experience is 
to be (most fundamentally) characterised in terms of the things in the subject’s 
immediate environment125 which she is perceptually related to in such 
experience. Hoerl says that, on the relational view, “there is no representational 
vehicle the subject instantiates, the particular properties of which fix the 
contents of her experience” (Hoerl, 2017: 179-80). Without granting a role to 
the properties of the vehicle, there does not appear to be the scope for allowing 
that, at a time, the subject is perceptually presented with occurrences unfolding 
over an interval of time.126 To the extent that a theorist finds a relational view of 
perceptual experience appealing, she may find herself sympathetic to the thought 
that, in Phillips’ terms, “an explanatory connection obtains between the 
unfolding of experience itself and its capacity to present us with change and 
succession” (Phillips, 2018: 294). This lends itself to an extensional model of the 
PSP, and appears to be incompatible with Kiverstein’s proposal.  
 
                                               
125 This is to take a direct realist reading of the relational view of perceptual experience, of the 
kind supported by Campbell (2009), Martin (2006), and Soteriou (2013). One might also present 
a relational view on which the direct objects the subject is acquainted with are mind-dependent 
entities, such as sense-data views of perceptual experience. 
126 It might be thought that a relational view need not be hostile to a retentional view, if we can 
appeal to relations of ‘just pastness’ and ‘presentness’ in perceptual experience. However, this 
would appear to be a modal form of retentionalism, rejected previously for violating temporal 
transparency. 
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For those theorists who wish to endorse an extensional model of the PSP – or 
simply do not wish to rule out such a model – Kiverstein’s proposal must be 
rejected. This would leave us without an account of how such a theorist avoids 
holding a proposal that ultimately amounts to a version of Tye’s ‘one experience’ 
view at one extreme, or the snapshot model at the other extreme. At this point, 
it might appear natural to return to the issue of discrete experiences and to 
question Tye’s claim that there is no principled way of individuating between 
successive experiences in the stream of consciousness. 
 
 
3. An extensional alternative 
 
3. 1. Hoerl’s individuation argument 
 
If we do not wish to commit ourselves to the claim that at a time what is presented 
in experience spans some interval of time, and if we are uncomfortable with 
Tye’s ‘one experience’ view, we can find an alternative method of characterising 
the phenomenology and ontology of experience over super-intervals of time in 
recent work from Hoerl (2013). Hoerl disputes Tye’s claim that nothing – in 
reflection upon the phenomenology – other than breaks in consciousness speaks 
to there being a maximum temporal extent that an experience can span. 
 
Hoerl provides what he calls the ‘individuation argument’. In doing so, he 
appeals to the distinction – discussed in the previous two chapters – between 
perceptible and imperceptible motion. The crux of what I want to take from 
Hoerl’s presentation of the individuation argument can be found in the 
following passages:  
 
“[W]hat does the real work in explaining the difference in phenomenology… 
[between imperceptible and perceptible motion] …  is simply the idea of the 
specious present as a fairly limited maximum period of time that individual 
experiences can span. The length of the specious present, thus understood, 
determines which temporal phenomena we can be aware of within experience…” 
(Hoerl, 2013: 387; emphasis in original). 
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“According to the individuation argument, what explains why you can see the 
second-hand moving but not the hour-hand is just this: the period of time that 
individual perceptual experiences can span is limited, with the term ‘the specious 
present’ denoting the maximal interval that an individual experience can span… 
As it is only across such discrete experiences that the different positions traversed 
by the hour-hand become discriminable, you can only become aware that the 
hour-hand has moved, whereas you can see the second-hand moving” (ibid.: 388). 
 
Hoerl explains how that which is presented in experience changes, over super-
intervals of time, through using the individuation argument in order to offer an 
account of how we are to cut up the stream of consciousness into discrete 
experiences. In response to Tye’s ‘one experience view’, Hoerl says that: 
 
“From the point of view of the defender of the individuation argument… there 
is in fact a feature of the phenomenology of experience (and indeed an 
introspectible feature) that we can point to in support of a particular way of 
individuating experiences (or at least the maximum length that any one experience 
can span) that is very different from that envisaged by the one-experience view. 
That feature is that we can directly perceive some instances of movement or 
change, but not others” (ibid.: 397). 
 
Hoerl is disputing the claim that there is no introspectible feature of the 
phenomenology which can support picking out temporal parts of the stream of 
consciousness as privileged intervals of a lesser temporal extent than the period 
between breaks in consciousness. On Hoerl’s presentation of the individuation 
argument, the feature which we can become introspectively aware of is the 
perception of motion/change. Given that we are introspectively aware of 
perceiving change, and can contrast this with the imperceptible cases of change 
(where we infer change, rather than perceiving it), Hoerl suggests that we can 
become aware of temporal limits upon the kinds of things we can experience. 
He further suggests that these temporal limits might be best accounted for if we, 
contra Tye, adopt an account on which such limits are taken to determine how 
we individuate between discrete experiences in the stream of consciousness.127 
                                               
127 Perhaps Frischhut implicitly assumes something like Hoerl’s view of discrete experiences, 
when she appeals to “the duration of a single experience” and says: “we can attend to an object 
for one hour constantly, we cannot ‘take in’ what happens over an entire hour with a single 
experience” (Frischhut, 2014: 46, footnote 14; emphasis added). In what follows I will argue that 
there is no reason in principle to say that we cannot have a single experience presenting an hour-
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To be clear, the presentation of this argument does not commit one to holding 
that experience presents a temporal extent over time, rather than at a time.128 But 
if we are uncomfortable with the claim that a temporal extent is presented in 
experience at a time, Hoerl offers an alternative. He offers a view on which there 
is an “explanatory connection” (ibid.: 383) between the temporal structure of the 
experience and what it presents: “…there is a sense in which experiences of 
succession do take the form of a succession of experiences, because they take 
up a duration during which different things are being experienced in succession” 
(ibid.: 382). Hoerl can be read as saying that experience extends through time like 
that which it presents, offering an extensional model of the PSP, while 
maintaining that a given experience has a maximal temporal extent – the extent 
of the PSP.  
 
On Hoerl’s proposal, we are given one explanation of how what is presented in 
experience as occurring at a time depends upon what is presented as occurring 
over time. In appealing to a sequence of discrete experiences, we can say that 
what is presented in experience as occurring at a time is only so presented in 
virtue of what is presented in an experience. We can also use Hoerl’s proposal 
in order to explain how that which is presented in a subject’s experience over 
super-intervals of time changes. The subject experiences what she does over 
super-intervals of time in virtue of what is presented in each discrete experience 
she undergoes over that time. However, it is not clear that the introspectable 
feature Hoerl appeals to – the distinction between perceptible and imperceptible 
motion – justifies the appeal to discrete experiences, except perhaps as an 
inference to the best explanation.  
 
 
3. 2. The limitations of the individuation argument 
 
As discussed in section 1, Tye appeals to reflection on one’s phenomenology 
over time – experienced continuity in particular – in order to cast doubt on an 
                                               
long occurrence, but – and perhaps this is the motivation behind Frischhut’s claim – the hour-
long occurrence will not be presented as present in the PSP. 
128 The individuation argument is available to a theorist advocating either a retentional or an 
extensional account of the PSP; it is neutral between their many differences. 
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account of the ontology of experience over time which appeals to discrete 
experiences that follow successively from one another in objective time. 
Following Rashbrook, I suggested that it might be best to put matters more 
neutrally and, rather than appealing to experienced continuity as Tye does, say 
that we are not typically aware of our experience over super-intervals – where 
there is no break in consciousness – as discontinuous. With this additional 
qualification, we might nonetheless appear to be proposing an account that is 
contrary to the phenomenology if we use the individuation argument in order to 
pick out token experiences over super-intervals. 
 
Some theorists (Dainton, 2014, and Rashbrook-Cooper, 2017) can be read as 
arguing that, on a proposal which postulates discrete successive experiences, we 
would expect to be introspectively aware of discontinuities in our experience 
over super-intervals of time. That is, if we suppose an account of the ontology 
of experience which appeals to discrete experiences unfolding successively over 
super-intervals of time, such theorists present considerations in support of the 
idea that subjects would become aware of discontinuities in experience over 
super-intervals. This is something it is claimed that subjects cannot, in actual 
fact, do. However, we need not be concerned with such arguments in the present 
context as Hoerl’s account need not be read in this way. The individuation 
argument is presented as a way in which to individuate particular experiences; 
there is no explicit commitment to such experiences occurring successively, 
rather than overlapping. 
 
It might yet be thought that individuating between discrete experiences which 
unfold – be it successively, or overlapping in content – over super-intervals 
leaves one needing to provide an explanation of why a subject’s experience over 
such super-intervals does not seem to be discontinuous. Rather than explore 
such a worry here,129 I simply wish to draw attention to how this method of 
individuating between discrete experiences is again an inference to the best 
                                               
129 I suspect that the strength of any such worry will turn on the issue of whether such 
discontinuities are of a great enough extent to rise to conscious awareness (allowing for an 
awareness of discontinuities rather than simply appealing to discontinuities in awareness); to 
simply assume that they are without further considerations would appear to beg the question 
against Hoerl. 
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explanation.130 The argument of Chapter 1 leaves us agreeing, to an extent, with 
Hoerl’s claim that “[t]he length of the specious present … determines which 
temporal phenomena we can be aware of within experience…” (Hoerl, 2013: 387; 
emphasis in original). That is, the argument presented in Chapter 1 supports the 
claim that the length of the PSP plays a role in determining whether or not 
certain temporal phenomena will be presented in experience, for example, 
whether a case of change or motion will be presented as such. It does not follow 
that we cannot be said to have an experience of temporal phenomena over 
super-intervals, such as plays, concerts, of football matches.  
 
Individuating between discrete experiences of the temporal extent of the PSP 
might be consistent with the fact that experience does not seem to be 
discontinuous (though it might not be, if it is cashed out in a certain way), but 
there is no unequivocal support from reflection upon the experiential 
phenomenology to suggest that there are such discrete experiences. 
Understanding the individuation argument to be an inference to the best 
explanation, in what follows, I offer an alternative that need not make the 
ontological commitments – the appeal to discrete experiences – Hoerl’s proposal 
does. 
 
 
4. A phenomenological characterisation of the PSP 
 
Having considered several extant proposals in the literature, in the current 
section I offer a positive proposal regarding how we are to characterise the 
experience of events over super-intervals of time. In order to do so, we need not 
appeal to discrete experiences unfolding successively in the stream of 
consciousness; we need not hold that experience over super-intervals is 
discontinuous in any principled sense. I begin by offering a phenomenological 
characterisation of the PSP. 
 
                                               
130 This can be read in how Hoerl sets up the individuation argument. He says: “What 
introspection might reveal, instead, are limits to the kinds of things we can and do experience, 
which in turn might be best accounted for by adopting a particular view of the individuation of discrete 
experiences” (Hoerl, 2013: 398; emphasis added). 
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I first (in section 4.1.) present how Russell draws a connection between attention 
and an object being given (present) in a primitive way in experience. After setting 
out this view of Russell’s, I demonstrate how Martin extends this claim – 
concerning what is present in experience – to a region of space, over and above 
the objects filling said region. I subsequently (in section 4.2.) demonstrate that 
this can be extended to occurrences and to an awareness of some temporal 
extent, over and above the occurrences falling within this temporal extent. This 
proposal makes use of an appeal to a subject’s awareness of immediately 
preceding and subsequent times, though it does so in a way which is distinct 
from the Husserlian proposal. Finally, given the characterisation offered of the 
PSP, I offer an explanation of how we may refer to token experiences (in section 
4.3.), on which there is no in principle distinction between successive experiences 
in an unbroken stream of consciousness. 
 
 
4. 1. Russell, the Theory of Knowledge, and the given 
 
In Principia Mathematica (1910/1912/1913) Russell and Whitehead set out to 
describe a set of axioms and rules of inference in symbolic logic from which all 
mathematical truths could – in principle – be proven. In the Theory of Knowledge 
(1992) manuscript (TK hereafter), Russell appears to be following a similar 
methodology. Russell proceeds by taking as basic a limited number of axioms, 
then trying to show how we could derive all knowledge from these axioms 
together with the deliverances of experience.  
 
In offering an analysis of experience,131 Russell says that there are (typically) 
several objects given in experience at any time – focusing on visual perceptual 
experience for simplicity. To say that an object is so given is to say that it is 
presented to the subject, without the subject needing to reflect on any of the 
properties of the object or relations between herself and the object. To illustrate 
                                               
131 Russell establishes at the outset what he means by ‘experience’: “The things which a man is 
said to experience are the things that are given in sensation, his own thoughts and feelings (at 
any rate so far as he is aware of them), and perhaps (though on this point common sense might 
hesitate) the facts which he comes to know by thinking” (Russell, 1992: 7). In what is a broadly 
similar use of the term, I have been taking ‘experience’ to mean a phenomenally conscious 
occurrence – an occurrence for which there is something it is like for the subject undergoing it.  
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this claim, Russell says that if we were inclined to go around naming objects, the 
particular objects named would be the objects given in experience (that objects 
given in experience can be demonstratively picked out and named in a way in 
which other objects cannot). That which distinguishes the objects named from 
the various other objects populating the world is that the former are given in 
experience and the latter are not, but this distinction only becomes evident in 
reflection. During the naming process, Russell says that the particular objects 
appear merely as this or that. 
 
In spelling out what it is that is given in experience, Russell says that ‘this’ can 
function as a proper name and apply directly to an object without requiring any 
description of the object; on different occasions it can apply to different objects. 
‘This’ is used to name the object being attended to at a particular time by the 
person who uses the word. He says that what one can pick out as ‘this’ is that 
which is given in experience (he says that ‘this’, referring to an object, is given in 
experience, and reflection shows that it is ‘that which is given’). In doing so 
Russell, draws a connection between attention and what is given in (visual) 
experience: 
 
“At any moment of my conscious life, there is one object (or at most some very 
small number of objects) to which I am attending. All knowledge of particulars 
radiates out from this object. The object is not intrinsically distinguishable from 
other objects – it just happens (owing to causes which do not concern us) that I 
am attending to it. Since I am attending to it, I can name it; … I am apt to name 
it ‘this’… ‘This’ is the point from which the whole process starts, and ‘this’ itself 
is not defined, but simply given...” (Russell, 1992: 40).  
 
The subject’s position in the world – and the relative position of various objects 
– delineates those objects which can be visually attended to from her current 
position, and those objects which she cannot attend to. The notion of attention 
being appealed to is something like the ‘spotlight model’ of attention. Without 
providing a sophisticated account of this model, we can say that there are 
particular things – particular objects, their parts, or perhaps other features – 
within the subject’s visual field which can be visually attended to. One way to 
put this would be by saying that, on this model, once we establish the extent of 
a subject’s visual field and her location relative to other objects at a time – such 
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that we know which stimuli fall within her visual field, from her current location 
– it is then a further question what, if anything, she is visually attending to in this 
sense.  
 
While a subject might visually attend to a single object in the above sense, it is 
plausible that what is given in visual experience is not typically a single particular 
object. In offering an account of what is given in experience, it is plausible that 
we need to appeal to more than ‘this’ – the particular object being attended to. 
It is plausible that there are a variety of stimuli given in experience, as well as the 
region of space within which such stimuli fall, delineated by the extent of the 
visual field. This coheres with Martin’s claim that: “We can think of normal 
visual experience as experience not only of objects which are located in some 
space, but as of a space within which they are located. The space is part of the 
experience in as much as one is aware of the region as a potential location for 
objects of vision” (Martin, 1992: 189). We are visually aware of a region of space 
spread wider than our position as experiencers, within which stimuli can be 
seen132. This region of space is given in the subject’s experience. 
 
Granting that this is how we should construe visual experience (that given in 
experience is a region of space within which various stimuli fall), in order to have 
this experience, of the region of space, it seems as though there must be some 
way to attend to all of this.133 Without being able to do so, the subject could not 
be said to experience the region of space over and above being aware of this-or-
that object or sub-region within the region.  
 
Building upon Russell’s proposal, we can maintain Martin’s claim that we are 
able to attend in this way to a region of space; this region of space being that 
which is given in experience. I will refer to this latter sense, contrasted with the 
attention to a particular object, as wide-attention. An appeal to what is given in 
                                               
132 And this region of space seems to be a sub-region of all of the space that there is. For further 
discussion of this claim, see Chapter 4; also see Soteriou (2013) and Richardson (2014), following 
Martin (1992). 
133 Nothing much hangs on calling this ‘attention’. If other theorists have strict accounts of what 
can and cannot count as a form of attention, and if the form currently under discussion would 
not pass their tests, they are free to disregard the terminology. What is important is that we can 
(and do) do what is being described here; not whether or not this can count as a form of attention, 
as opposed to a form of awareness, for example. 
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experience can then be used in order to provide a phenomenological 
characterisation of the visual field: it is that spatial extent which is so given in 
visual experience, which can be wide-attended to, from a given location at a 
given time.134 Before turning to further considerations, it is worth highlighting 
that in the case of the visual field we are not forced into a particular account of 
how we are to individuate between experiences. I have offered a characterisation 
of the notion of wide-attention and how this can capture what is given in 
experience, but this is not to say that what can be attended to from a position, 
at a time, gives us an experience in any principled sense.135 This notion of what 
is given in experience plausibly also has application in the temporal case. 
 
 
4. 2. The phenomenological characterisation of the PSP 
 
In TK Russell discusses the presence of objects in perceptual experience under 
the broader guise of ‘acquaintance’. For Russell acquaintance is a dual relation 
between a subject and an object. Russell develops a view on which there are 
three forms of the relation of acquaintance: imagination, sensation, and 
memory.136 For Russell, the relation of presence/sensation137 is one of the 
ultimate constituents of our knowledge of time; the ‘present time’ is to be 
understood as the time of those things which stand in the relation of 
presence/sensation to the subject (see Russell, 1992: 66).  
                                               
134 There may be questions concerning whether everything which falls within the region of space 
given in experience should be counted as being attended to in the wide sense, no matter how 
small the stimulus, for example. There will also be questions concerning whether there is really 
a neat cut-off point between what is and is not attended to in this way, from a given location at 
a given time. This is the question of whether the edges of the visual field are – 
phenomenologically speaking – clear and determinate, or fuzzy and/or indeterminate. For 
present purposes, neither point needs to be settled decisively. We can say, minimally, that the 
visual field is to be given a phenomenological characterisation in terms of the spatial extent 
which can be attended to in the wide sense; we need not settle precisely what can and cannot be 
so attended to from a given location at a given time. 
135 One may wish to individuate experiences in terms of what a subject can see from a given 
location at a given time, but reflection on what is given in experience does not force a theorist 
to do so. 
136 I won’t discuss the distinction between memory, imagination, and sensation that Russell 
draws in this context, as exploring the senses in which the remembering and imagining are and 
are not ‘present’ – concerning the phenomenally conscious occurrences and the objects to which 
the subject is psychologically directed to – would take us too far from our current concerns. (He 
also speaks briefly of attention as a fourth relation of acquaintance, which picks out particular 
objects in sensation.) 
137 These two terms are used interchangeably by Russell to pick out a single acquaintance relation. 
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The difference between these modes of acquaintance is taken to be 
introspectively accessible. Russell says that in sensation objects are ‘present’ in a 
sense in which they are not in memory, for example. As put by Martin, for 
Russell: “[In memory] there is a distinctive kind of acquaintance with past 
objects, one in which we experience them as past, and recognise them as 
belonging in the past. This contrasts with all present sensation, and all sense 
experience of sense-data, including what Russell himself labels the specious 
present in TK” (Martin, 2015: 12). This is, as Martin says, to contrast that which 
is given as past in memory with that which is given by the relation of presence.  
 
In discussing the relation of presence, Russell did not appear to think that the 
relation holds between the subject and an instantaneous state of affairs, but 
rather between the subject and some brief temporal extent – the PSP. Martin 
writes that “Russell contrasts the status of objects that one experiences in the 
specious present, and the objects of immediate memory… Russell takes all 
objects that belong to the specious present of a subject in an interval as being 
objects of sensation, as being present. In contrast, the key significance of 
immediate memory is that while objects are experienced in immediate memory 
we are acquainted with them in a way different from that of sensation, in being 
past rather than present” (Martin, 2015: 6).138 This highlights a distinction 
between Russell’s proposal and that which was previously drawn from Husserl. 
Immediate memory combined with sensation is not what gives the specious 
present temporal breadth, for Russell this comes from sensation alone.139 The 
relation of presence which he postulates is a relation to occurrences of some 
temporal extent, and this makes available a proposal on which such a temporal 
extent is given in experience. 
 
He says: “The most obvious fact, in our present inquiry, is that… some objects 
undoubtedly fall within my present experience, and of these objects some at least 
did not fall within my experience at earlier times which I can still remember” 
(Russell, 1992: 33; emphasis added). In saying this, he can be read as highlighting 
                                               
138 In a footnote Martin also points out that in The Analysis of Mind (1921) Russell changes his 
view on this point, holding that immediate memory is a feature of the specious present and that 
which explains our experience of change. Here I will only consider Russell’s proposals in TK. 
139 Again, see Martin, who says that “for Russell, present experience excluding memory can 
present a temporal interval and not just a moment...” (Martin, 2015: 11). 
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one motivation behind the PSP: the sense in which, over super-intervals of time, 
that which is presented in experience changes. In ongoing experience, a subject 
may be able to remember what she has previously experienced (in the same 
unbroken period of consciousness) and she may be able to anticipate what she 
will subsequently experience (in the same unbroken period of consciousness), 
while there is some limited temporal extent she is given in perceptual experience. 
It is within this latter temporal extent that some objects/occurrences stand in 
the relation of presence to the subject. 
 
Taking a relatively invariant temporal extent to be given in perceptual experience 
can allow us to offer a characterisation of the PSP which parallels the 
characterisation I offered of the visual field. We can make an analogous 
primitiveness claim regarding what is experientially given in the spatial and 
temporal variants. In typical cases a variety of stimuli, of some temporal spread, 
are given in experience. To parallel with Martin’s suggestion in the spatial case, 
we can also make the point that our experience is not merely of stimuli of some 
temporal spread, but of a positive temporal extent within which such stimuli are 
located. In the temporal variant, talk of what is given in experience picks out the 
totality of the temporal extent that can be attended to in the wide sense:140 the 
PSP. However, in offering a phenomenological characterisation of the visual 
field, I appealed to the region a subject could attend to from her location in 
space. It might be objected that this is part of what gives substance to the notion; 
yet I have not appealed to anything analogous in the temporal case.  
 
The objection offered certainly has merit. If we offer a phenomenological 
characterisation of the visual field in terms of what is given in experience, from 
a given location at a given time, it might appear plausible that this is what we 
                                               
140 It might be objected that there is a striking disanalogy between the case of the visual field and 
the PSP, concerning the distinction between the two forms of attention discussed previously. In 
motivating the wide notion of attention, through considering what can be said about the visual 
field, it was taken for granted that something akin to the spotlight model is also applicable. It 
may be contended that it is not clear whether we can take this for granted in the temporal case. 
One may question whether we can attend to a temporal part of what falls within the PSP in the 
way in which we can attend to a spatial part of what falls within the visual field, in the spotlight 
sense of the term. The quick response is that nothing that has been said commits the account of 
the PSP to come down either way on this issue. We might be able to attend – in the spotlight 
sense of the term – to a temporal part of the PSP and we might not. For the account of the PSP 
outlined above the important point is to recognise the applicability of the wide notion in the 
temporal case, regardless of the applicability of something akin to the spotlight model. 
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should also do in the temporal case. Do we mean to appeal to what is given in 
experience at a time? Or in a particular experience? Neither will do, having 
previously questioned both Kiverstein’s appeal to what is presented in 
experience at a given time and Hoerl’s appeal to discrete experiences. If not 
committing to either way out of the mire, how are we to pick out the interval of 
interest? To offer no such explanation would be insufficient. We need some way 
of constraining the interval of interest when we appeal to what is given in 
experience, because – as Tye might rightly object – everything experienced over 
the course of the day will be similarly given in experience at the time at which it 
is experienced.  
 
A solution can be found if we take what Russell says together with Husserl,141 
but divorced of the claim that the temporal extent given in experience is 
presented at a time. Husserl appeared to offer a view on which the notions of 
retention, protention, and primal impression, can only be understood in terms 
of one another; in addition we are offered a characterisation of the PSP in terms 
of the temporal breadth spanned by the retentions and protentions (these being 
understood as different temporal manners of presentation, presenting their 
objects as just past or about to come respectively). I have given reasons to be 
sceptical of the characterisation of the PSP suggested by the latter claim, but this 
was not to say that we should be sceptical of the broader idea which can be read 
in the former: that a subject’s experiential awareness of a time – or rather an 
interval of time – as present irreducibly depends on her awareness of other times 
as recently past/future.142  
                                               
141 There is reason to think that the resulting view would do no violence to the view Russell 
expresses in TK. After all, Russell defines the present time in terms of the time of those things 
to which I stand in the relation of presence; the past and future would both therefore be defined 
in terms of what comes before/after the time of those things to which I stand in the relation of 
presence. 
142 This claim of irreducibility can also be read in O’Shaughnessy’s discussion of the temporal 
properties of experience. He says that “the essential description of any experience of the moment 
contains an irreducible reference to the immediate past/future of the experience, given from the 
temporal vantage-point of ‘now’. … Close up the past, wall off the future, and you cover over 
the present too” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 62). O’Shaughnessy also makes the claim that the 
experienced present is instantaneous, but we need not accept this claim in order to accept the 
irreducibility claim. For a proposal which is inspired by O’Shaughnessy’s discussion of the 
irreducible reference to the past and future in an experiencing subject’s awareness of the present, 
but which holds that perceptual experience presents a non-zero temporal extent as such, see 
Crowther and Soteriou (2017). I will say more about this awareness of past/future times in 
Chapter 4; I argue that this is related to the sense in which time seems to pass in Chapter 5. 
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Taking elements from Russell and Husserl, the resulting view of the PSP is as 
follows. We take (from Russell) the claim that a temporal extent is given as 
present in experience – through the relation of presence, in Russell’s terms. We 
take (from Husserl) the idea that a form of awareness of the recent future and 
past has an irreducible role to play in characterising our awareness of the present. 
These ideas are compatible if we say that an interval is given as present in 
experience, not necessarily involving memory (nor retention) or imagination 
(nor protention), though the subject’s awareness of immediately preceding and 
subsequent times is constitutive of the interval being so given. We can then say 
that the subject is invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this 
extent marking the partition between the past and the future for the subject. No 
claim is made regarding whether a subject is presented with such an interval at a 
time as opposed to over some interval of time and no claim is made concerning 
the individuation between discrete experiences, because no such claims 
concerning the ontology of experience are yet required in order to do justice to 
the phenomenology. 
 
 
4. 3. The Russellian account and token experiences 
 
On the proposal developed above, the PSP is characterised as the invariant 
interval the subject is given in experience – given as the partition between past 
and future. On this account, although it will be true to say that over time 
whatever brief occurrences are experienced by the subject will seem to be 
present (between past and future) as she experiences them, all that she 
experiences in an unbroken stream of consciousness does not seem, to her, to 
be given as falling between past and future. It is not typically that what is given 
in experience, as falling between the past and future, positively seems to be a 
discrete experience either, as Tye suggests.  
 
To return to the example of the play, we can say that experiencing unfolds over 
the two hours in which the subject is watching the play. We can grant to Tye 
that experiencing does not appear to stop until there is a break in consciousness. 
I have suggested that throughout this two-hour period an invariant interval, the 
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PSP, is given in experience as that which falls between the past and the future. 
As time goes on, the occurrences the subject is so aware of – which are given as 
falling between past and future – changes.143 What the subject experiences over 
the two-hour interval is dependent upon what is given in the subject’s 
experience, as falling between past and future as the subject is oriented to them, 
over sub-intervals of this super-interval. The latter claim can be true without us 
thinking that there is a discrete experience, and indeed a series of discrete 
experiences. 
 
To say that what is given in experience is a temporal extent which marks out the 
partition between past and future, for the subject, does not commit us to 
anything which forces us back towards a version of the snapshot model. We can 
hold that what is presented in experience as occurring at a time is so presented 
in virtue of what is presented in experience as occurring over that time – over 
the PSP.144 We can also maintain that what is presented in experience over super-
intervals changes. One’s experience is not only of occurrences located in time, 
but of an interval of time within which they are located. We can attend – in the 
wide sense – to the temporal extent which is given in experience in a way in 
which we cannot attend to super-intervals, such as that which spans an unbroken 
period of consciousness. Thus there is a sense in which the PSP picks out a 
privileged interval, for experiencing subjects. A subject can experience things of a 
greater temporal extent, things that unfold over super-intervals of time, but 
when she does so this is through experiencing sub-intervals of the occurrence, 
as they fall within the PSP, over time. 
 
                                               
143 This can accommodate the sense in which our experience over time is often said to be in flux 
– there is continuously more experiencing occurring – while also stable, in that the PSP remains 
throughout. This is so even if what the subject is experientially aware of seems to remain identical 
in content, such as watching a static scene, as there is always more experiencing which seems to 
be taking place. This is not a new claim; it is put particularly forcefully by O’Shaughnessy when 
he says: “even when experience is not changing in type or content, it still changes in another 
respect: it is constantly renewed, a new sector of itself is there and then taking place. …Thus, 
even if I am staring fixedly at some unchanging material object, such staring is not merely a 
continuous existent across time, it is an activity and therefore also a process, and thus occurrently 
renewed in each instant in which it continues to exist” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 42). 
144 Just as we may wish to say that what is visually presented as being at a point in space depends 
upon what is presented as being over some spatial extent within which the point falls (see 
Chapter 2, section 5, for further discussion). 
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In offering the phenomenal characterisation of the PSP, we have not had to 
commit to any principled way of individuating between experiences in the 
stream of consciousness. To end, I return to the thought that this may be 
because there is no principled way of individuating between experiences. 
Common sense might wane at this point, but we tend to talk about experiences 
as things which may either have a fairly substantial or a short temporal breadth 
– contrast one’s experience of the play with the experience of a flash of lightning 
– and as things that we may pick out in terms of the presence (or absence) of 
certain phenomenal properties – such as the experience of pain in one’s leg, or 
the experience of a pause in the music. Consistent with the idea that experiencing 
continues to unfold while a subject is wakefully conscious, we may pick out 
token experiences by picking out the ingredients of the experience we are 
concerned with. 
 
Suppose a subject is awake and experiencing from t1-t30 (for simplicity, take the 
PSP to span the interval between successive integers). Suppose that she is 
perceptually aware, over time t11 – t20, of a distant whining sound. Through 
becoming perceptually aware of the whining sound at t11 and no longer being so 
aware after t20, we can pick out her experience of the whining sound: that portion 
of the experiencing which unfolded from t11-t20. (We could just as well pick out 
the experience of the whining sound starting, between t10 and t11). To pick out an 
experience is therefore to do something which is, to this extent, interest/context 
relative. Tye may be correct that at no point in an unbroken stream of 
consciousness is a subject aware of what seems to be a discrete experience, 
followed by another, and so on. However, the subject can be aware of the 
presence/absence of an ingredient of the phenomenology; she can be aware, for 
example, of the whining sound starting, continuing for some period of time, and 
then stopping. Being so aware, we can gainfully appeal to an experience of the 
whining sound, the token experience being picked out with reference to the 
relevant feature of the phenomenology. 
 
In summary, we can grant that there is no principled way of individuating 
between discrete experiences in the stream of consciousness. It does not follow 
that we cannot refer to token experiences in the stream of consciousness; it is 
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merely a reflection of the fact that our doing so is to this extent interest/context 
relative. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In the present chapter, the issue of interest has been how we are to characterise 
the experience of occurrences that unfold over super-intervals – such as plays, 
concerts, and football matches. I have sought an account which can maintain 
that what is presented in experience as occurring at a time is only so presented 
in virtue of what is presented as occurring over a greater extent, while 
consistently maintaining that what is presented in experience over super-
intervals of time changes.  
 
I considered three extant accounts of the ontology and phenomenology of 
experience over super-intervals of time, from Tye (2003); Husserl (1905) and 
Kiverstein (2010); and Hoerl (2013). Tye argues that there are no reasons from 
reflection on the phenomenology to think that there is a sequence of discrete 
experiences, each presenting some invariant temporal extent. He argues that 
there is, on the contrary, one experience which presents an entire unbroken 
stream of consciousness. While sympathetic to the former claim, I argued that 
we must reject the latter as it is stated, because it does not do justice to how what 
is presented in experience seems to change over time.  
 
Husserl and Kiverstein can be read as offering a proposal on which a subject’s 
experience, at a time, presents a given non-zero temporal extent (the PSP). 
Against this view I argued that we do not have phenomenological support for 
supposing that we experience a greater temporal extent from a point of view of 
a lesser temporal extent (in contrast to the spatial-visual case). I said that 
Kiverstein’s proposal can be read as an inference to the best explanation, but 
that the ontological commitments of the proposal render it unavailable to those 
theorists wishing to endorse extensional models of the PSP or relational views 
of perceptual experience. Hoerl offers a proposal on which we have a series of 
discrete experiences (overlapping or in succession) over super-intervals of time, 
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individuated by the temporal extent of the PSP. Against Hoerl’s proposal I 
suggested that we need not take the stream of consciousness to consist of a 
series of discrete experiences – each the temporal extent of the PSP – in order 
to do justice to the phenomenology. 
 
I have offered a positive characterisation of the PSP through developing 
Russell’s construal of what is given in experience. On this proposal a subject is 
invariably presented with a positive temporal extent, with this interval marking 
the partition between the past and the future for the subject. Given the 
phenomenological characterisation of the PSP developed, we can explain the 
sense in which that which is presented in experience over super-intervals seems 
to change without arriving at any principled way of individuating between 
experiences. I ended by suggesting that what counts as a token experience may 
be somewhat context or interest relative. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Blood Brothers: On the Experience of Objects and 
Events 
 
 
“So, did y'hear the story of the Johnstone twins?  
As like each other as two new pins, 
Of one womb born, on the self-same day, 
How one was kept and one given away?” 
(Russell, 2013: 5). 
 
 
Blood Brothers, a musical by Liverpudlian playwright Willy Russell, revolves 
around twin boys, Mickey and Edward, who are separated at birth and brought 
up in different environments in the city of Liverpool. Mickey (and his family) 
represents the working class, badly affected by the economic downturn in the 
1980s, while Edward (and the Lyons family in which he is raised) embodies the 
middle class, which thrived over this period. During this period of economic 
strife, it was often said that anyone who wanted to succeed only needed to work 
hard; yet Russell’s play disputes this and captures the outcry against Thatcherism 
from the working class. Rather than there being a single set of principles 
governing the path to success for everyone, Russell illustrates how there 
appeared to be different principles (and circumstances) for the middle and 
working classes. 
 
One view of our experience of objects and our experience of events is that they 
are much like Mickey and Edward, insofar as they are remarkably similar, and if 
for some reason theorists have appealed to different phenomenological 
principles in characterising either, this should be rectified. One way to approach 
the discussion to follow is through the question of how good such a comparison 
is: just how similar is our typical experience of objects as they fill space to our 
experience of events as they fill time? This question, as I will understand it, 
concerns how we are to characterise the phenomenal character of our 
121 
 
experience. I am interested in the phenomenal character of a subject’s experience 
of medium-sized objects145 – such as books, cups, tomatoes, and so on – and 
‘medium-length events’146 – such as a bar of music, the scoring of a goal, the 
path traced by a comet in the night sky, and so on – as well as the sense in which 
a subject occupies a perspective in space and time on such objects and events. 
 
In order to fruitfully compare and contrast our experience of objects and events, 
I first discuss the spatial case and the idea that a typical subject seems to 
experience an object while not seeming to experience all spatial portions of the 
object from a given spatial location relative to it. Having demonstrated that this 
is an idea that many theorists have found puzzling (in section 1.1.), I turn to 
consider Alva Noë’s (2012) proposed solution to the apparent puzzle (in section 
1.2.), on which the occluded portions of an object are presented in a subject’s 
experience as accessible from the subject’s point of view (albeit less accessible than 
those portions of the object which are not occluded). I demonstrate that Noë’s 
proposal requires us to deny, or at least importantly qualify, a plausible 
phenomenological claim, and that this can be avoided if we opt for an alternative 
solution (outlined in section 2). On the latter, the sense in which an object is 
perceived as a voluminous whole while some portions of the object are not seen 
is to be accounted for through how it is manifest to the subject that she is 
experiencing an object from a relative point of view (the object seeming to afford 
many perspectives in space upon it). This relates to one sense in which our 
experience of objects will always be partial. 
 
Having discussed the spatial case and the experience of objects, I turn to how 
Noë offers an analogous account of our experience of events (outlined in section 
3). For Noë, perceiving a portion of an object can implicate, in the perceptual 
experience, the rest of the object extending in space, and perceiving some 
portion of an event can implicate, in the perceptual experience, the rest of the 
event extending in time. Developing Noë’s proposal (in section 4.), I argue that 
while there are some analogies which can be drawn, the temporal case is 
                                               
145 In the sense of Austin’s “moderate-sized specimens of dry goods” (1962: 8). 
146 Which, to be analogues of Austin’s moderate-sized specimens of dry goods, I will take to be 
temporal particulars from less than a second in length to several seconds in length. I will assume 
that while some may fall within the temporal extent of the PSP, others will extend beyond it.  
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importantly disanalogous in one respect: spatiotemporal occurrences do not 
seem to admit of any other possible perceptual points of view in time. I end by 
clarifying how my proposal interacts with other debates concerning temporal 
experience in the contemporary literature (in section 5.1.), and briefly contrast 
the explanatory projects of Noë and dynamic snapshot theorists (in section 5.2.), 
the latter being the main focus of Chapter 2. 
 
 
1. Experiencing objects 
 
1.1. Two phenomenological claims and a puzzle 
 
When wakefully conscious, with open eyes and looking straight ahead, we tend 
to – in the typical case – take ourselves to be visually presented with objects.147 
It is part of what it is like for us – it is manifest in the phenomenology – that we 
are seeing such objects,148 though it does not seem as though we can see all 
spatial portions of such objects at a given time.  
 
These two claims – that we seem to see objects, and that we do not seem to see 
all spatial portions of any given object at a given time – are made in many places 
in the phenomenological literature. For example, Husserl says that a 
phenomenologically adequate description of the experience of a three-
dimensional object would not merely appeal to the front facing surface; neither 
would it appeal to all portions of the object’s surface equally. He says: “Of 
necessity a physical thing can be given only ‘one-sidedly’... A physical thing is 
necessarily given in mere ‘modes of appearance’ in which necessarily a core 
of ‘what is actually presented’ is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of 
‘co-givenness’” (Husserl, 1913: 94; emphasis in original). In a similar fashion, Sartre 
                                               
147 In philosophical discussions of perceptual experience the focus is, for the most part, on the 
visual experience of moderate-sized objects: books, cups, tomatoes, and so on. The experience 
of such objects is taken to be the paradigmatic or central case of perceptual experience; I will 
continue to focus on such objects in what follows. However, there are increasingly many 
important contributions which do not share this focus. For a recent example, see the discussions 
of perceptual ephemera collected in Crowther and Mac Cumhaill (2018). 
148 See Strawson’s (1979) response to Ayer in defence of this claim. I will speak interchangeably 
of ‘experiencing’ and ‘seeing’ objects in what follows, nothing hangs on this difference in 
terminology. 
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says the following. “In perception I observe objects. It should be understood by 
this that the object, though it enters whole into my perception, is never given to 
me but one side at a time. … All this has been said a hundred times: it is 
characteristic of perception that the object never appears except in a series of 
profiles, of projections” (Sartre, 1940: 8; emphasis in original).149 Each author 
maintains that it is phenomenologically apt to talk of visually experiencing a 
three-dimensional object, while also maintaining that some portion of the object 
is seen and other portions are not, at any given time. 
 
At a given time, when you can see a whole tomato before you, you cannot see 
the reverse facing surface of the tomato. It does not follow that you experience 
the tomato as lacking the reverse surface that a tomato usually has – we might 
find plausible quite the opposite, that the phenomenology is committal on there 
being the usual reverse surface of a tomato – but it does follow that the front 
facing surface of the tomato shows up in your experience in a certain sense150 in 
which the reverse facing surface does not. The claim that we seem to experience 
three-dimensional objects, together with the distinction between the front facing 
surface of an object and its rear, make two phenomenological claims about visual 
experience plausible. 
 
1. The Object Claim: A phenomenologically apt description of a typical 
subject’s visual experience needs to appeal to three-dimensional, space-
filling objects, rather than mere patches of colour or surfaces. 
2. The Surface Claim: A phenomenologically apt description of a typical 
subject’s visual experience needs to account for the sense in which we 
experience the front facing surface of an opaque object and not its rear. 
 
Each claim is supposed to be supported by reflection on the perceptual 
phenomenology and yet they have been read by some theorists as being in 
                                               
149 This can also be read in Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) discussion, when he similarly says that there 
are “two elements of perception”, and that “the appearance of ‘something’ requires both this 
presence and this absence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 16). He takes perception to be “a reference 
to a whole which can be grasped, in principle, only through certain of its parts or aspects” (ibid.). 
150 At this point I intentionally leave it ambiguous what it means to say that the front surface of 
the tomato shows up in experience in a certain sense, as this is one of the issues under investigation. 
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conflict; as a consequence, we have a puzzle regarding how these two claims can 
be coherently maintained.  
 
Thompson Clarke begins his discussion in ‘Seeing surfaces and physical objects’ 
(1965) by remarking that “[m]ore than one philosopher of impressive 
intelligence has taken the fact that normally we can see no more of a physical 
object than part of its surface to have paradoxical implications, that is, to signify 
that the ‘common-sense’ belief that we can see physical objects and on this basis 
know that there are such objects must either be flatly rejected or importantly 
qualified” (Clarke, 1965: 98).151 As Clarke suggests, when faced with the puzzle 
of how we are to coherently maintain the two claims above, one way in which 
some theorists have proceeded is by denying the first claim outright (or 
importantly qualifying it). 
 
Moore appears to be willing to deny the Object Claim when he says that what a 
man sees, when looking at his hand, is not strictly identical with his whole hand, 
but rather “that part of its surface which he is actually seeing…” (Moore, 1959: 
54). Broad can also be read as denying the Object Claim when he says: “If you 
press a plain man with questions, you will easily get him to admit that all that he 
literally sees at any one moment is a limited part of the outer surface of a certain 
body” (Broad, 1952: 4; emphasis in original). Broad and Moore can be read as 
saying that we do not visually experience objects at all; that all we strictly 
speaking experience is the front facing surface of the object.  
 
While Broad and Moore offer us one way out of the puzzle, as we do not need 
to explain how to coherently maintain the two claims if we simply reject one of 
them, this comes at a price. To deny the Object Claim is to run counter to a 
phenomenological claim that theorists have found incredibly plausible.152 
Theorists might try to lessen the cost, by suggesting that the claim that we are 
confronted with three-dimensional objects in our environment is a judgement – 
perhaps an implicit one – based on experience, rather than being something 
                                               
151 I will not go on to further discuss Clarke’s positive proposal in this context. For detailed 
discussion of Clarke’s position, and the different ways in which one may disagree with the 
conclusions he draws, see Martin (2017). 
152 For example, Noë says that it is “bedrock, phenomenologically speaking, that the tomato [as 
one example] looks voluminous, that it looks to have a back” (Noë, 2012: 16). 
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experienced. Such claims remain revisionary, if not outright contrary to the 
phenomenology. In recent work Alva Noë can be read as offering an alternative 
proposal in an effort to coherently maintain both claims. While I am sympathetic 
to the spirit of Noë’s proposal, in what follows I argue that, ultimately, he either 
denies or importantly qualifies the Surface Claim. Denying either claim is 
something that it would be preferable to avoid. 
 
 
1.2. A sensorimotor response to the puzzle 
 
Discussing our visual experience of objects, Noë can be read as suggesting that 
we should maintain the Object Claim, saying: “you have a sense of the presence 
of the object as a whole at a moment in time” (Noë, 2012: 74); not merely a 
portion of its surface. Noë can also be read as suggesting that we should endorse 
the Surface Claim, saying that in visual experience “[y]ou have an experience of 
a voluminous whole… [while] you can only see the facing surface of the 
[object]…” (ibid.: 56). He says that objects “outstrip our experience; they have 
hidden parts, always” (ibid.: 74).  
 
In an effort to coherently maintain the Object and Surface Claims Noë develops 
the technical notions of perceptual presence and presence in absence. For Noë, the front 
facing portion of an object’s surface is perceptually present in the subject’s 
experience, but this is not all that there is to the phenomenology of the 
experience. The object’s reverse surface, which she cannot see from her current 
position relative to it, can also be perceptually present in her experience, but it 
is ‘present in absence’. The notion of presence in absence is characterised by 
Noë as picking out the regions of an object’s surface that the subject cannot 
currently see, but that figure in the phenomenal character of her experience 
through her understanding of how appearances could vary if she moved relative 
to the object.153  
 
                                               
153 He says that presence in absence is “…a special kind of availability. The world is present, in 
perception, not by being present (e.g. represented or depicted) in consciousness all at once, as it 
were, but by being available all at once to the skillful perceiver. And different items are available 
in different ways, depending on the kind of bodily, sensorimotor relation that we hold to them” 
(Noë, 2012: 58). 
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Noë offers an account of perceptual presence in terms of sensorimotor 
availability: “what is visible is not what projects to a point… what is visible 
[should be thought of] as what is available from a place” (ibid.: 19; emphasis in 
original).154 He claims that we have a visual sense of the presence of the reverse 
surface of an opaque object – contrasting this with the object’s insides – which 
consists in practical sensorimotor understanding: how we would have to move, 
or how the object would have to be moved, in order to bring what is currently 
the reverse side into view. For something to be perceptually present a perceiver 
must understand (where talk of ‘understanding’ here is not supposed to entail 
explicit reasoning, but can be construed in an implicit, practical, bodily way) that 
there is a relation between the perceiver and the object/quality which satisfies 
two conditions: one on how movements of the perceiver’s body will control the 
character of the relation, and another on how movements or other changes in 
the object/quality will control the character.  
 
Note that Noë’s proposal is committed to more than the developmental claim 
that in early infancy we have sensorimotor interactions with three-dimensional 
solid objects and that it is – in part – through having such interactions that we 
come to experience objects as voluminous wholes in mature perception. Noë is 
making a claim about the phenomenal character of mature perceptual experience 
and the sense in which the reverse surface of an object features in a subject’s 
experience. He appears to be committed to the phenomenological claim that the 
reverse surface of an object features in the phenomenal character of a subject’s 
experience given the relevant sensorimotor understanding.  
 
For Noë “all perceptual presence is the presence of access… I reject, that is, the 
idea that we see the front of the tomato as it were unproblematically and that we 
achieve access to the back of the tomato by dint of the application of 
sensorimotor understanding…” (Noë, 2008: 697). That is, he rejects the idea 
that we are to give one account of how the front facing surface of an object 
features in experience and a different account, appealing to the subject’s 
                                               
154 Matthen (2005, 2010) offers what appears to be a similar view, appealing to the operations of 
the visuomotor system. I focus on Noë in the present chapter because of how he extends his 
account to incorporate our experience of temporally extended events, to be discussed in sections 
3 and 4. 
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sensorimotor understanding, of how the reverse facing surface of an object 
features in experience.155 There are different ways of understanding what Noë is 
here claiming. In order to be compatible with what he says about presence in 
absence, it would be uncharitable to interpret him as saying that there is no 
difference in how the back and the front of the tomato show up in experience. 
Such an interpretation would also appear to be incompatible with Noë’s claim 
that “[i]n fact, you can only see the facing surface of the [object]… After all, 
what could be more salient than the fact that you only see its visible features, its 
facing side...” (Noë, 2012: 56). A more charitable interpretation may be that, for 
Noë, both the front and reverse portions of the object’s surface are present in 
the subject’s experience as accessible – and this is to be explained in each case 
through appeal to sensorimotor understanding – though the reverse surface is 
less accessible;156 hence the reverse surface is only given in experience as present in 
absence.  
 
On what I take to be the more charitable interpretation of Noë, he nonetheless 
makes the phenomenological claim that the reverse surface of an object features 
in the subject’s experience. We may take this to be the strength of the claim that 
“[v]ision is not confined to the visible. We visually experience what is out of 
view, what is hidden or occluded” (ibid.: 15). He also appears to take the 
experience of occluded parts of an object to be part of an explanation of what it 
                                               
155 Also see his claim that: “…if anything is given, everything is. If the front of the tomato is 
given, then so is the back. And the nature of our access to the front is of a kind with that of our 
access to the back. The thing (front and back) is there for us, present, in reach” (Noë, 2012: 20-
21). 
156 This fits with his claim that “From the actionist standpoint [that Noë defends,] there is no 
sharp line to be drawn between that which is and that which is not perceptually present. The 
front of the tomato is maximally present; the back a little less so…” (Noë, 2012: 26). We might 
question whether this is true – that the reverse surface is less available – even on Noë’s own 
account. It might sound plausible to say that the reverse surface is less available for being seen, 
from the subject’s relative location, but it doesn’t appear as though this can be what Noë would 
want to say. The surfaces of the object being presented as more or less available is supposed to 
account for the visual phenomenology; it isn’t clear what it would mean to say that something is 
presented in the visual experience as more or less available for the visual experience (they would, 
after all, be presented in the experience and by this light be available for the experience). The 
appeal to sensorimotor understanding suggests that Noë would say that the portions of the 
object are presented as more or less available for tactual (sensorimotor) exploration, but is it true 
that the front surface of the object phenomenologically seems to be more available than the 
reverse in this sense? If so, it would appear that the phenomenology has little role to play in 
explain the gripping action the subject makes in picking up standard objects, where the front 
facing surface is rarely privileged over the reverse (consider picking up a handless coffee cup, 
where one typically places a thumb on the front and four fingers on the reverse of a cup as one 
grasps it). 
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is to experience an object as a voluminous whole. Noë says that “…you now 
have a perceptual sense of the presence of the tomato’s back even though you 
do not now see it” (ibid.: 74). The reverse surface of the object is not “…seen 
without being seen…” (ibid.: 75; emphasis in original), Noë acknowledges that to claim 
that it is would be paradoxical. But he maintains that “[t]he hidden portions of 
the object are present in experience now, even though we don’t now see them, 
because we are now coupled to them in a special, immediate, familiar, 
sensorimotor manner” (ibid.: 75).  
 
In order to forestall a possible misunderstanding, consider the following. We 
might find plausible that part of what is puzzling to theorists concerned with our 
typical experience of objects is the sense in which, when one sees an object, there 
seems to be more than one can see at a given time. (We might suppose that this 
does not depend upon the object having hidden or occluded parts. For example, 
we might think that even in seeing a two-dimensional drawing there seems to be 
a sense of there being more than one can see at a time; where one could see 
greater detail if stood closer to the sketch, for example.) Looking at a typical 
object from a given distance at one time, a subject may be able to discern the 
object’s colour and shape. At this distance, the subject may be unable to discern 
any greater fine-grained details. Moving closer to the object at a later time, the 
subject may be able to discern far greater fine-grained detail, such as subtle 
variations in colour and scratches to the surface. (This is the case with typical 
three-dimensional objects and the example of a two-dimensional drawing.) 
While such fine-grained details were not presented in the subject’s experience at 
the earlier time, we might nonetheless find it plausible that at the earlier time 
there did seem, to the subject, to be more that could be seen in this sense, 
without yet appealing to any sense of occlusion.  
 
Although much of Noë’s discussion focuses on the case of occluded spatial 
portions of objects, his proposal does extend to cases such as the above. It is 
best to read what Noë says regarding presence in absence as a particular 
application of a more general role fulfilled by expectations (based on 
sensorimotor understanding) in perceptual experience. We can take Noë to 
explain the sense in which there seems to be many possible perspectives one 
129 
 
could take upon an object in terms of the experiencing subject’s expectations of 
how appearances would vary if she moved relative to the object. The experience 
of three-dimensional opaque objects, that seem to have occluded portions at any 
given time, may then be taken to be one – perhaps central or paradigmatic – case 
explained by Noë, but such expectations are not solely concerned with occluded 
spatial parts. Yet Noë’s account of the phenomenology, as presented above, is 
problematic. 
 
Firstly, it is not obvious that we can give an account of the phenomenal character 
of experience in terms of such expectations. Even if a subject has such 
expectations, there is more to the phenomenology than this. We need to heed 
Campbell’s warning that, on Noë’s account, there is the “danger that the content 
of perception will simply collapse into a set of counterfactual implications for 
sensorimotor activity” and if this was the analysis we were to make, then “[t]he 
ordinary world, there independently of us, there for us to explore, has simply 
disappeared” (Campbell, 2008: 667). It would appear as though Noë’s proposal 
is too dispositional to account for the phenomenology, for the sense in which 
the objects of experience are presented in experience as external to and 
independent of the experiencer’s particular point of view. Kelly also appears to 
have such a worry in mind when he says that Noë’s sensorimotor account does 
not satisfactorily explain the sense in which the particular is experienced as a 
voluminous object, as having a rear side, now. Kelly suggests that the 
sensorimotor account could be satisfied even if “the back sides of objects didn’t 
exist until I looked at them, if they only came into existence at the very moment 
I looked, then that situation would be perfectly compatible with their being 
represented as accessible in Noë’s sense…” (Kelly, 2008: 684; emphasis in original). 
But, Kelly says that this is inconsistent with reflection on the phenomenology. 
He says that “I experience [the object] as something that now has a back side, 
even though that’s not something I can see directly now” (ibid.).  
 
A second and closely related worry with Noë’s proposal is that it gets the order 
of explanation wrong. Noë appears to appeal to expectations in order to account 
for the phenomenology, but this proposal, so understood, gets the cart before 
the horse. The phenomenology plausibly has a role to play in the subject having 
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such expectations. Experiencing something as a voluminous object will play a 
role in explaining why the subject has certain expectations about how the object 
will look from other relative perspectives; it is not to be reduced to the 
possession of such expectations. 
 
The previous worries are concerned with a reduction of the phenomenal 
character of experience to expectations based on sensorimotor understanding. 
A separate worry is that Noë’s insistence that the occluded portions of objects 
are present in experience, albeit present in absence, suggests that his proposal 
ultimately has a further reductive element: reducing the sense in which an object 
features in experience to a sense in which all portions of an object’s surface 
features in experience.157 The implicit assumption of such a reduction may 
explain why the Object and Surface Claims are taken to be in conflict; to this 
extent it may also be behind why some theorists are willing to deny the Object 
Claim, instead maintaining the Surface Claim – which they believe to receive 
greater motivation from reflection upon the phenomenology. (I’ll refer to this 
as the reductive assumption in what follows.) Appearing to make such a reductive 
assumption, Noë then offers a way out of the apparent puzzle by ultimately 
denying, or importantly qualifying, the Surface Claim.158 
 
On one reading of the dialectic, theorists – such as Noë – implicitly make the 
reductive assumption and consequently reason from the phenomenologically 
motivated Object Claim to the claim that, in some sense, the rear surface of the 
object features in the subject’s experience in the same way as its front surface;159 
                                               
157 On this reading of Noë’s claims, see Martin (2008: 676). 
158 To stress, this is not to suppose that such a reductive assumption is, or would be, explicitly 
endorsed. Rather, when puzzling about how it is implicit in the phenomenology that there is 
more of an object to be seen than is currently seen, something akin to this reductive assumption 
appears to motivate certain solutions that are offered in the literature. Although explicitly 
disagreeing with the finer points of Noë’s account, we can also read what appears to be similarly 
reductive claims – or at least, claims motivated by an implicit reductive assumption – being made 
by Nanay (2010b), who says: “When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that 
are not visible. … We represent the occluded parts of perceived objects by means of mental 
imagery. …[T]he exercise of mental imagery is necessary for amodal perception: for the 
representation of those parts of the perceived objects that are not visible” (Nanay, 2010b: 239-
240). 
159 In a recent response to Noë, Kind (2018) helpfully elucidates the distinction between the 
claims that we seem to perceive voluminous objects (and not merely surfaces) and that there is a sense 
in which we seem to perceptually experience the reverse side of the object. Kind ultimately 
proceeds to suggest her own positive account, on which imagination – rather than sensorimotor 
understanding – accounts for our experiencing objects as voluminous wholes and the presence 
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the latter claim being taken to be part of the explanation of the Object Claim.  
Such a proposal does not appear to accommodate the Surface Claim: the sense 
in which we experience the front facing surface of an object and not its rear. 
Once something akin to this reductive assumption takes hold in one’s reasoning, 
it appears as though we are faced with either denying the Object Claim or the 
Surface Claim. Rather than denying either, we can reject the assumption.160 
 
While the reductive assumption might motivate the thought that there is a 
tension between the Object and Surface Claims, I suggest that there is no such 
tension and that there is no independent motivation for supposing such an 
assumption (as illustrated through contrast cases, below). Nothing has been said 
in favour of the reductive assumption; there is no agreed upon principle such as 
‘one must see all parts of an object in order to see the object’.161 Against such a 
principle, note that it is not as if there are two competing things vying for being 
that which a subject sees when looking at an object: the object or its front facing 
surface. The object is not contrastive with a portion of its surface in this sense. 
                                               
in absence of the rear sides of such objects: “Working in tandem with our perceptual capacities, 
our imaginative capacities contribute to our perceptual experience by making unseen features of 
objects seem present” (2018: 176). However, we might find plausible the claim that we can 
experience objects as voluminous wholes without entertaining any mental imagery 
corresponding to the occluded portions of the object (see Prinz 2006a). Even when one does 
entertain such mental imagery, upon ceasing to do so one does not thereby fail to perceive what 
is before them as a three-dimensional object. 
160 Something akin to the reductive assumption appears to be quite pervasive in discussions of 
perceiving objects; it even appears to be implicit in the writing of theorists who are explicitly 
critical of such reductionism. This is one way of reading Dokic’s claim that “… we can be visually 
aware of a whole self-occluding object even though there is a phenomenal sense in which what 
is visually apparent to us falls short of the presence of such an object” (Dokic, 2018: 181). In 
this claim Dokic appears to accept some of the reductive flavour present in Noë’s proposal: that 
some portion of an object’s front facing surface is visually apparent and the object itself is not. 
This can also be read in how Dokic describes the “phenomenological contrast” as being 
“between what we are visually aware of, namely a cat, and what is visually apparent to us but 
falls short of being a cat” (Dokic, 2018: 183). If we reject the reductive assumption, then we can 
accept that some portion of an object’s front facing surface is visually apparent (in Dokic’s terms) 
and that the object itself is, while some portion of the object’s rear facing surface is not. As 
Dokic says at another point: “It is not obvious that being visually aware of a whole cat entails 
being visually aware of its hidden parts” (ibid.) In rejecting the reductive assumption, we could 
also say to Dokic that the same is true of what is visually apparent: It is not obvious that a cat 
being visually apparent entails its hidden parts being visually apparent; we can experience an 
object without experiencing all portions of its surface. 
161 We can accept that the reverse surface of an object is not perceptually present and that its 
front surface is – that we do not need to appeal to the reverse surface or its sensible qualities in 
order to describe what the subject experiences – without committing to anything puzzling or 
paradoxical, unless one accepts as a restriction that in order for a subject to experience an object 
she must experience all parts of the object. Again, see Martin (2008), who says: “That there are 
some parts of the cat [or any ordinary, opaque, three-dimensional object] I can’t see doesn’t 
show that strictly speaking I don’t see the cat, unless one can only see something when one sees 
all of its parts” (Martin, 2008: 677).  
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This is consistent with the fact that the subject cannot see some other portion 
of the object, such as its reverse side.  
 
In this context ‘contrastive’ is used in order to pick out two (or more) things 
which may be considered as being in competition with regards to some relevant 
standard. Firstly, consider occupying space: Laura’s torso and Laura are not in 
competition to be located in a given region of space in the sense that Laura’s 
torso and Laura’s hand are; if someone shoots a gun aimed at that position, we 
can ask whether the bullet hit Laura’s torso or her hand, but not whether it hit 
her torso or her. Secondly, consider location: one room in the Social Sciences 
building – say S2.35 – and the Social Sciences building itself are not in 
competition to be where I am currently located in the sense that two such rooms 
– say S2.35 and S0.17 – are. The two rooms are contrastive with one another 
with regards to where I am currently located, but neither is contrastive with the 
Social Sciences building in this regard.162 Similarly, while the front and the back 
of an opaque object may be contrastive with respect to being that which a subject 
sees, neither is contrastive with the object in this regard. 
 
In summary, I have rejected Noë’s proposal on the grounds that it is too 
dispositional to account for the phenomenology, for the sense in which the 
objects of experience are presented in experience as external to and independent 
of the experiencer’s particular point of view on them. Furthermore, the 
phenomenology plausibly has a role to play in the subject having expectations 
regarding how a given object, presented in experience, would look from other 
points of view, rather than being reducible to such expectations. I have also 
argued that we have no reason to accept the reductive assumption which can 
motivate the thought that the Surface and Object Claims are in conflict. In the 
subsequent section I offer an explanation of how the two claims are to be 
coherently maintained; in doing so I bring out several features of what it is like 
to occupy a visual point of view in space.  
                                               
162 Clarke (1965) can be read as suggesting that, in noticing that we only have visual contact with 
some portion of a surface this very noticing brings this portion of the surface into competition 
with the object itself, making the two contrastive with regards to what one can see. It isn’t 
obvious why we should take this to be so. An object’s front facing surface and its reverse surface 
may be so contrastive (with regards to what one can see), but neither is in competition with the 
object. 
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2. Experiencing in space 
 
2. 1. Perspectival-partialness and field-partialness 
 
In the opening chapter of The Imaginary (1940), Sartre is engaged in a discussion 
of our experience of objects; using the example of a cube, he says: “The cube is 
indeed present to me, I can touch it, see it; but I can never see it except in a 
certain way, which calls for and excludes at the same time an infinity of other 
points of view” (Sartre, 1940: 8). In this passage Sartre brings out how, in visual 
experience, we seem to have one of many possible points of view on an object. 
The nature of visual experience in three-dimensional space is such that visual 
experience of objects will always be partial in a sense; what I refer to as being 
perspectivally-partial. I motivate this idea and explain this terminology in what 
follows, but briefly: in visual experience, we are perceptually presented with 
something (such as an object) and this is all the while manifestly from a 
perspective – and one of many possible perspectives – on that something. This 
is the phenomenological notion of perspective in what is being called 
perspectival-partialness. The partialness is to be accounted for in virtue of how 
the object is presented relative to a given point of view. 
 
Sartre’s appeal to how our perceptual experience of objects both calls for and 
excludes other points of view can be used to develop an account of how we are 
to maintain both the Surface and Object Claims. The notions of perspectivalness 
and partialness are to be motivated by reflection on the phenomenology, and 
can be elucidated through a comparison with how other theorists have appealed 
to the such notions in discussions of perceptual experience. Several authors have 
emphasised the need to appeal to an experiencing subject’s perspective when 
articulating the phenomenal character of her visual experience. One such 
example comes from Campbell (2009), who makes the following claim. “We 
have to factor in the standpoint from which the scene is being observed. We 
should think of consciousness of the object not as a two-place relation between 
a person and an object, but as a three-place relation between a person, a 
standpoint, and an object. You always experience an object from a standpoint” 
(Campbell, 2009: 657).  
134 
 
While Noë can be read as offering a reductive or dispositional account of the 
phenomenal character of a subject’s visual experience of an object, Campbell 
can be read as offering a different account through appeal to this third relatum: 
a standpoint. What goes in to characterising a standpoint will depend on various 
considerations. In the case of vision, as well as specifying a time and place, we 
also need to appeal to “… the relative orientations of the viewer and the object, 
how close the viewer is to the object, whether there is anything obstructing the 
light between them, and so on” (ibid.: 658). As Soteriou puts it, on Campbell’s 
view “we need to factor in the notion of a ‘standpoint’ as our experience of 
objects is always, in some sense, partial” (Soteriou, 2016: 94).  
 
Campbell’s appeal to a standpoint gets close to the appeal I wish to make to a 
manifest perspective in visual experience, but there are reasons for thinking that 
the two are not equivalent. What is partial, for Campbell, and the need to appeal 
to a standpoint, is not merely found in the more basic notion of what is 
perceptually presented to a subject – plausibly, it is not simply a 
phenomenological notion.163 While Campbell’s appeal to a standpoint may be 
motivated, in part, by reflection upon the phenomenology, it is not obviously to 
be thought of as showing up in the phenomenology.  
 
For a characterisation of the notion of perspective which is closer to that which 
is being advanced in the current section, we can turn to Brewer (2011). Brewer 
starts with the claim that “perceptual presentation irreducibly consists in 
conscious acquaintance with mind-independent physical objects” (Brewer, 2011: 
94), before acknowledging that “there can be quite different perceptual 
experiences – had by the same subject or by different subjects – with identical 
such direct objects” (ibid.: 95). In recognition of how a subject can have quite 
different experiences of the same object from different relative locations, being 
in visual contact with distinct portions of the object’s surface, Brewer puts his 
claim: “In a slogan, the ways things look are the ways (perceptually presented) 
things look from that point of view in those circumstances” (ibid.: 99). This is the 
claim that in order to articulate the phenomenal character of a subject’s 
                                               
163 As Brewer (2011: 96, footnote 2) notes, the control on Campbell’s third relatum – the 
standpoint – comes from requirements on Fregean sense (Frege 1993), where this accounts for 
the cognitive significance of one way or another of picking out an object. 
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experience of an object, we must do so through appeal to the subject’s 
spatiotemporal point of view relative to the object.  
 
Appeal to a role for the notion of a perspective which I am interested in 
developing here need not depend on taking perceptual experience to be 
fundamentally a matter of conscious acquaintance as Brewer does. In offering 
an account of how to specify the representational content of a subject’s 
experience, Peacocke (1992) makes a similar appeal to a perspective (though not 
in these terms). In specifying the representational content, Peacocke says: “The 
first step is to fix an origin and axes” (Peacocke, 1992: 62). One origin, for 
Peacocke, is given by the property of being the centre of a human subject’s chest, 
with three axes being given by the directions back/front, left/right, and 
up/down (with respect to the origin).  
 
In making this appeal to a point of origin and three axes, Peacocke is motivated 
by the phenomenal character of visual experience, saying that the “appropriate 
set of labelled axes captures distinctions in the phenomenology of experience 
itself” (ibid.). He suggests that in perceptual experience the locations of perceived 
objects are given as egocentric locations. This brings with it a notion of 
perspective. To illustrate this point, he distinguishes between the experience a 
given subject has when looking straight ahead at a building and the experience 
that subject has when turning her face toward the building while her body is 
turned toward some point on the building’s right-hand side. In the latter case, 
he claims that the building “is experienced as being off to one side from the 
direction of straight ahead…” (ibid.). Regardless of whether one takes a view on 
which perceptual experience is to be characterised as fundamentally a matter of 
conscious acquaintance, or to be characterised through appeal to 
representational content, we can recognise that there is a role for the notion of 
a visual perspective to play in capturing the phenomenology.  
 
The phenomenal character of visuo-spatial experience cannot be captured by 
simply describing the allocentric spatial relations between objects (presented in 
experience), we also need to acknowledge that the subject seems to occupy a 
spatial location from which these objects are seen. To demonstrate, it is not 
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merely that two objects visually experienced at a given time are presented as 
adjacent and with a given degree of separation. One object is presented as being 
to the left of (or above, or in front of, and so on) the other, and in being so 
presented this already brings with it the egocentric character of visual experience 
and the sense in which the objects are seen from a relative perspective. Examples 
such as this demonstrate that there is more to the phenomenology than merely 
that the objects of perceptual experience are presented as three-dimensional, and 
as stood in various relations to each other in three-dimensional space.164 In 
characterising the phenomenal character of a subject’s perceptual experience we 
need to appeal to that subject’s point of view, because of how the objects of 
perceptual experience are presented as external and relative to the location from 
which the subject is visually aware of them.  
 
This manifest perspective in space is a feature of the phenomenology; not as one 
of the objects presented in experience but as the perspective relative to which 
such objects are presented. That the phenomenology is perspectival, in this 
sense, may explain the holding of various expectations regarding how an object 
may look from other relative perspectives, rather than being reducible to such 
expectations. An experiencing subject is aware of the objects of visual perceptual 
experience as external and relative to the region of her eyes, to this extent she is 
aware of her perspective in space as occupying a distinct spatial location from 
those objects.165 Being so aware of an object as externally located relative to a 
distal perspective brings with it an awareness of locations being presented 
relative to a perspective on those locations; it brings an awareness of locations 
other than that occupied by such an object and other possible perspectives on 
the object in question. It may well be that awareness of the perspective a subject 
seems to occupy relative to the objects presented in experience also brings with 
it an awareness of various enabling conditions: that in addition to the possibility 
                                               
164 In maintaining this phenomenological claim, Smith (2002: 134-7) distinguishes the 
phenomenal character of perceptual experience from bodily sensation. In the latter case he 
suggests that bodily sensations may seem to be located in three-dimensional space and may seem 
to stand in spatial relations, but in bodily sensation – in contrast to perceptual experience – an 
experienced ache or pain is not presented as external and relative to a given sense organ. 
Perceptual experience, but not bodily sensation, seems to involve what Smith calls the “spatial 
over-againstness with which perceptual objects are given to awareness” (ibid.: 134; emphasis in 
original). 
165 For it to be a feature of the phenomenology in this sense is not sufficient for it to be graspable 
in thought, the latter plausibly has further requirements. 
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of being otherwise spatially related to the object, something could interpose itself 
so as to occlude the object, and so on. We can take this to be one expression of 
Evans’ (1980) claim that perceptual experience seems, to the subject, to be a 
joint upshot of how things are in the world and certain enabling conditions on 
perception.166  
 
The perspectivalness of perceptual experience is revealed in the phenomenal 
character, the objects of perception being presented as external and relative to 
the subject’s sensory organs; the partialness of perceptual experience is to be 
characterised in terms of the subject’s awareness that the perspective she 
occupies is one of many possible perspectives upon the object. To capture the 
sense in which what a subject sees from her perspective is partial, we can 
consider how there is “a kind of overflowing in the world of ‘things’: there is, at 
every moment, always infinitely more than we can see…” (Sartre, 1940: 9). That 
there are, at every moment, always more things than the subject can see – and 
more perspectives than the one the subject occupies – is easy enough to 
illustrate.  
 
Building on the discussion of the previous section, we can say that in the case of 
objects of experience that seem to be extended in three spatial dimensions, the 
subject’s position relative to the object (where this includes the distance from 
the object) alters how much of the object can be seen, as does whether an object 
is opaque, translucent, or transparent. From one side of an object the subject 
will see features she would not see from the other side. From a great distance, 
very few fine-grained details will be made out, whether the object is opaque or 
transparent. From very close such fine-grained details may be seen, but other 
parts of the object may not. Small blemishes/scratches on the surface of an 
object may be seen when the subject is very close to the object, but from this 
                                               
166 In Evans’ discussion, the central interest (through critical discussion of Strawson) is the 
necessary conditions on experience if it is to form the basis of an explanation of our belief in an 
objective world, and of our related belief in the continued existence unperceived of the objects 
we perceive. Evans says that the subject requires some rudimentary theory, or form of theory of 
perception; that “[this] is the indispensable surrounding for the idea of existence unperceived, 
and so, of existence perceived… the two ideas are sides of a single idea: the idea of an objective 
world” (Evans, 1980: 262). To say that this is required does not commit one to the claim that it 
must be actively or reflectively deployed by the individual. For greater discussion of the 
awareness a subject has of the world as existing objectively, on the basis of her experience, see 
Eilan (1997 and 2011). 
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distance – depending on the size of the object – the subject may not see some 
of the parts which she could see from a distance, because they now fall outside 
of the visual field (I say more about this below). We might suppose that a subject 
will see more of a transparent object from a given perspective than an opaque 
object, because she may see marks on both its front and rear side from a given 
position relative to it, whereas she can only see features of the front side of an 
opaque object. This is not, however, to say that she sees all portions of the 
transparent object from a given position relative to it – it is plausible that there 
will be blemishes or scratches on the surface she will only see if held very closely. 
If the subject holds an object at a certain distance from her eyes she may see the 
shape of the object but not all of its fine-grained features, and holding the object 
closer to her eyes she may see more of its features although she cannot now see 
the outline of its shape. 
 
To say that visual experience is perspectivally-partial is therefore to say that in 
visual experience a subject occupies a manifest perspective – where this seems 
to be one of many possible perspectives – upon the objects within that three-
dimensional region of space. From any such point of view one only seems to see 
some part of the objects that fall within that region. The notion of perspectival-
partialness can be elucidated further by distinguishing it from another way in 
which we can construe a subject’s visual experience of space as being partial. 
Call this field-partialness, where this notion in invoked in order to capture the 
limited extent of a sensory field. The notion of a sensory field is a region with 
certain limits, such that if some relevant stimulus was to appear within these 
limits (in the sensory field) it would be possible for the subject to experience it 
(assuming the normal operation of that modality). To this extent, the notion of 
a sensory field can be characterised counterfactually. 
 
In vision, we typically seem to be visually aware of a region of space within which 
objects can be seen,167 and this region seems to extend wider in space than the 
subject’s perspective upon it. The limits of this spatial region, given in 
experience, do not positively seem to be the limits of all of the space that there 
                                               
167 As Martin says: “[Sight] is experience of objects external to one as arranged in physical 
space… Normal visual experience is essentially experience of objects as they fall within the visual 
field...” (Martin, 1992: 210). See Chapter 3, section 4.1., for further discussion of this claim. 
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is.168 Reflecting on our experience, we are aware that the spatial extent of the 
visual field is a sub-region of all of the space that there is; by turning our head 
we can make it the case that we are now aware of a distinct sub-region of space. 
 
To illustrate the notion of field-partialness, consider a subject holding a pumpkin 
close to her face, so that – from her relative position – she cannot see at least 
some portion of the edge of the pumpkin (because it falls outside of her visual 
field). While some portion of the pumpkin’s front facing surface shows up in 
the qualitative character of the subject’s experience, by stipulation some portions 
do not (because these portions of the pumpkin fall outside the visual field). To 
this extent, the limitations of the subject’s visual field result in her experience of 
the object being partial. 
 
An appeal to field-partialness does not do the work of explaining how we seem 
to experience objects as voluminous while only seeing some portion of the 
object. Whether the object and the experiencing subject are positioned relative 
to one another in such a way that the object falls partly within and partly outside 
the visual field, or completely within it, in each case the object is experienced as 
a voluminous whole.  
 
Appeal to the sense of perspectival-partialness does do the work of explaining 
how we are to maintain both the Object and Surface Claims. In visual experience 
we manifestly experience objects and we manifestly do so from a relative 
perspective. The object presented in experience seems to be something that 
affords other perspectives upon it in space and the subject’s spatial location 
relative to an object seems to determine the portions of the object that she can 
see and those portions that she cannot.  
 
On Noë’s proposal, it appears as though the sense in which an object features 
in experience is reduced to a sense in which all portions of an object’s surface 
features in experience (through the subject’s sensorimotor understanding). I 
                                               
168 Soteriou (2011) further says that the subject can become aware of the limits of this region as 
being determined by her own sensory limitations, when (for example) by squinting, or closing 
one eye, she makes this region of space decrease in size. Soteriou refers to the visual field as a 
structural feature of experience, where this an aspect of the manner in which a subject presented 
with entities she is consciously aware of in perceptual experience. 
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suggested that such reductionism, be it implicit or explicit, motivates the thought 
that the Object and Surface Claims are in tension; such reductionism and 
supposed tension between the claims can be rejected. In contrast to Noë’s 
dispositional account of the phenomenal character of experience, we are to 
appeal to the manifest perspectivalness of perceptual experience.  
 
 
2.2. A place for presence in absence 
 
In offering the above proposal we need not deny that the subject will have 
expectations about how a tomato, for example, will look when she changes her 
position relative to it; nor need we deny that such expectations may show up in 
her visual experience in some sense.169 What we do deny, in offering the above 
proposal, is that such expectations need to be appealed to in order to explain 
how the subject experiences the tomato rather than merely some portion of its 
front facing surface.  
 
And yet, it can be granted that Noë’s appeal to presence in absence is not without 
merit. In a given case of visual experience, such as seeing a tomato, there may 
be expectations about how occluded portions of the tomato look. To adequately 
characterise how things are for the experiencing subject, I have suggested that 
we need to appeal to how she manifestly occupies a perspective in space relative 
to the objects – and the region of space – presented. We may think that the 
phenomenology is committal – to an extent – on what is filling some of this 
space, beyond the object’s occluding surface and perhaps beyond the limits 
visual field. This is not to say that the sensory properties of that which falls in 
the region of space that lies outside of her visual field, or that lies behind an 
occluding object or surface, are presented in the subject’s perceptual experience. 
 
                                               
169 That is, we can grant that there is a sense in which “…we seem to be visually aware of more 
than what is visually present or… apparent to us” (Dokic, 2018: 181). However, rejecting the 
reductive assumption, we need not take this to be part of an explanation of how we experience 
voluminous objects. 
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Talk of what the phenomenology is committal on, in this context, should be read 
in terms of a sense of expectation.170 (It is not that the perceptual 
phenomenology is to be cashed out in terms of expectations, but that such 
expectations can be explained, at least in part, by the phenomenology.) The 
subject has certain expectations regarding the layout of the environment around 
her and how things would look if she occupied a given perspective on an object 
or a region of space. There is plausibly a role for something akin to presence in 
absence in characterising how things are for the experiencing subject, if it is 
understood in terms of such expectations. This could also be put in 
counterfactual terms, that the subject would be surprised if things turned out 
otherwise. This is not to say that the subject actively entertains any such 
expectations in thought, or that how things look from another point of view 
(other than the point of view the subject occupies in actual fact) is presented in 
the perceptual experience.  
 
In addition to being manifest in the phenomenology that the subject possesses 
one of many possible points of view upon an object, how things are for the 
subject may be committal on what the object would look like if the subject 
possessed a different position relative to it. Insofar as one takes the 
phenomenology to be so committal, this may be more or less fine-grained. In 
the example of a subject holding a pumpkin close to her face, by stipulation it 
was said that some portion of the pumpkin’s front facing surface lies outside of 
her visual field. It is nevertheless plausible that how things are for the subject is 
committal – at least in the typical case – to some of what lies beyond the extent 
of the visual field; that if the subject turns her head to look, there will both be 
more space there, and also more pumpkin filling that space. How things are for 
the subject is committal – at least in the typical case – both to the pumpkin 
continuing on beyond the limits of the visual field and to it continuing on 
beyond the surface and filling a given region of three-dimensional space.  
                                               
170 We might think of this in terms of anticipations concerning how the object would look if we 
occupied a different perspective relative to it. Husserl often appealed to ‘anticipation’ to describe 
the way in which the ‘co-given’ is present in perceptual experience. He says, “there belongs to 
every external perception its reference from the 'genuinely perceived' sides of the object of 
perception to the sides 'also meant'—not yet perceived, but only anticipated and, at first, with a 
non-intuitional emptiness... the perception has horizons made up of other possibilities of 
perception, as perceptions that we could have, if we actively directed the course of perception 
otherwise” (Husserl, 1931: 44). 
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It may be that how things are for the subject is committal on the pumpkin being 
visually similar on its reverse surface to its front facing surface (that, all else being 
equal, it is committal to uniformity of shape, colour, and so on); that it is 
committal on it having certain distinctive markings (perhaps as a result of 
previously seeing this pumpkin from other angles, or other pumpkins); and/or 
that it is committal on certain signs the subject is familiar with being complete. 
For an example of the latter, if in a given region fruit and vegetables are labelled 
with large stickers, and looking at the pumpkin a subject can – from her position 
– see the letters “U M P K I” on a label, how things are for the subject may be 
committal on there being the letters “P” and “N” on portions of the label which 
are out of view.171 
 
The phenomenology may be committal on where the edge of the pumpkin – 
which falls outside the visual field – is to be found, on the pumpkin’s reverse 
surface having a given colour and/or shape, and on the letters “P” and “N” 
being at either end of the label. This may be true while sensory qualities 
corresponding to such features are not presented in the subject’s perceptual 
experience; this is, plausibly, part of what motivates the Surface Claim, as well 
as motivating Moore and Broad’s claim that we only strictly speaking see the 
front facing surface of such objects.  
 
What a subject makes of the scene/object being viewed may well depend on 
previous experience of the scene/object in question as she has – on this occasion 
– moved around it; as she has encountered it on other occasions; or perhaps as 
she has encountered relevantly similar scenes/objects on other occasions. To 
this extent, what a subject makes of some scene/object may be context-
                                               
171 This may be related to how Kind (2018) construes the presence of the ‘Diet Coke’ lettering, 
when the subject can – from her position – only see a couple of the relevant letters on the can. 
We can allow for the sake of argument that an object can be experienced as ‘a Diet Coke can’ 
(in support of the view that high-level properties do feature in the phenomenal character of 
perceptual experience, see Siegel, 2006 and 2009; in opposition, see Prinz, 2006b; on the 
importance of distinguishing between perceptual and non-perceptual phenomenology in such 
cases, see Butterfill, 2009). Granting that it is part of the representational content that it is a Diet 
Coke can, we can also allow that, in order for the experience to have this content, it is necessary 
that the subject’s experience is committal on what the can would look like from other 
perspectives in space (that other portions of the lettering would be seen, for example). This may 
be part of the story of what it is to see something as a Diet Coke can, it does not follow that this 
is also part of the story of what it is to see the can as a voluminous object. 
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relative.172 This is one way of interpreting Sartre’s claim that “[o]ne must learn 
objects, which is to say, multiply the possible points of view on them. …What 
does this signify for us? The necessity of making a tour of objects, of waiting, as 
Bergson said, until the ‘sugar dissolves’” (Sartre, 1940: 8; emphasis in original). 
Whether the reverse of the object has been seen by the subject previously, 
whether other objects of this kind have been seen by the subject previously, 
whether the object is completely novel to the subject, and so on, may impact 
upon what it is like for the subject when she perceives the scene before her.  
 
To be clear, I am suggesting that there may be some way in which expectations 
show up in the phenomenology, though I remain noncommittal on that claim, 
but we do not need to appeal to a subject’s expectations about the sensory 
qualities of these occluded portions of an object in order to explain what it is for 
her to experience it as an object. Having demonstrated that we can satisfy the 
Object and Surface Claim while rejecting the reductive assumption, and that we 
can allow that there might be a role for something akin to presence in absence 
in giving a complete account of the phenomenology, we can turn to consider 
how Noë extends his proposal to the temporal case. 
 
 
3. Experiencing events 
 
In addition to providing an account of what it is like to experience objects, Noë 
also provides an account of what it is like to experience events. Responding to 
criticism from Clark (2006),173 who claims that Noë’s sensorimotor account is 
ill-equipped to accommodate for temporal features of our perceptual experience, 
                                               
172 We might think that this will depend upon the perceptual recognitional capacities of the 
subject. See Dokic (2010) for a discussion of this point. 
173 Clark appeals to an example given by Kelly (2005) in which we are to imagine hearing an 
opera singer holding a high C note. The nature of Clark’s claim against Noë and the finer details 
of Kelly’s example need not concern us here. (It is worth noting that there is a lot going on in 
Kelly’s example, perhaps more than Kelly or some recent commentators have explicitly 
acknowledged, such as: our perceptual experience of temporal properties; how preceding 
experience impacts upon current experience; how our understanding may impact upon our 
experience; and whether there is any role for short-term memory in the phenomenal character 
of a subject’s ongoing experience.) The focus in what follows will be on how Noë explains some 
of the temporal features of our experience in an analogous way to his explanation of our 
experience of objects, and what analogies and disanalogies we can draw out in developing his 
proposal. 
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Noë poses the following puzzle: “How is it possible, at a moment in time, to experience 
an event, something which has no existence at a moment in time?” (Noë, 2012: 77).174 This 
question appears to parallel the question which Noë addressed in the spatial case, 
where his concern was our experience of objects. The question in the temporal 
case concerns how we perceptually experience an event (temporal particular) as 
a temporally extended whole, while only ever perceptually experiencing a 
temporally limited portion of the event at a time.175  
 
Behind Noë’s way of posing these questions in the spatial and temporal cases 
there appears to be an implicit assumption of a commonality between our 
experience of objects and events. For Noë, there is a sense in which we seem to 
perceptually experience an object, and experience it as a voluminous whole, 
while not seeing some parts of that object (or its surface) from a given 
spatiotemporal location. Similarly, he appears to hold that there is a sense in 
which we seem to perceptually experience an event, and experience it as a 
temporally extended whole, while not seeing some parts of that event from a 
given spatiotemporal location. The aim in the current section is to present Noë’s 
position and to highlight two questions which remain. 
 
Having posed the question concerning our experience of events, in offering a 
solution Noë draws the following comparison between the spatial and temporal 
cases: “It is not the past that is present in the current experience; rather, it is the 
trajectory or arc that is present now, and of course the arc describes the relation 
of what is now to what has already happened (and to what may still happen) … 
Just as in a way the front of the [everyday three-dimensional object] is directed 
toward the back – indicates the space where the back is to be found – so the 
present sound implicates a temporal structure by referring backwards and 
                                               
174 It is worth noting that – pace Noë – there are events that can be said to exist at a moment in 
time (even if they are realised as a result of what occurred over some preceding interval). As put 
by Vendler: “One reaches the hilltop, wins the race, spots or recognizes something, and so on 
at a definite moment” (Vendler, 1957: 146). However, granting that there are instantaneous 
events, such as the event of crossing a finish line, the question as to how we perceive such events 
isn’t necessarily any easier than it is in the case of extended events. In what follows I will focus 
on events of some temporal extension. 
175 I offer an account of our experience over super-intervals in the preceding chapter. My current 
concern is not with rehearsing the details of the positive proposal offered in Chapter 3, but with 
how a subject’s experience of temporally extended occurrences and her perspective in time 
differs from the spatial analogue. 
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forwards in time” (ibid.: 77-8). In the case of objects, Noë says that a subject 
seems to experience the object as a voluminous whole because of how the 
portion she is in visual contact with implicates the rest of the object extending 
in space (in virtue of her sensorimotor understanding). Analogously, he suggests 
that visual (or auditory, or so on) contact with some portion of an event 
implicates, in the perceptual experience, the rest of the event extending in time. 
Noë wants to be careful to insist that we do not strictly hear a past sound 
concurrently with the present sound (the past and future portions of the event 
do not seem to be audibly present concurrently with the present portion), but 
he holds that the trajectory/arc is present. This is how Noë takes it to be 
possible, at a moment in time, to experience an event, something which he says 
has no existence at a moment in time.  
 
As may be obvious, this sort of analysis will not work for any old event – for 
any temporal particular of some extent. Noë is explicit in recognising how his 
account entails this result. As he puts matters, “[not] any old sequence of 
occurrences is an event in this sense; events are sequences with a sense; they 
unfold in a direction according to a rule” (ibid.: 78). Calling these temporal 
particulars meaningful events, Noë says that the past and future parts of the 
event are not present in one’s experience now – from one’s current temporal 
perspective – but they are implicated by it, and that the “able perceiver 
appreciates this” (ibid.). Mention of meaningful events as events with a sense, and 
this being something an able perceiver appreciates, highlights how – for Noë – 
perceptual experiences are activities of skilful engagement with one’s 
environment.176 On the account Noë offers, characterising the phenomenal 
character of one’s perceptual experience requires appealing to more than what 
is perceptually present (as present) from a subject’s point of view; this is the case 
in both our experience of objects and events.  
 
                                               
176 That Noë’s account will only be applicable to certain temporally arranged occurrences may 
strike the reader as problematic in and of itself. While the scope of Noë’s account could be 
problematic in this regard, more would have to be said in order to demonstrate that it is so. 
Consider by analogy how not any spatial particular, or spatial arrangement of stimuli, is an object 
(or will be experienced as an object); Noë may suggest that the same is true in the temporal case 
and that he is picking out those cases which are experienced as wholes in the relevant sense. 
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We should not attribute the implausible claim to Noë that events are experienced 
as temporally-voluminous wholes, as the voluminous-claim is tied to spatially 
extended three-dimensional objects. But Noë does appear to take there to be an 
analogy tied to the notion of spatial and temporal wholes. In the spatial case, 
reflection on the phenomenal character of experience supports the claim that 
we experience objects from a given spatial location relative to the object, a 
location from which we cannot see some parts of the object. Noë takes there to 
be an analogous claim to be made in the temporal case; that reflection on the 
phenomenology supports the claim that we experience events from a given 
temporal location, even though we do not see (or hear, and so on) some parts 
of the event from this location. 
 
There are different ways of interpreting Noë’s proposal and the commonalities 
he draws between our typical experience of objects and events. In order to better 
appreciate Noë’s proposal and to appreciate the sense in which we do – and the 
sense in which we do not – seem to have a point of view in time, there are two 
particular issues we need to address.177 Firstly, how are we to understand the 
claim that we experience events at a time, rather than simply holding that we 
experience events through experiencing their temporal parts in turn? Secondly, 
how are we to understand the distinction Noë draws between the spatial and 
temporal cases, where in the temporal case Noë says that the past and future 
parts of the event are not presented as temporally present in one’s experience – 
in contrast to how the other spatial parts of an object are – but they are 
implicated by it? In addressing these questions, we can gain a greater 
understanding of the phenomenological differences (and similarities) between 
the perspective a typical experiencing subject seems to occupy in space and in 
time, and corresponding phenomenological differences between her experience 
of objects and events. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
177 My interest in what follows is in the truth of the matter, in how we are to accurately 
characterise our experience of temporally extended occurrences, rather than in faithfully 
presenting Noë’s expressed view. If the two come apart, I will focus on the former. 
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4. Experiencing in time 
 
How we experience events in time is not directly analogous to the case of 
experiencing objects in space. A subject’s visuo-spatial field contains three 
dimensions of spatial extension; this is not true of the temporal case. As a result 
of our visual experience typically being of three-dimensional objects in space, 
and of events in the single temporal dimension, some object or object-part can 
be occluded or ‘hidden’ from sight, from a relative perspective, in a way in which 
a temporal part of the event cannot.  
 
To avoid confusion, it is true that we can construe events as having both spatial 
and temporal parts, and some spatial parts can seem to be occluded from view 
by other spatial parts. This is not the case with temporal parts. One temporal 
part does not seem to occlude another; the occluding role played by opaque 
surfaces in three-dimensional space does not seem, to an experiencing subject, 
to be played by a temporal part of an event in the single temporal dimension. It 
is not as if the most recent instant, or something to that effect, seems to play the 
role of a temporal surface. 
 
Perspectival-partialness is a phenomenological ingredient of our typical visual 
experience of objects in three-dimensional space, where a subject manifestly 
occupies one of many possible perspectives upon an object and where there 
seems to be more, to the subject, than she can see from her relative point of 
view. (Where a subject could see more/other spatial parts if only she occupied a 
different point of view in space relative to the object.) It is not a 
phenomenological ingredient of our typical experience in the temporal case. The 
subject does not seem to occupy one of many possible perspectives in time on 
the occurrence given in perceptual experience over the PSP; it does not seem to 
the subject as though she could possess a different perceptual perspective in 
time on any given temporal part. To be charitable, we should not understand 
Noë’s appeal to an analogy between our experience of objects and events in 
terms of there being a role in each case for perspectival-partialness, or else the 
proposal would be immediately objectionable. 
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One thought may be that even if there is no perspectival-partialness – as it has 
been characterised – in the temporal case, there could be another way in which 
the notion of perspective could be appealed to in order to explain how we 
experience events from a point of view in time. Recall how Peacocke described 
the perspective a subject possesses in the spatial case as featuring three axes of 
extension from a point of origin. The suggestion might be that we could describe 
the temporal case as featuring a single earlier/later axis of extension which a 
subject has a point of view upon. There are at least two ways of understanding 
how this suggestion can be used to flesh out Noë’s proposal. On the first, we 
could say that the subject seems to experience an event as spread out through 
some interval of time from a time within this interval, in much the same way as 
an object is experienced as extended through space from a location in space, 
albeit with the proviso that the temporal case is one dimensional. So stated, the 
proposal would be uncharitable and contrary to a distinct aspect of the 
perceptual phenomenology: temporal transparency. 
 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, in reflecting upon the phenomenal 
character of visual experience a subject can distinguish between the spatial 
location of her experiential perspective and the apparent spatial location of the 
object of perceptual experience; this cannot be done in the temporal case. 
Objects of visual experience seem to be distally located with regards to the 
subject and they can also seem to be of a greater extent than the experiencer’s 
perspective (extending along the left/right and up/down axes); this is something 
evident in the phenomenology. In the temporal case matters are not analogous. 
From reflection upon the perceptual phenomenology, a subject cannot 
distinguish between the temporal location of her perceptual perspective and the 
apparent temporal location of that which she is perceiving; the latter does not 
positively seem to be spread through a greater interval of time than the former. 
A more charitable interpretation of how the above suggestion can be used in 
order to flesh out Noë’s proposal would appeal to how, while there is no 
perspectival-partialness in the temporal case, we might think that there is field-
partialness.  
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We typically take ourselves to experience events over the time over which they 
occur.178 A subject does not seem to experience a whole song now, at a time, but 
over the time it takes to play the song.179 Yet we might nonetheless think that 
what she experiences now, over the PSP, will depend in some sense on what she 
takes herself to be experiencing over a greater interval. For example, we would 
want to say that there is a phenomenological difference between hearing a bar 
of music as part of a song and hearing a bar of music played in isolation (not as 
part of a song occurring over a greater interval). This reveals a sense in which 
there seems to be field-partialness – and a form of awareness of times beyond 
this field – in the temporal case.  
 
On this second way of developing Noë’s proposal, how things are for an 
experiencing subject depends on her being aware of other times: both that there 
were earlier times/temporal parts she experienced, and that there will be later 
times/temporal parts she will experience. The temporal location of the subject’s 
perceptual point of view is transparent to the apparent temporal location of that 
which is being perceived; yet, how things are for the subject is not completely 
transparent to the interval of time she is perceptually aware of. If it was, we 
would struggle to explain why she continues to stare at the TV screen as the 
football match builds to a climax, as there would be no expectation that the 
match should continue to unfold in the future. In much the same way as how 
things are for the typical subject is committal – to an extent – regarding what 
lies beyond the limits of the visual field, how things are for the subject may also 
be committal regarding what occurred immediately prior to and/or will occur 
immediately subsequent to the time presented in perceptual experience: 
perceiving a bar of music as part of a song, for example. 
 
This way of developing Noë’s proposal, as laid out above, offers us one way of 
responding to the first question from Noë’s discussion. We can maintain the 
plausible claim that it takes us at least as long to experience a song as it takes for 
the song to be played. We are not to understand the claim that we experience 
                                               
178 See my Chapter 3. 
179 Where this need not entail that what we experience over time is to be accounted for in terms 
of the sum of what we experience at each instant in the interim, see Chapters 2 and 3 for further 
discussion of this point. 
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events at a time in a way which would lead to denying that we experience events 
through experiencing their temporal parts in turn, or in a way in which would 
require us to deny temporal transparency. When Noë says “the present sound 
implicates a temporal structure by referring backwards and forwards in time” 
(Noë, 2012: 78) we can understand him to be saying that the phenomenology is 
committal on what occurred immediately prior to what one is currently 
perceiving and what will occur immediately subsequently. This is the sense in 
which there is field-partialness in the temporal case, though not perspectival-
partialness.  
 
The final matter to consider concerns the distinction Noë draws between the 
point of view a subject seems to occupy in space and time. Noë says that “to 
experience an event…is not to experience something whose hidden parts are 
present but out of view [as is the case with objects]. It is to experience something 
whose past and future parts are precisely not present” (ibid.: 77). Noë says that the 
past and future parts of the event do not seem to be present now, in contrast to 
how the other spatial parts of an object do seem to be. This distinction is 
plausibly related to the claim that the time a subject is perceptually aware of 
seems to the subject to be a sub-interval of a greater interval (or which that sub-
interval is a part). Whether or not we agree with such a claim will depend upon 
what we take it to entail.  
 
Phenomenologically speaking, the experiencing subject does not seem to occupy 
a perspective in time in the same sense as she does in space. As previously stated, 
it does not seem as though she could just as well be experiencing the same 
occurrences – which occupy the same temporal location – but from a different 
relative temporal location. However, it is not as though the time a subject is 
perceptually aware of positively seems to the subject to be all of the time that 
there is, was, or will be. The temporal part a subject is experiencing, that which 
is presented over the PSP, can be experienced as a temporal part of a greater 
occurrence (such as perceiving a few notes as a temporal part of a greater piece 
of music). 
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This is how we can understand Noë’s claim that the past and future portions of 
a perceived event do not seem to be present in the way in which the reverse 
surface – or the spatial portions falling outside of the visual field – of a perceived 
object do. In the spatial case, to the extent that how things are for the subject is 
committal to there being other spatial regions (behind the object and beyond the 
limits of the visual field), it is committal to those regions being there now.180 In 
the temporal case, to the extent that how things are for the subject is committal 
to there being other times (beyond the limits of the PSP), it is committal to those 
times as preceding or succeeding the interval presented over the PSP. 
 
The idea just outlined is related to a further point, which we can draw out of 
Soteriou’s claim that “…the extent of the temporal interval one is aware of does 
not seem to one to be determined by one's sensory limitations. In this respect, 
one’s conscious perceptual experience of limited temporal intervals is quite 
unlike one’s visual experience of bounded regions of space” (Soteriou, 2011: 
203-4). We can understand this difference in the following way. When an object 
moves from one’s visual field – whether it is the subject or the object that moves 
– it does not seem to the subject as though the object is no longer there should 
she wish to look at it again. This point can also be made regarding an object 
which falls partly within and partly outside of the subject’s visual field; there is a 
sense in which those portions of the object which the subject is not visually 
aware of from her current position do seem to be there in space, should the 
subject wish to look at them. Space – not just objects – seems to be there for 
the subject’s exploration of it.  
 
The above is not true of the temporal case. Once an occurrence is over – once 
the subject has perceived it – then it does not seem to the subject as though she 
can return to observe it again. The temporal case features an asymmetrical 
awareness of times either side of the PSP: there is the time/occurrence which 
has been experienced and so is no longer there to be experienced, and there is 
the time/occurrence which will be there to be experienced in the immediate 
future. The subject can anticipate other occurrences unfolding in the immediate 
                                               
180 While I have suggested that this is recognised by Noë, as discussed previously Kelly (2008) 
can be read as criticising Noë for nevertheless failing to satisfactorily account for this.  
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future, she does not seem to be stuck in time, but time does not seem to be there 
for the subject’s exploration of it in the way in which space does.181 
 
In summary, experiencing subjects are perceptually presented with a positive but 
limited spatial and temporal extent. Capturing how things are for the subject 
typically also involves appealing to a sense in which the subject is aware of other 
regions of space and/or intervals of time which go beyond that region/interval 
she is perceptually presented with. In the spatial case a subject’s experience is 
perspectivally-partial, the subject seems to possess one of many possible 
perspectives in space upon that which she is perceiving; this is not true of the 
temporal case. In three-dimensional space, in which one has a distal point of 
view, the spatiotemporal occurrences a subject perceives seem to admit of many 
possible perceptual points of view in space. In one-dimensional time, in which 
one has a temporally-transparent perceptual point of view, spatiotemporal 
occurrences do not seem to admit of any other possible perceptual points of 
view in time. 
 
 
5. A perspective in time: contemporary debates 
 
5. 1. The temporal microstructure of experience 
 
As in Chapter 3, I do not take the discussion of the phenomenal character of 
experience presented above to settle the question of the view of the temporal 
microstructure of experience we are to take. However, readers familiar with 
contemporary debates may be suspicious that what has been said above proves 
too much. Within such debates, theorists endorsing a retentional view can be 
read as saying that an experiencing subject has a perceptual temporal perspective, 
a perspective which reaches some way into the past (and perhaps also the future) 
from the present. It may be thought that such accounts have been ruled out by 
the considerations presented above, but it should be clarified that while what I 
                                               
181 In Chapter 5 I argue that this is related to the sense in which time seems to pass, for the 
subject. 
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have said in the present chapter does stand in contrast to modal retentional views, 
it remains consistent with non-modal retentional views. 
 
The claim that there is a disanalogy between the perspectival nature of visual 
experience in the spatial and temporal cases – in that the former does, and the 
latter does not, feature perspectival-partialness – does not automatically gain 
traction against the retentional view. There could, of course, be particular 
retentional accounts which are inconsistent with the proposal put forward in 
section 4, such as the modal variants (to the extent that they would require one 
to deny the temporal transparency of perceptual experience). But in principle a 
retentional view need not deny the features of the phenomenology I have 
described. 
 
There is a sense of perspectival-partialness and sense of occlusion in the spatial 
case which is not present in the temporal case. This does not speak to the issue 
of what view of the temporal microstructure of experience one takes. I have 
appealed to the absence of a perspectival nature to be revealed in the 
phenomenology in the temporal case (in contrast to the spatial case); this may 
be orthogonal to the retentionalist’s concerns and something she could accept. 
Insofar as retentionalism and extensionalism are views concerning the temporal 
microstructure of experience, the proponent of either can maintain the 
disanalogy between the experience of objects and events. On retentional and 
extensional views, an experiencing subject is taken to have something akin to a 
limited temporal field (the PSP); on both views we can make sense of field-
partialness.  
 
 
5. 2. The DSM and Noë: a brief comparison 
 
As a final aside, the reader may wonder how the current discussion relates to the 
discussion of Chapter 2. Both Noë and dynamic snapshot theorists appear to 
take a subject to have visual access to something like the present 
moment/instant, with the former appealing to an intentional trajectory/arc 
which is also present in the experience at that time, while the latter appeals to 
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vectors ‘painted on’ what is perceptually presented as being the case at that time. 
These differences appear to reflect a difference in what the theorists take to be 
required in order to provide an adequate characterisation of the experiential 
phenomenology, at least within their respective explanatory projects. 
 
Dynamic snapshot theorists appear to be concerned with accounting for how 
we experience motion/change, offering a candidate causal story about how our 
perceptual systems integrate information over time. Within this context, it is 
suggested that we need only appeal to experiential snapshots and vectors 
‘painted on’. I argued that there is more to a subject’s experiential 
phenomenology than spatially-ordered states of affairs (like snapshots) and 
movement/change; I argued against the idea that an appeal to a series of 
snapshots (and vectors) can adequately characterise the phenomenology. 
 
Noë is concerned with providing a richer causal story than the dynamic snapshot 
theorist – appealing to sensorimotor understanding – and accounting for our 
experience of time-filling temporal particulars. Within this context, he 
introduces an apparent analogy with the spatial case, an analogy with seeing a 
particular object as a voluminous whole though only in perceptual contact with 
a portion of the object from a relative perspective. In this chapter, I have 
demonstrated that there are analogies that can be drawn between our experience 
of objects and events, as well as the experiential point of view we occupy in the 
temporal and spatial cases – each featuring field-partialness. There are also 
significant disanalogies.  
 
The temporal case, unlike the spatial case, is not perspectivally-partial; and the 
temporal case features an asymmetrical awareness of times either side of the PSP 
– that which has been experienced and so is no longer there to be experienced, 
and that which will be there to be experienced in the immediate future – unlike 
the spatial analogue. In the spatial case, the subject plausibly has a form of 
awareness of the regions of space surrounding the sub-region captured by the 
visual field, but this awareness does not feature the asymmetry evident in the 
temporal case. This latter idea is related to the sense in which space seems to be 
there for our exploration in a way in which time does not. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter I have been concerned with several questions in the philosophy 
of perception and temporal experience. The overarching interest has been how 
similar our experience of objects and events is, and how similar our manifest 
experiential point of view in space is to our experiential point of view in time. 
To return to the opening metaphor, are they Blood Brothers, or distinctly different?  
 
I suggested Noë provides an illustration of some of the ways in which the two 
are and are not analogous. Noë presents a candidate solution to an issue which 
many theorists have found to be puzzling – the sense in which we experience 
objects as voluminous wholes while not seeing some portions of the objects’ 
outer surfaces. I argued that Noë’s proposed solution to this puzzle leaves us in 
the unwelcome position of denying (or importantly qualifying) a very plausible 
phenomenological claim. On the proposal I have offered, we need to appeal to 
how it is manifest to the subject that she is experiencing an object from a relative 
perspective. The perspective she possesses is one of many possible perspectives 
on the object and from other perspectives she could see more/other portions 
of the object. One’s visual experience of objects has a sense of perspectival-
partialness. 
 
Having discussed the spatial case and a subject’s typical visual experience of 
objects, I turned to consider the phenomenal character of our experience of 
events. Noë provided a good foil because he offers an analogous account of our 
experience of objects to our experience of events. For Noë, perceiving a portion 
of the object can implicate, in the perceptual experience, the rest of the object 
extending in space, and perceiving some portion of an event can implicate, in 
the perceptual experience, the rest of the event extending in time. This is, for 
Noë, how it is possible at a moment in time to experience a temporally extended 
event.  
 
Developing Noë’s proposal, I demonstrated that in the temporal case our 
experience is not perspectivally-partial; spatiotemporal occurrences do not seem 
to admit of any other possible perceptual points of view in time. Yet, getting 
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right how things are for the subject requires an appeal to the sense in which the 
subject has an (asymmetrical) awareness of the times immediately prior and 
subsequent to the time presented in perceptual experience: that there were earlier 
times/temporal parts she experienced, and that there will be later 
times/temporal parts she will experience. In the following chapter I argue that 
this asymmetrical awareness of times either side of the PSP is (partly) responsible 
for the sense in which time seems to pass, for the experiencing subject. 
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Chapter Five 
 
On Time Seeming to Pass 
 
 
“Time involves a kind of movement or activity. It does not stand still. It waits for no man. 
Sometimes it even flies. Poets liken time to a river, bringing fresh events and sweeping away old 
ones. Time is always passing” (Olson, 2009: 440). 
 
“We say that time passes or flows by. We speak of the course of time. …If time is similar to a 
river, it flows from the past towards the present and the future. …But this often repeated 
metaphor is in reality extremely confused. …The fact that the metaphor based on this comparison 
has persisted from the time of Heraclitus to our own day is explained by our surreptitiously 
putting into the river a witness of its course” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 366). 
 
In discussions of the philosophy of time, theorists often appeal to an ingredient 
of our wakeful, phenomenally conscious experience as evidence of a certain 
metaphysical view of time: that time flows or passes.182 This kind of metaphysical 
claim is itself difficult to offer without resorting to metaphors of streams, 
flowing water, or other forms of movement. Without resorting to metaphors – 
and whether or not it is true that time does in fact pass – it is worth pausing to 
consider what this apparent ingredient of a subject’s phenomenally conscious 
experience amounts to. In what follows I maintain the phenomenological focus 
which has been present throughout the thesis; the issue of interest is not whether 
time does pass, but whether time does seem – in a phenomenological sense – to 
pass; if so, in virtue of what? 
 
Within academic discussions and literature written for a more general audience, 
it is widely claimed that there is such an ingredient of a subject’s experience: 
 
                                               
182 This is suggested by the passage from Norton (2010) below. Craig (2000) also presents such 
an argument from experience, when he says that experience is “a defeater-defeater that 
overwhelms any B-theoretic arguments against the reality of tense” (Craig, 2000: 138). See also 
Balashov (2005) and Falk (2003). 
158 
 
 “[T]he flow of time, or passage, as it is known, is given in experience, …it is as 
indubitable an aspect of our perception of the world as the sights and sounds that 
come in upon us…” (Schuster, 1986: 695; emphasis added). 
 
“There is hardly any experience that seems more persistently, or immediately given 
to us than the relentless flow of time” (Schlesinger, 1991: 427; emphasis added). 
 
“…something in the way of ‘now’ must surely be inaccessible to non-
experiencers. What that is, seems to be a direct consequence of their incapacity 
to experience the passage of time” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 50). 
 
“[A]s a human being, I find it impossible to relinquish the sensation of a flowing 
time and a moving present moment. It is something so basic to my experience of 
the world...” (Davies, 1995: 275). 
 
“Time really passes ... Our sense of passage is our largely passive experience of a fact about 
the way time truly is, objectively” (Norton, 2010: 24; emphasis added). 
 
It might be surprising to some readers that whether or not our experience 
presents time as passing is a debated issue. It is tempting to think that time either 
does or does not seem to pass, and whichever is true should be remarkably 
obvious whenever we come to reflect on our experience. Given the current state 
of the literature, this would not appear to be the case.183 Some theorists have 
claimed that time does seem to pass, suggesting various candidate explanations 
of what the experience of time passing amounts to;184 others have insisted that 
                                               
183 There might be reason not to expect that this should be something obvious to a given subject. 
The experience of time is an issue which is liable to confuse people, as time (much like space) 
does not show up in a subject’s experience in the sense that shape, brightness, or change do. As 
we seem to experience time (or space) in virtue of experiencing temporal (or spatial) relations, 
asking whether time itself seems to pass – and even asking what it means to say that time seems 
to pass – is liable to create some confusion, or at least pause for further thought. 
184 There are a number of proposals which could be appealed to, but which I do not have the 
space to consider here. Torrengo (2017) presents a phenomenal modifier (or what might be 
called a projectivist) account of the experience of passage. While I am sympathetic to much of 
the motivation behind Torrengo’s account, I take the proposal I offer in section 3 to be an 
independently motivated alternative. Phillips (2013) gives an account of the phenomenology of 
time passing in terms of the direct perception of durations relative to a non-perceptual stream 
of consciousness. Insofar as Phillips’ account is of the rate at which time seems to pass, much of 
what I say may be compatible with his proposal. Skow (2011 and 2012) offers a view on which 
time seems to pass because, in part, time does pass. Though the author later appears to change 
his mind on this matter (Skow 2015). 
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these theorists are misclassifying aspects of their experience,185 taking what is 
really the experience of something else to be the experience of time passing.  
 
To give substance to this disagreement, in section 1 I generate a puzzle about 
how time could seem to pass in perceptual experience. I set out two proposals 
from the literature which can be read as attempts to solve this puzzle, a reductive 
proposal which appeals to the perception of motion/change is presented in 
section 2.1, and a proposal which appeals to the objects of perception being 
presented as enduring is presented in section 2.2. I argue that although these 
proposals provide some valuable insights, given some independently plausible 
assumptions it remains puzzling how there could be a sense in which time seems 
to pass in perceptual experience. In section 2.3, I argue that the puzzle cannot 
be bypassed by simply making an additional appeal to episodic memory. In 
section 3, drawing on aspects of the accounts discussed in section 2 (and the 
tripartite temporal structure of experience appealed to in Chapters 3 and 4), I 
offer a proposal which does allow us to bypass the puzzle without abandoning 
the idea that time seems to pass. On the positive proposal I develop, an appeal 
to ‘a witness’ is made less surreptitiously than Merleau-Ponty suggests it often 
is; I suggest that the temporal structure of an experiencing subject’s perspective 
is responsible for time seeming to pass. 
 
 
1. Time seeming to pass: two assumptions and a puzzle 
 
A puzzle regarding the supposed experience of time passing can be generated 
when we try to reconcile two independently plausible phenomenological claims. 
Firstly, from passages such as those quoted previously, we can take it that time 
seeming to pass is supposed to be a pervasive, perhaps ever-present, ingredient 
of our wakeful phenomenally conscious lives. Secondly, there is the claim that 
                                               
185 Such arguments appear to be presented by Callender (2008), Deng (2013a, 2013b, and 2017), 
Frischhut (2015), and Hoerl (2014). The latter is more narrowly focused in arguing that we do 
not seem to perceive time passing. These authors appear to be motivated, at least in part, to argue 
against the idea that experience supports the metaphysical view of time actually passing. It should 
be noted that in section 3 I offer an account of the phenomenology, the correct account of the 
metaphysics of reality is then a further question which I do not take the phenomenology to 
settle. 
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perceptual experience is temporally transparent.186 Recall that, in my hands, 
temporal transparency is the following negative claim: it doesn’t seem to the 
subject as though, through merely reflecting upon her perceptual 
phenomenology, she can mark out the temporal location of her perceptual point 
of view on an object or occurrence as distinct from the apparent temporal 
location of whatever object or occurrence it is that she seems to be perceptually 
aware of.  
 
To generate the puzzle, let us take from Schuster (quoted previously) the claim 
that when we talk about the experience of time passing we are talking about 
perceptual experience. Consider a subject perceiving some occurrence, such as 
visually perceiving a ball rolling down an incline. What is it that she is 
perceptually aware of which can be properly brought out as time seeming to 
pass? One thought may be that the subject seems to be perceptually aware, at a 
given time, of the ball’s journey from one location to another over a greater 
interval of time. Being so aware of the ball’s journey, the subject might also be 
said to be aware of not only the ball’s change in spatial (and temporal) location, 
but a change in some property of time, of some previous time seeming to give 
way to the time which seems to be now.  
 
If a theorist was not concerned with maintaining the claim of temporal 
transparency, she might take this route and claim that a subject is perceptually 
aware, at one time, of the ball as occupying distinct spatial locations at different 
times. However, commitment to temporal transparency renders such an 
explanation unavailable.187 Supposing that a subject is able to discern the time at 
which she seems to be perceptually presented with such an occurrence,188 by 
temporal transparency she is unable – in introspection alone – to distinguish 
between the time at which she is so perceptually presented with the occurrence 
                                               
186 See Chapter 3, section 1, for discussion. 
187 This does not automatically also create a puzzle concerning how a subject can experience 
change, something occurring over time, unless we make the further assumption that what is 
presented in perception is an instantaneous state of affairs – this does not follow from the claim 
that perceptual experience is temporally transparent. However, it might still be thought that the 
experience of change is closely related to the experience of time passing. 
188 In what follows reference to the time presented in experience, or to what is experienced as at 
a time, is not to pick out an instant, it is to pick out time as it is given in perceptual experience – 
the time a subject’s perceptual point of view is transparent to. I will take this to be the interval 
of the PSP. 
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and a distinct apparent temporal location of the occurrence perceptually 
presented. From merely reflecting on the phenomenology, she does not seem to 
be perceptually aware of the ball in a given location as just previous or past.  
 
To avoid conflicting with the claim of temporal transparency, a further thought 
may be that we need only appeal to how the subject first seems to be perceptually 
aware of the ball as occupying one spatial location at a given time and at a 
subsequent time seems to be perceptually aware of it as occupying another 
spatial location. Yet, while this may avoid violating the claim of temporal 
transparency, the experience that something is the case at one time and not at 
another time does not in and of itself provide a sense in which time itself has, or 
seems to have, changed. Perhaps this provides for a sense in which there seems 
to be more than one temporal location, but there being – and there seeming to 
be – multiple temporal locations is not sufficient for time to seem to pass. (For 
time to seem to pass there must be more than a change in perspective upon time, 
as a change in perspective upon space does not make it the case that space seems 
to pass. More will be said about this in section 3.1.) 
 
It is not yet clear what it means for time to seem to change, pass, or flow, unless 
we are merely saying that each time can be said to seem to be present at the time 
at which it is presented in experience. But the claim that time seems to pass is 
certainly supposed to amount to more than the claim that at each time of 
experience it seems to be the time that it is. For there to be a change there needs 
to be something which is the subject of that change; it is as of yet unclear how 
time can seem to be the subject of such change.189 I take the proposal I offer in 
section 3 to directly address this issue. Prior to offering a positive proposal it will 
be useful to consider some existing accounts, in order to draw attention to what 
they appear to get right and so should be accommodated, and where puzzles 
remain. 
 
 
 
                                               
189 This being one of the issues widely discussed in the philosophy of time since McTaggart’s 
(1908) argument for the unreality of time, an argument defended by Dummett (1960). 
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2. Accounts of why time seems to pass 
 
2.1. From the perception of motion and change 
 
To give a succinct summary of one way of accounting for the claim that time 
seems to pass, we can turn to L. A. Paul: 
 
“I step out of my house into the morning air and feel the cool breeze on my face. 
I feel the freshness of the cool breeze now, and, as the breeze dies down, I notice 
that time is passing… Reflection on the qualitative character of such experiences 
suggests that events occurring now have a characteristic property of nowness, 
responsible for a certain special “feel,” and that events pass from the future to 
the present and then into the past” (Paul, 2010: 333). 
 
Paul takes as a question to guide her enquiry: “… what exactly do we perceive 
when we are supposed to be perceiving passage?” (ibid.: 345). In the above 
passage an appeal to perceived change is tied to an awareness that time is 
passing.190 Paul says that there is a distinctive qualitative character to a subject’s 
experience in cases of perceived change, over and above the experience of some 
object having a given property at a time and the experience of the same object 
not having that given property at a later time. Paul talks about this in terms of 
“an animated qualitative change” and the “animated, flowing character of our 
ordinary experiences as of change” (ibid.: 351). In saying this, I take Paul to have 
in mind a case such as when one looks at the second-hand of a clock and sees it 
moving around the clock face (as opposed to a case such as when one looks at 
the hour-hand of a clock and does not see it moving, even if after some time 
one can infer that it has moved). In what follows I will take it that Paul is right 
in this regard; to experience change is not merely to experience an object 
instantiate different properties at different times. 
 
                                               
190 Paul also says that “experiences as of nowness and as of the passage of events are central to 
our subjective perspective. In some deep but hard to define way, our temporal experience is 
caught up with our sense of being, that is, our sense of what we are and how we are” (Paul 2010: 
333-4). Paul suggests that “[m]aking sense of the features of temporal experience is fundamental 
to our ability to make sense of the world and of ourselves as agents in the world and bears 
important connections to one's having a point of view and to one's sense of being a self” (ibid.: 
334). I will go on to argue (in section 3) that this claim is very close to the truth of the matter, 
but it is also a claim which I believe gets obscured in Paul’s positive proposal, which I outline. 
163 
 
Paul describes how the brain interprets perceptually presented stimuli over time 
and how this can account for the phenomenology common to cases of perceived 
change (be they veridical or illusory). The subject’s perceptual makeup is such 
that it responds to perceptually presented stimuli, which are presented within a 
given temporal window and which have (a degree of) some sort of qualitative 
contrast, by organising these inputs and giving rise to the animated, flowing 
character of our experiences of change (see ibid.: 354). If such a qualitative 
contrast is only discriminable over a greater interval, the experience of change 
will not arise.  
 
Paul further says that “if we were in an entirely static environment where there 
were no contrasts between property instances (this would have to include no 
contrasts with respect to properties of my thoughts) then it would seem to us as 
though time were standing still. And, indeed, I think this is a very plausible 
supposition” (ibid.: 355). It is not entirely clear how to interpret the parenthetical 
qualification regarding the change in properties of thoughts. One proposal 
which can clearly be read in Paul’s discussion trades on an appeal to a subject’s 
perceptual mechanisms and an empirical explanation of a feature of the (visual) 
perceptual phenomenology. In what follows I will focus on this proposal: that 
the (visual) perceptual systems are such that the perceptual experience of change 
involves a dynamic quality, and this quality is what is picked out by people who 
refer to time as seeming to pass. It is not clear what role contrasts with respect 
to properties of thoughts can play in this story. Taking the focus upon the visual 
perception of motion/change throughout Paul’s paper to indicate the thought 
that there is a necessary connection between perceiving motion/change and 
experiencing time passing, in what follows I reject this claim. If the focus is not 
solely on the perception of motion/change, then there may be a further proposal 
which can be developed from Paul’s discussion (though I won’t here attempt to 
spell out what this proposal amounts to). 
 
Paul says: “There is no claim (at least no claim that I have been able to discover) 
that we somehow have experiences as of passage apart from experiences as of 
change. …The argument for the existence of passage relies solely on our 
experience as of change, rather than on any claim that we somehow directly or 
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independently detect passage as a fundamental feature of the universe” (ibid.: 
346). If we grant that there is some particular ingredient of the subject’s 
phenomenology which we can call time seeming to pass, we can take Paul’s 
suggestion to be that this ingredient is reducible to some combination of other 
phenomenal ingredients, such as the perception of motion and change.191 
However, there are reasons to believe that the perception of motion and change 
is not all that there is to the experience of time’s apparent passage. 
 
Consider O’Shaughnessy’s (2000) invitation to imagine “[p]erceptual worlds 
populated exclusively… by unchanging objects” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 60). He 
goes on to say that this would be experienced as “a sort of graveyard of 
immobilized entities, all frozen in their tracks. And in fact such a scene would 
be a world, not in reality of changelessness, but of persistence and change in 
which the change is presented to consciousness in the mode of the hour hand” 
(O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 61). O’Shaughnessy is describing a scenario in which a 
subject’s perceptual experience lacks the phenomenal ingredient picked out by 
our talk of perceiving qualitative change and motion. Changes in the 
environment may only be inferred over time, when the subject notices – based 
on a comparison between what she currently perceives and can recall – that 
things in her environment are not as they were. 
 
O’Shaughnessy maintains that: “Even in the situation of total lack of change in 
the objects of perception, change continues—within. …However frozen the 
perceptible world may in fact be, the ‘internal clock’ of consciousness ticks 
on…” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 61). In claiming that the internal clock of 
consciousness ticks on, O’Shaughnessy claims that time would still seem to pass, 
for the subject.192 He stipulates that the closely spaced inputs to the subject’s 
perceptual mechanisms do not have the qualitative contrasts required in order 
to give rise to the animated, flowing character of our typical perceptual 
experiences of change. Yet, he says that time would seem to pass for the subject, 
                                               
191 For a deflationist response to Paul’s proposal, and moreover to the claim that we seem to 
perceive the passage of time, see Hoerl (2014). For more on the difference between reductionist 
and deflationist theses one could take with respect to the claim that time seems to pass, see 
Torrengo (2017). 
192 This is related to his claim that “experience guarantees a direct confrontation with the passage 
of time…” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 65). 
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because the subject will seem to have been perceiving such a static state of affairs 
for some time, as her experiencing continues on.  
 
Without appealing to such a ‘frozen perceptible world’, this point is also 
emphasised by Torrengo (2017). Torrengo picks up on the distinction between 
perceptible and imperceptible change and says: “Although there is no direct 
perception of movement or change … [in the case of watching the hour-hand 
of a clock, for example, unlike the case of watching the second-hand] … they 
don’t seem to differ with respect to their ability to tell us what it is like for time 
to pass” (Torrengo, 2017: 176). Even when we are confronted with a seemingly 
static state of affairs in perceptual experience, each author maintains that there 
is a phenomenal ingredient in our wakeful conscious lives which can be picked 
out as time seeming to pass as the subject’s experiencing continues on. 
 
The thought can be summarised as follows. Over a given period of time a subject 
might not be perceptually presented with any discriminable qualitative contrasts 
between property instances, and yet it would not seem to the subject as though 
time were standing still. Time seems to pass as she seems to be experiencing the 
same (seemingly unchanging) objects for some period of time. This strikes a 
chord with the first assumption outlined above, that time’s seeming passage is 
supposed to be a persistent and perhaps ever-present feature of our wakefully 
conscious lives. 
 
It is open to a theorist to dispute such a claim and to insist that experiencing 
time passing does entail perceiving motion and change,193 but if the claims of 
O’Shaughnessy and Torrengo – in addition to the assumption made at the outset 
– are more in line with lay thought regarding time seeming to pass, any such 
response would be at least revisionary. For those who find the opening 
assumption plausible, the phenomenal ingredient being gestured at as the 
experience of time’s apparent passing is not reducible to perceived qualitative 
                                               
193 One suggestion may be that we should develop Paul’s proposal not in terms of perceived 
motion/change, but in terms of some other form of awareness of change, which could include 
an awareness that more experiencing is taking place even if there was no perceptible change in 
the environment. This thought gets close to the proposal I offer in section 3. 
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change. The challenge is to then explain what is missing from the present 
proposal.  
 
 
2.2. From the experience of change and persistence 
 
One moral we may take from the preceding discussion is that it is not merely 
the experience of change which is distinctly temporal, but also the experience of 
persistence regardless of change. In addition to being perceptually aware of an 
object undergoing some qualitative change as an occurrence which unfolds over 
time, we can also be perceptually aware of some object persisting without 
undergoing some qualitative change as something which occurs over time. 
Whether the subject seems to have been perceiving a static state of affairs or a 
changing one, she will seem to have been experiencing it for some time as her 
experiencing continues on; being so perceptually aware of some object persisting 
over time, whether it undergoes some qualitative change or not, time seems to 
pass.  
 
The above line of thought may make plausible the following suggestion: it is 
something about how perceptually presented objects seem to persist over time 
which accounts for the sense in which time seems to pass. This line of thought 
is presented by Simon Prosser (2012 and 2016), who argues that it is in virtue of 
the objects of perceptual experience being presented as enduring that we 
experience time passing.194 In order to persuade the reader of this proposal, 
Prosser suggests that objects being presented as enduring plays a crucial role in 
our experience of change (and plausibly persistence regardless of change too). 
                                               
194 Prosser cites Velleman (2006) as a source of inspiration for this claim. Velleman suggests that 
“experiential memory leads me to think that my own temporal extension is composed of a single 
momentary self playing the role of each temporal part of my existence” (Velleman, 2006: 8). 
That is, Velleman suggests that in experiential memory a subject thinks of herself as being 
present in the here-and-now in a way which is inconsistent with having temporal parts, but she 
nevertheless thinks that she has persisted over time (her memory being evidence of her existence 
at earlier times). Hence, Velleman argues that we are led to conceive of ourselves as enduring 
subjects. I explain why such an appeal to memory is not sufficient for the current explanatory 
project in section 2.3. I believe that there is something correct in both Velleman’s and Prosser’s 
suggestions, but that in the current context such proposals might get the cart before the horse. 
I will consider the relationship between an appeal to the subject of experience, as we find in 
Velleman (and Hofweber and Velleman, 2011), and an appeal to the objects of experience, as 
we find in Prosser, in section 3. 
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To endure, in the sense at issue, is – crudely – for something to exist in its 
entirety at any moment at which it exists. The alternative way to persist over 
time is by perduring; to perdure is for something – again crudely – to persist by 
having different temporal parts at different times.195 
 
Prosser reads Kant as making the point that in order for a change to be 
presented196 in experience, something must be presented as retaining its identity 
throughout the change. From this Prosser suggests that “in order to experience 
change our experience must also represent something retaining its identity 
through the change. This, I suggest, requires objects to be represented as 
enduring” (Prosser, 2012: 105). In order for an object to be presented as 
changing in colour from green to red, for example, it must be presented as one 
and the same object which is at one time green and then at a later time red. We 
can say the same of persistence regardless of qualitative change. Minimally, an 
object must seem to be numerically one and the same thing which exists at 
different times in order to seem to persist through time.197 
 
On perdurance theories an object also retains its identity throughout a change, 
but Prosser says such theories do not capture the change “as we experience it” 
(Prosser, 2012: 106; emphasis in original). Explaining this claim, Prosser says: 
“Change is not experienced as an F temporal part succeeded by a non-F temporal 
part, with it somehow being understood that both parts belong to the same 
composite whole; this does not correctly capture the phenomenology” (ibid.). 
He says that if we were to experience objects as perduring, we would experience 
one temporal part followed by another, experiencing these as temporal parts, 
and that reflection supports the claim that the phenomenology is not this way. 
                                               
195 This comes from Lewis’s (1986) discussion of temporary intrinsics and relates to contested 
issues concerning how we are to understand the endurance/perdurance distinction (see, for 
example, Donnelly, 2011; Fine, 2008; Hofweber and Velleman, 2011; Sider, 2001). I don’t intend 
to settle any such disputes here, in what follows I simply draw attention to one of the differences 
in how we experience objects and occurrences as filling time. 
196 Prosser’s discussion makes use of ‘representation’ rather than ‘presentation’. I use the latter 
in order to be neutral on the issue of whether perceptual experience is fundamentally 
representational, but if it would chime better with Prosser’s claims everything I say in this section 
could be cast in terms of perceptual representation rather than presentation. 
197 This is necessary, but not sufficient. We could concoct a case in which an object seems to go 
out of existence at t1 and comes into existence at t5 while seeming to remain numerically identical 
and yet not seeming to persist from t1 to t5. 
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The consequence of this line of reasoning, Prosser suggests, is that objects are 
presented in experience as enduring.  
 
According to Prosser, objects being presented as enduring is responsible for 
change seeming dynamic, and change being experienced as dynamic is a key part 
of time seeming to pass198 (in this sense, Prosser comes close to the position 
attributed to Paul). The particular proposal I am drawing from Prosser is as 
follows: the perceptual experience of objects persisting over time by enduring is 
what the experience of time passing consists in.199 Prosser’s appeal to the 
presentation of an object as enduring throughout a change, and even if there is no 
change,200 distinguishes his proposal from Paul’s; yet this proposal has 
implications I reject.201 
 
One might take issue with Prosser’s claim that objects of experience are 
presented as enduring.202 Yet this is a claim which I believe has some plausibility 
when further developed, as I do below. I defend Prosser’s claim because doing 
so ultimately reveals a more substantive disagreement. Prosser’s proposal fails 
because the perceptual experience of objects as enduring is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for time to seem to pass. 
 
 
 
                                               
198 Prosser claims that if objects were presented as perduring there would be no such dynamism 
in the phenomenology – that experiencing objects as perduring would be akin to experiencing a 
series of ‘static’ images. Against this claim, see Hoerl (2014). 
199 If there are other proposals which can be read in Prosser’s discussion then these would need 
to be developed further. In conversation, Prosser has confirmed that he foresees more of a role 
being given to the subject’s sense that she too endures; the pursuit of this thought is one way of 
viewing the proposal I offer in section 3. 
200 Regarding the question of why objects are presented as enduring – which he takes to be 
illusory – Prosser suggests that this is because of a ‘laziness’ in the perceptual system: “it is more 
economical to represent a simple enduring identity than a perduring identity that consists in the 
unity of a series of independently represented parts” (Prosser, 2012: 112). 
201 It might be that we could appeal to a ‘perfect’ sensory deprivation tank (which deprives a 
subject of all sensory input), suggesting that while in such a tank time would still seem to pass 
for the subject, even though there is no object of experience to be represented as enduring. 
However, such a thought experiment is far from straightforward. Firstly, Prosser could complain 
that it is not clear what our intuitions would dictate in this case; by insisting that time would 
seem time pass his interlocutor might simply be begging the question against his proposal. 
Secondly, depending on how broad his use of the term ‘object’ is, Prosser might hold that there 
would still be ‘objects’ of memory or imagination, presented to the subject while in this tank, 
which may be represented as enduring. 
202 For a response to Prosser’s argument along these lines, see Deng (2013a). 
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2.2.i. Experiencing objects as enduring 
 
In claiming that objects of experience are presented as enduring Prosser appears 
to argue by elimination while only considering two options, that objects are 
presented as perduring or enduring, and while not explicitly considering whether 
objects could be presented as persisting in a way which is neutral between 
perdurance and endurance. However, we can add some plausibility to Prosser’s 
claims when we consider a difference between how we perceive objects and 
occurrences (I will focus on processes) over time.203  
 
We may not expect the nature of a particular’s persistence to be read off 
perceptual experience, as a subject’s perceptual mechanisms are not 
metaphysicians, but reflection on the phenomenology does reveal differences in 
how we ordinarily experience things filling time. An object, such as a ball, can 
seem to persist over time without there seeming to be any more of the object. 
In the ordinary case, a ball – visually perceived over some period of time – seems 
to persist over time, but it is not phenomenologically apt to say that there seems 
to be more and more of the object. There could seem to be more and more of 
the ball over time, if it swelled in size, but this is a change over time in how it 
fills (and seems to fill) space. Keeping its spatial extent constant over time, it is 
not true to the phenomenology to say that there seems to be more of the ball 
over time. Experiencing the ball over time, it seems to exist – it is presented in 
experience – at each time, and so it seems to be changing in its temporal location 
over time. The same is not true of occurrences.  
 
Experiencing some processual activity, such as a ball rolling down an incline, it 
seems to have temporal parts at different temporal locations. When watching 
the ball’s journey over time, it is phenomenologically apt to say that the ball’s 
journey fills time by there seeming to be more and more of it. This is one way 
of understanding O’Shaughnessy’s claim that “processes ‘go on’ or ‘continue’ 
occurrently in time, each new instant realizing more of the same as what has 
gone on so far… the process ‘lays down’ more and more of an event the same 
                                               
203 See Chapter 4 for a distinct but related discussion of some of the phenomenological 
differences between our experience of spatial and temporal particulars. 
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in kind as itself” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 44). A given process that a subject 
experiences does not seem to change its temporal location; as she experiences 
it, it seems to have more and more temporal parts at subsequent temporal 
locations. This is how processes seem to fill time and this is to be contrasted 
with objects.  
 
Over time an object of experience, a spatial particular, may seem to change its 
temporal location while remaining numerically one and the same object, but it 
does not do so by there seeming to be any more of it. On the basis of such 
phenomenological reflections, Prosser’s suggestion regarding the objects of 
experience being presented as enduring can be supported. Rather than focusing 
on the contested endurance/perdurance distinction we can say that, through 
reflection on the phenomenology, objects – but not processes – seem to fill time 
by changing their temporal location over time. I will take this claim to be the 
content of Prosser’s insight. 
 
2.2.ii. Experiencing objects as enduring and time seeming to pass 
 
Prosser’s account may allow us to build upon the puzzle which remained after 
the proposal from Paul, offering an account of how time can seem to pass even 
when one is not perceptually presented with any discriminable qualitative 
contrasts between property instances. Yet as stated it also faces problems, 
because the perceptual experience of objects as enduring is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for time to seem to pass. To begin I focus on the necessity claim. 
 
In the passage quoted above Paul appeals to feeling a breeze dying down, tying 
this to an awareness of time as passing. To switch sensory modalities, it is also 
plausible that in hearing the whistling of the wind time can seem to pass for the 
subject. In each case, there is constantly something new occurring and being 
experienced. Even if there is no change in the content of what is being 
experienced – such as when one hears the whistling of the wind without hearing 
it getting louder/quieter, faster/slower, and so on – there is still more experiencing 
occurring. In neither case have we introduced an object – a spatial particular – 
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that the subject is experientially aware of as enduring; yet in experiencing either 
phenomenon it is plausible to maintain that time seems to pass. 
 
As demonstrated in the previous examples, our perceptual experience of 
processes involves a seeming awareness of time passing. On the proposal 
attributed to Prosser this would only be derivatively so, in virtue of it somewhere 
involving an experience of an object (on Prosser’s proposal it is necessary to 
experience objects – as enduring – in order to experience time passing). This 
does not appear to be true to the phenomenology in the two cases above. It 
appears plausible that a subject can be perceptually aware of a breeze dying 
down, or of the whistling of the wind, without thereby being perceptually aware 
of an enduring object of experience. Because in such cases time seems to pass, 
the perceptual experience of objects as enduring is not necessary for time to 
seem to pass; hence Prosser’s proposal cannot give us the whole story. 
 
It is also not obvious that the perceptual experience of objects as enduring is 
sufficient for time seeming to pass, at least not without saying more concerning 
what is being assumed about the experiencing subject. For example, it cannot be 
sufficient for time to seem to pass, nor for an object to seem to change and/or 
persist, that a numerically identical object is perceptually presented as occupying 
one temporal location and subsequently perceptually presented as occupying a 
distinct temporal location. It is necessary that there is also single subject 
experiencing the object over time; not a series of subjects each experiencing the 
object at successive times.204 The object perceptually presented needs to seem to 
remain the same – needs to be presented as numerically identical over time – 
and the thing to which the object is presented needs to seem to remain the same 
in some sense – the experiencing subject. In order for an object to seem to 
change or persist, over time both the object and the individual the object is 
presented to must seem to remain numerically identical. 
 
Matters are more complicated still. Consider a subject with no sense of memory 
or anticipation, a subject who is only responsive to her immediate environment. 
                                               
204 This is related to the Jamesian claim that a succession of experiences are not alone sufficient 
for an experience of succession (see James, 1890: 420); being explicit about this avoids our appeal 
to an experiencer being surreptitious. 
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Call this the purely-perceptual subject. By the temporal transparency of 
perceptual experience, it doesn’t seem, to the subject, as though she can mark 
out the temporal location of her experiential point of view on an object or 
occurrence as distinct from the temporal location of whatever object or 
occurrence it is that she seems to be experientially aware of. As a result, for the 
purely-perceptual subject it is not obvious that the object perceived can seem to 
be numerically identical to the object perceived at earlier/later times, because 
this requires an awareness of these earlier/later times (this would also plausibly 
be the case for the subject – rather than object – end of the relation).  
 
For an object to seem to persist over time it is not enough to stipulate that each 
of the object of experience and the experiencing subject are one and the same 
numerically identical things over time, each must also seem to be. For an object 
of experience to seem to persist, as well as the subject experiencing the object 
now, at time t2, she must seem to have previously occupied a view point on the 
same object, at t1, and perhaps anticipate having a subsequent view point on the 
same object at t3. (This is not something Prosser would need to disagree with – 
though it is also not something he explicitly acknowledges – as he is not 
assuming a purely-perceptual subject.) This boils down to what can be regarded 
as a problem for any account of time seeming to pass which only appeals to what 
a subject is aware of in perceptual experience: for time to seem to pass it is not 
sufficient to be aware of a time at a time. Without invoking a sense of memory 
or anticipation, though the experiencing subject may seem to be aware of a time 
– the time her perceptual perspective is transparent to – it does not appear as 
though she can be said to be aware of time seeming to pass.  
 
We have been supposing that when we talk about the experience of time passing 
we are talking about perceptual experience, and since this supposition has led to a 
series of puzzles it would be best to see whether we can explain the sense in 
which time seems to pass if we jettison this supposition. Without supposing that 
time seeming to pass is reducible to a particular ingredient of a subject’s 
perceptual phenomenology, we are still left with the question of how we are to 
make sense of time seeming to pass for a wakefully conscious subject.  
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2.3. Beyond perceptual experience 
 
Our phenomenally conscious wakeful lives – our conscious points of view in 
time – do not merely reduce to the deliverances of perceptual experience. We 
are not like the purely-perceptual subject. As wakefully conscious subjects we 
also recall and anticipate occurrences; it may be thought that it is a form of 
memory which is responsible for time seeming to pass. In some recent 
discussions of our experience of the apparent passage of time, some authors 
have explicitly distinguished between the temporal awareness afforded by 
perceptual experience and that which is afforded by recollection. For example, 
Le Poidevin says: “We are indirectly aware of the passage of time when we reflect 
on our memories, which present the world as it was, and so a contrast with how 
things are now” (Le Poidevin, 2007: 87). Following Le Poidevin, Deng (2017) 
also says that reflection upon what one recalls affords a kind of temporal 
awareness which might be thought to play a role in time seeming to pass. Deng, 
like Le Poidevin, calls this an indirect kind of temporal awareness “that arises 
when we reflect on how things used to be and compare them to how they are 
now” (Deng, 2017: 245). In so far as these are offered as explanations of time 
seeming to pass for wakefully conscious subjects,205 we need to say more about 
the form of memory that such explanations concern. 
 
It cannot be that memory understood as retained knowledge (such as semantic 
memory) plays the role envisioned by such authors in an explanation of time 
seeming to pass. Retained knowledge may concern timeless facts, such as facts 
concerning prime numbers; such knowledge does not play any role in a 
distinctive form of temporal awareness. There is also no guarantee that retained 
knowledge regarding occurrences in time will concern times at which the subject 
was alive, or that such knowledge will make a difference to how things seem 
experientially to the subject. That Harold Godwinson died during the Battle of 
Hastings in 1066 may have been learned in childhood and retained through 
                                               
205 To be clear, this is not a claim the authors explicitly support. Deng goes on to argue that time 
does not seem to pass in any substantive phenomenological sense. Le Poidevin, in the previously 
quoted passage, also says that we are more immediately aware of the passage of time when we 
perceive motion and/or change; moreover it isn’t obvious that time seeming to ‘pass’ is really 
what is at issue for Le Poidevin, rather than experiencing time and/or temporal phenomena 
more generally. 
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adolescence and into adulthood, but this retained knowledge does not appear to 
make an experiential difference to the subject, we say that such knowledge is 
retained even in dreamless sleep. 
 
An appeal to episodic memory206 – understood as a form of autonoetic, 
autobiographical memory, taken to involve some form of imagery207 – may 
appear plausible. The proposal would then be that it is the comparison between 
what one episodically recalls and what one is currently perceptually aware of 
which is responsible for time’s seeming passage. Depending on the account of 
episodic memory one gives, this form of memory can be taken to deliver a 
representation of a previously experienced occurrence. That is, episodic memory 
can be understood to be an experiential form of awareness of objects (and their 
qualities) as they were previously perceived, but not as they are now perceived 
(episodic recollection is not temporally transparent to its objects). The claim 
could be that, granting that in episodic recall a subject is aware of an event (or 
temporal part thereof) as something which was witnessed at the time at which it 
occurred, but which is now – during the time of recall – no longer being 
witnessed, this delivers a sense in which time seems to pass or have passed. 
However, there are at least two problems when one takes this to explain the 
sense in which time seems to pass. 
 
A representation of one time as something which was perceived, but is not 
currently being perceived, together with a representation of another time as that 
which is being perceived currently, does not yet get to the idea that time has, or 
seems to have, passed. Such an experiential representation delivers a sense in 
which there are – or rather, there seem to be – different temporal locations. As 
discussed previously, the idea that there are – and that there seem to be – 
different temporal locations does not yet deliver a sense in which time seems to 
have passed, or any sense in which time itself seems to have changed. That is, 
not unless we say more about this comparison between what can be recalled and 
                                               
206 That there is such a distinction to be drawn between semantic and episodic memory is stressed 
by the work of Tulving (1972 and 1982). 
207 By ‘imagery’ I here simply mean that there is something experiential, there is something it is 
like for the subject, where this need not be understood in visual terms. 
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what is now being experienced,208 or build more into the phenomenology of 
episodic recall,209 but even if one was to explore this option, there is a further 
concern.  
 
Suppose we were to appeal to episodic memory in order to give an account of 
an ingredient of the phenomenology which can be picked out as time seeming 
to pass. Such an ingredient of the phenomenology would be a feature which is 
only present in episodic recall. Time seeming to pass is supposed to be a 
pervasive part of our experiential lives. It is a plausible enough assumption that 
episodic recall only occurs sporadically. Therefore to pick out a 
phenomenological feature of episodic recall is not to pick out the 
phenomenological ingredient of interest when theorists discuss time seeming to 
pass, something which is said to be persistently and immediately given to us. 
 
Without appealing to more than what is presented in perceptual experience, we 
appear to encounter the puzzle laid out in section 1. The temporal transparency 
of perceptual experience makes it puzzling how time can seem to pass. I have 
further suggested that an appeal to episodic recollection does not provide us 
with a solution to our puzzle, but it would be an oversimplification to conclude 
that no appeal to a form of memory or anticipation could be fruitful in explaining 
a sense in which time seems to pass. I will explore a further possibility, drawing 
on a role for an experiencing subject’s perspective in time, in the final section. 
 
 
                                               
208 Deng (2017) says that a comparison between what a subject can recall and what she is now 
experiencing, in addition to a subject’s awareness of the temporal asymmetry of episodic memory 
– that she is always experiencing something new and adding to memory (at a later time you are 
aware that you can recall more now than you could previously) – may be thought to provide the 
subject with an awareness of time passing/having passed. We could grant this, as Deng (and Le 
Poidevin) suggests that such a form of awareness would be indirect. Insofar as we think that there 
is a pervasive feature of our phenomenally conscious lives properly picked out as time seeming to 
pass (and that this is direct – it doesn’t require reflection) we are motivated to keep on looking. 
209 We might describe episodic memory as a form of awareness of a ‘past present’, where this 
involves an awareness that the time in question once had the objective property of presence but 
no longer does. An early version of such a view might be read in Russell’s Theory of Knowledge 
manuscript, where he suggests that in memory the events we recall appear as in the past rather 
than appearing as present (see Russell 1992). This phenomenological claim can also be read in 
Martin (2001), who says that while perception and memory can coincide with respect to the 
objects of experience, and their qualities, “they still differ in the manner by which these objects 
are given or presented to the mind” (Martin, 2001: 271). 
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3. On why time seems to pass 
 
3.1. Taking stock 
 
In the previous sections I outlined several candidate explanations for the sense 
in which time seems to pass. While each proposal illuminated a feature of a 
typical experiencing subject’s temporal awareness, each also left a puzzle of its 
own. Paul’s proposal drew attention to the experience of change, but appeal to 
a change in the properties of an object presented in perceptual experience is not 
sufficient to account for the pervasiveness of time seeming to pass. Prosser’s 
proposal drew attention to the objects of experience being presented as 
enduring, but the focus upon what is presented in perceptual experience – and 
three-dimensional objects in particular – does not account for how a subject can 
be aware of a succession of times as successive. An appeal to episodic memory 
was considered in order to patch the previous worry; while this appears to get 
right that we need to appeal to more than what is presented in perceptual 
experience, as stated it also fails to account for the pervasiveness of time seeming 
to pass.  
 
To make headway, let’s return to some thoughts offered at the outset. Merleau-
Ponty suggested that the metaphor of time as a river, and of it flowing/passing, 
is only supported by our surreptitiously assigning a role to a witness of its course. 
Motivated by Merleau-Ponty’s claim, we can stop to ask if there is something 
about the role of a witness – the experiencing subject – which, once articulated, 
might allow for an account of time seeming to pass. 
 
In offering an account of time seeming to pass, it is not enough to merely appeal 
to an experiential perspective, because occupying an experiential perspective on 
a given state of affairs is not sufficient for anything to seem to pass. Consider a 
subject’s perspective in space. In Chapter 4, I discussed the ways in which we 
might think of a typical subject’s visual experience of space as perspectival, yet 
at no point was it claimed – and it would not be plausible to claim – that space 
seems to pass the typical subject in the sense in which time is supposed to. As 
time seeming to pass is said to be one of the ways in which a subject’s experience 
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of time differs from her experience of space, we are motivated to look for ways 
in which the experiential perspective a subject occupies in space differs from 
that which she occupies in time. 
 
One thought might be that it is the passivity in the change of perspective in the 
temporal case, unlike the activity in the change of perspective in the spatial case, 
which is sufficient for time to seem to pass. This thought goes as follows. The 
subject can (to an extent) be active with regards to the spatial location of her 
experiential perspective; she can choose to move through three-dimensional 
space in a number of ways and she can choose to remain stationary (relative to 
her immediate environment). The subject is not so active with regards to the 
temporal location of her experiential perspective; she cannot choose at will what 
time to experience next, and she cannot choose to remain at one particular 
temporal vantage point.  
 
Passivity regarding the temporal location of one’s point of view does contrast 
with the agentive control one has over its spatial location, but this difference 
between the two cases is not sufficient for time – rather than space – to seem to 
pass.210 To demonstrate why, we can imagine a spatial case in which one passively 
occupies a series of positions relative to an object. From cinematic 
representation we are familiar with a range of camera angles on an object being 
presented in succession, without the audience having any say on which camera 
angle is presented next. In a broadly analogous fashion, suppose a subject 
possesses subsequent perspectives, at disparate points (not following a 
continuous path through spacetime) in three-dimensional space, upon an object; 
suppose further that she has no agentive control over the succession of 
perspectives she occupies. (For current purposes the specifics of the example do 
not matter, whether we construe the example as involving virtual reality goggles, 
a subject being rapidly and continuously tele-transported, or simply the watching 
of a film.) In the supposed case the subject occupies a series of seemingly 
random perspectives upon an object at subsequent times; the subject seems to 
change in her spatial location relative to the object, but it does not appear 
                                               
210 I do not dispute that such passivity may be necessary, what I dispute is that passivity alone is 
sufficient. Minimally, it needs to be supplemented with other features of awareness; in particular, 
an awareness of more than the present time. 
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plausible to suggest that in this case space would seem to pass in the sense that 
time is supposed to. Therefore the appeal to passivity – regarding the location 
of one’s point of view – does not alone appear to be sufficient for anything to 
seem to pass. 
 
An alternative suggestion might appeal to the idea that there has to be a 
continuous (or at least not noticeably discontinuous) path through time/space 
in order for time/space to seem to pass. Without saying more, it would appear 
that, once again, this is not quite enough. We can take there to be a perspective 
on time/space which includes some sort of awareness of a ‘path’, without 
time/space seeming to pass. For example, in the spatial case there is no sense in 
which anything seems to pass if one remains stationary at a point on a path.211 
The metaphor of a path only appears to be fruitful if it is added that one seems 
to be moving along the path.212 In order for time to seem to pass, it appears that 
there must be some sense of movement; a sense in which the subject is aware of 
occupying distinct, successive temporal locations at distinct times (being aware 
of them as successive). The experiential perspective a subject possesses in time, 
developed in Chapter 3 and 4, can be put to use in explaining how there is such 
a sense of movement through time.  
 
 
3.2. The tripartite temporal structure of experience 
 
In Chapter 3 I argued that a form of awareness of both the immediate past and 
immediate future has an irreducible role to play in characterising a subject’s 
awareness of the present. What is given in experience is a non-zero temporal 
extent, given as falling between the recent past and future as the subject is 
                                               
211 I take this to be the import of Kit Fine’s discussion, when he says (regarding the temporal 
case): “the passage of time requires that the moments of time be successively present and this 
appears to require more than the presentness of a single moment of time” (Fine, 2005: 287; 
emphasis added). 
212 Dummett (1960) supports this idea by imagining a hypothetical observer who is aware of 
four-dimensional spacetime in such a way that it can survey the whole course of events at once, 
or in whatever order it chooses. In this case, he says: “If our hypothetical observer observes only 
the four-dimensional configuration without observing our movement – the movement of 
consciousness – through it, like someone observing the road but blind to the traveler, he does 
not see all that happens. But if he also observes our passage through it, what he is observing is 
no longer static…” (1960: 502). 
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oriented to them. This is not to say that what is presented in perceptual 
experience is presented under distinct temporal modes of presentation, rather 
the awareness of immediately preceding and subsequent times is constitutive of 
the interval being given as present in experience.  
 
To elucidate this tripartite temporal structure, before returning to the issue time 
seeming to pass, we can turn to O’Shaughnessy’s discussion in his Consciousness 
and the World (2000). O’Shaughnessy says that the experiencing subject “stands 
in a special relation to time not discoverable in those not experiencing” 
(O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 50); at least part of this special relation is to be found in 
the way in which something about a ‘thin now’ is only accessible to an 
experiencing subject. By speaking of a ‘thin now’, O’Shaughnessy says that this 
use of ‘now’ should be thought of as picking out an instant, rather than a ‘fat 
now’ which picks out a rough position on a timescale. In using the fat now, we 
can truly say ‘2018 is now coming to an end’ when speaking at around 11pm on 
December 31st, but in using the thin now we could only truly say this on the 
stroke of midnight. Unlike O’Shaughnessy, in what follows I will assume that 
we could also use this ‘thin now’ to pick out the interval of the specious present 
(PSP), rather than an instant.213  
 
The special relation to a ‘thin now’ enjoyed by an experiencing subject isn’t 
simply the ability to hold a belief about the ‘thin now’. A subject may form a 
belief about what is occurring now – in the ‘thin’ sense – before falling suddenly 
into dreamless sleep, and may be said to retain this belief while asleep (and so 
not experiencing). However, in forming a belief directed at the ‘thin-now’ before 
falling into dreamless sleep, the subject fails to recognise that a continuity of 
such ‘now’s then follow while she is in dreamless sleep, resulting in the ‘thin-
now’ the content of the belief concerns continuing to pick out that moment 
before she fell into dreamless sleep.214 In recent work, building upon 
                                               
213 As it will be used in what follows, the ‘thin now’ is ‘thin’ in that it only picks out the temporal 
extent which is given in experience, the time perceptual experience is transparent to. 
214 O’Shaughnessy tells us that what is going wrong, in this case, is a form of temporal indexing 
of the subject’s belief: “But of which instant did the dreamless sleeper believe that ‘now the train 
is passing through Zermatt station’? Undoubtedly, the instant before he fell asleep. Then during 
the six-hundred-second interval he retained that belief, directed erroneously at each instant to that 
instant in the past as ‘now’. This error is instructive. What a non-experiencing person cannot do is, 
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O’Shaughnessy’s discussion, Crowther and Soteriou (2017) emphasise that 
“those who lack experience are not capable of a temporally indexical mode of 
awareness of the present moment” (Crowther and Soteriou, 2017: 186). What 
experience affords a subject with is a form of awareness of a time, the time given 
in experience, as the time that it is.215 A non-experiencing person cannot direct 
a held belief to the same time as the belief itself is held, singled out by the ‘thin 
now’, because an experiencing subject has an awareness of the current time, 
picked out by the ‘thin now’, which a non-experiencing subject lacks. This time 
– the thin-now – seems to be the time the subject has a vantage point upon and 
can consequently form beliefs about. 
 
In addition to being aware of a given time that it is the time that it is, 
O’Shaughnessy says that an experiencing subject’s temporal awareness has a 
tripartite structure. O’Shaughnessy describes how this tripartite structure of 
experience “essentially connects and contrasts ‘now’ with its immediate 
neighbours...” (O’Shaughnessy, 2000: 55). In doing so, he says: “The essential 
description of any experience of the moment contains an irreducible reference 
to the immediate past/future of the experience, given from the temporal 
vantage-point of ‘now’…” (ibid.: 62). This can be read as the claim that 
experiencing subjects, in addition to being experientially aware of what is given 
in experience, are psychologically oriented to what is to come and what has just 
been. This psychological orientation is asymmetrical, to the immediate past and 
immediate future,216 either side of the time given in experience.  
 
Appeal to an experiencing subject’s temporal awareness as asymmetrical is to 
appeal to an inequivalence in the subject’s awareness of what is to come and 
                                               
direct a belief to the same instant as the belief itself, singled out purely as ‘now’” (O’Shaughnessy, 
2000: 51; emphasis added). 
215 It is not only that non-experiencing subjects are incapable of being aware of a given moment 
as now; in addition “[t]hey lack a distinctive kind of awareness of time over the intervals of time 
during which they are dreamlessly asleep” (Crowther and Soteriou, 2017: 187). 
216 It might be the case that, in unfamiliar circumstances, what the subject anticipates is not a 
given stimulus being perceptually presented, but more minimally that something will be 
perceptually presented (where what this ‘something’ is might be more or less precisely specified). 
The violation of such anticipation, whether the subject anticipates a change or a continuation of 
some stimulation, may be part of an explanation of the feeling of perceptual surprise. See 
Reisenzein et al. (2017) for a review of the use of the repetition-change paradigm – which can be 
used to create and violate both explicit and implicit anticipatory expectations in subjects – in 
empirical studies of surprise; see Niepel (2001) for a clever way of dissociating the change in 
stimulus from the violation of expectations in a similar experimental paradigm. 
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what has just been. This can be contrasted with a subject’s spatial awareness of 
what – from a given position – is just out of view to the left and to the right. 
With the subject’s psychological orientation towards the future, there is an 
awareness of there constantly being something new coming to be experienced 
(if not different in content, there is still more experiencing to come); the subject’s 
psychological orientation towards the past involves an awareness of what has 
been experienced and cannot be returned to (at least a token occurrence cannot 
be returned to, though there is a sense in which the same type of occurrence can 
be experienced again). By contrast, if a particular object passes out of the 
subject’s visual field – to the subject’s left or to her right – there is not typically 
an awareness on the subject’s behalf that it cannot be returned to and 
experienced again; rather, the subject is typically aware of how to see the object 
again, through turning left or right.  
 
The two-pronged temporal psychological orientation further brings out the 
sense in which experience affords a subject with a temporal vantage point (upon 
the time a subject has a temporally indexical mode of awareness of). The subject 
is psychologically oriented to a time as what she has experienced immediately 
previously and to another as what she anticipates experiencing immediately 
subsequently, where this is contrasted with the time which is currently given in 
experience – given as that time which falls between the immediate past and 
future as the subject is so psychologically oriented to them. 
 
While the notion of a primitive psychological awareness of the immediate past 
and future appears to be under-described by O’Shaughnessy, there are a few 
different ways in which the project can be illuminated. An independent source 
of motivation for appealing to such an asymmetrical structure of temporal 
awareness in wakeful experience – which O’Shaughnessy himself appeals to – 
can be found in how experiencing subjects engage in intentional action. When 
explaining a subject’s actions in terms of her intentions, we appeal to a distinctive 
relation to her immediate past and immediate future. When a subject performs 
a given intentional action, such as running across her garden in order to chase 
away a fox, her intention at any moment in time aims towards the immediate 
future and depends upon the immediate past. There is a constant bringing about 
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of some state of affairs, her running onwards to some further point of the 
garden, where at any moment she has an awareness of and orientation towards 
what she is intending to do (what she will do in her immediate future, such as 
continue running, or skid to a halt) and towards what she has just done (what 
she did in her immediate past); without which she would not have the same 
awareness of what it is she is doing now. 
 
O’Shaughnessy expresses this point by saying that there is “no action without 
intention, and no intention without a mental posture directed towards the future 
(not to be confused with the capacity to think about the future)” (ibid.: 53). The 
last parenthesis is important here for the current project. What is at issue is an 
awareness the immediate future, that portion of time into which one’s acting 
continues, rather than merely the distant future portion of time one can 
hypothesise about.217 For this to be of use in the current context, we need to 
show that this posture to the immediate past and future is not merely a feature 
of how we describe an agent’s actions, but of how she experiences the actions 
she is engaged in. 
 
For O’Shaughnessy, “[t]ime lies at the heart of the intention” (ibid.: 54). 
Explaining this point, he says that in intention-explanation we explain a present 
phenomenon irreducibly by reference to a future phenomenon. At least part of 
this idea seems to be captured by the following claim. The way in which we have 
a perspective in time, revealed in how a subject experiences her own intentional 
activity, cannot be captured by simply talking about the temporal relations 
between the occurrences that the subject is experientially aware of. In intentional 
action, discharging an intention requires an awareness of what is the case now, at 
the time of discharge, and what one anticipates unfolding in the immediate 
future. An awareness of a time as now also allows for the subject to be aware of 
                                               
217 We can also find the connection between a psychological orientation to the future and action 
in Augustine’s Confessions, where he says: “…we often plan our future actions in advance, and 
that the advance planning itself exists in the present, whereas the action being planned does not 
yet exist, because it is in the future. Once we have got it under way, and have begun to put what 
we were planning into action, then that action will be existent—because it is at that point not in 
the future but existing in the present” (Augustine Book XI, 18; 2016: 227). While Augustine 
illustrates the connection between action and an orientation towards the future from the present, 
it should be stressed that the account being advanced in the current section does not require the 
explicit planning of future actions, in the sense in which Augustine appears to have in mind. 
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particular activity as what is now being-performed and as that which she was 
aware of immediately previously as intended-to-be-performed. 
 
In intentionally acting over some period of time a subject is, over that time, 
poised to act: to continue with the performance of an action and/or to change 
the course of her action.218 Being in this position of readiness/potentiality to act 
is expressible as an awareness that ‘I can φ’, whether or not I want to φ or I try 
to φ. φ-ing will, in any such a case, be something I am aware that I can do in the 
immediate future, should I now form the intention to perform the action. This 
awareness – that ‘I can φ’ – need not be too reflective.219 Rather than a subject 
explicitly entertaining the thought that ‘I can φ’, this should be taken as giving 
voice to something more primitive. When I awake in the morning, I am aware 
that I can swing my legs out of bed, that I can try to recall my dream, or try to 
imagine my meeting later that day, or simply lay still. I am aware that I can φ, 
whether or not I choose to, and without explicitly entertaining the thought that 
‘I can φ’. The cognitive form of awareness that ‘I can φ’, such as entertaining this 
proposition in thought, is a higher and more sophisticated form of what is a 
distinctive property of the experience of agency.220 
 
In the typical case, a subject engaged in intentional action has expectations about 
what will occur in her own immediate future and an awareness of what was 
experienced as occurring in her own immediate past. I have suggested that 
having such attitudes is vital to the generation of action and the management of 
ongoing actions. To illustrate, suppose there is a subject stood upright, with her 
                                               
218 In a discussion of the phenomenology of action, Elisabeth Pacherie (2008: 195) says that a 
typical agent has both a sense of initiation and sense of control over the actions being performed. 
Regardless of what the reader thinks of the distinction between these two senses, I take both to 
be captured by the readiness/potentiality to act under discussion. 
219 That we are – or at least can be – so aware of what we are doing is suggested by other passages 
in the literature. See, for example, O’Brien’s suggestion that: “we can obviously fail to know that 
we are acting, as when we are acting absent-mindedly . . . But it does not seem to be the case 
that our actions can be, as a matter of brute fact, beyond our ken . . . It seems to me that we 
cannot, in Shoemaker’s phrase, envisage a creature which is simply self-blind with respect to all 
their actions in this way . . . Surely if I have the power to initiate or stop what I am doing then 
what I am doing must normally be in some way accessible to me” (O’Brien, 2003: 364-6). 
220 That there is such an experience of agency may be somewhat supported by the clinical 
observation that this experience can be lost; in such cases one’s movements are observed in 
much the same way as the movements of others. See, for example, the discussions of Mellors 
(1970: 18) and Spence et al. (1997: 2000). On the loss of agency also see O’Shaughnessy (1963: 
386). 
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left foot forwards, who shifts her weight from front to back in the course of 
moving her body. If this activity-part is all that she is aware of, and if she is not 
aware of her stepping forward with her left foot immediately previously, nor 
stepping back with her left foot as what will occur immediately subsequently, 
she can scarcely be said to be aware of what she is doing as salsa dancing. Yet 
we think that such a subject can be aware of what she is doing as salsa dancing, 
and so it appears plausible that she does have such an awareness of her 
immediate past and future. 
 
Experience does not only possess a tripartite temporal structure in the context 
of intentional bodily action. Consider a subject who is experientially imagining 
salsa dancing. We can assume that the subject would imagine subsequent 
temporal parts of this dance turn (though she is also aware that she can stop 
imagining this, if she so wishes). As the subject is engaged in this intentional 
mental activity and imagining dancing, over the course of 10-15 seconds at any 
time she anticipates what she will be doing over the next few seconds – 
presumably, continuing to imagine further parts of her dance. If she failed to 
have such attitudes that orient her towards her immediate future it is difficult to 
see how she could experience her imagining the dance as the (mental) activity 
that it is. It remains the case that awareness of the activity one is engaged in 
depends, in part, on an awareness of what one anticipates occurring in the 
immediate future and what one recalls occurring in the immediate past.  
 
 
3.3. The enduring subject and time passing 
 
With the tripartite temporal awareness being independently motivated, we can 
return to consider the objects of experience being presented as enduring. I said 
that on a proposal that merely appeals to a feature of what is presented in 
perceptual experience, we are left facing the following problem: it is not obvious 
that the presented object can seem to be numerically identical to an object 
perceived at earlier/later times than the perceived present, because this requires 
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an awareness of these earlier/later times.221 I further suggested that an appeal to 
episodic memory – as an awareness of the object at an earlier time – was not 
sufficient to account for the sense in which time seems to pass. With appeal to 
the tripartite temporal structure of experience an alternative can be offered.  
 
In wakeful experience, the subject is psychologically oriented to a time as what 
she has experienced immediately previously and to another as what she anticipates 
experiencing immediately subsequently, where this is contrasted with the time 
which is currently given in experience. Considering an object presented in 
experience, we can say that this object is experienced as wholly present now (in 
contrast to an occurrence), even though the subject is aware of experiencing it 
as wholly present immediately previously and anticipates experiencing it as 
wholly present immediately subsequently. 
 
To be wholly present at one temporal location and then wholly present at 
another the object has to alter its temporal location relative to something (or 
something needs to move relative to it). To the subject, the object does not 
positively seem to be changing its temporal location relative to her. Perceptual 
experience is temporally transparent; it is not as though either the subject or the 
object seems to be left behind, in time. The object and subject do not seem (at 
least they need not seem) to be moving across space, phenomenologically 
speaking. Rather, the object’s temporal location – and the subject’s – seems to 
be changing relative to time.  Time seems to be passing; passing the subject and 
the object.  
 
It does not follow from the above that time seeming to pass depends on 
perceiving objects as enduring; that the subject also seems to endure appears to 
be enough for time to seem to pass. In their discussion of the notion of 
endurance, Hofweber and Velleman suggest that “[o]ne has the sense … of 
being all there, or wholly present, at each moment of one’s life” (Hofweber and 
                                               
221 I suggested that this is a problem with Prosser’s proposal, as stated, but Prosser may be able 
to say more at this point. If we take what he says about time seeming to pass together with what 
he says in the context of discussing DSMs, it may be that he would want to appeal to the object 
presented in experience being explicitly represented, with it being implicitly represented that this 
object existed at earlier times. Given that I have already rejected an appeal to DSMs in Chapter 
2, I will not consider here whether, or precisely how, such a proposal would work. 
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Velleman, 2011: 48). This is illustrated by Hofweber and Velleman in terms of 
the structure of episodic memory and imagination. The authors claim that in 
episodic recollection the subject takes herself to be wholly existing as the subject 
recollecting and as the subject that wholly existed while experiencing the state 
of affairs now being recalled. In this case, they say “I am conceived as entirely 
present at a single point in time, either as me-here-and-now, entertaining the 
memory, or as ‘me’-there-and-then, having the experience” (ibid.: 49), where the 
subject picked out in each case is taken to be numerically identical. In other 
words, the subject who occupies a perceptual perspective on occurrence x seems 
to be wholly present as she perceives x;222 the subject who occupies a perspective 
from which she recalls perceiving x seems to be wholly present as she recalls 
perceiving x; and the subject in each case is taken to be numerically identical. 
The subject therefore seems to have changed in her temporal location; hence we 
arrive at the idea that there seems to have been some change relative to time.  
 
We may not wish to commit ourselves to the claims Hofweber and Velleman 
make regarding episodic memory, and with what has been said regarding the 
tripartite temporal structure of experience we do not need to commit ourselves 
to such claims in order to arrive at a sense in which the subject seems to endure. 
For a wakefully conscious agent, as experiencing continues on (and even if she 
is not perceiving a particular object), it is not as though the time she has an 
experiential point of view on – the PSP – is all of the time that there is. In the 
typical case, the subject has expectations about what will occur in her own 
immediate future – which she anticipates possessing an experiential point of 
view on, and/or in which she will proceed to perform a later portion of an action 
– and an awareness of what was experienced as occurring in one’s immediate 
past – which she possessed an experiential point of view on, and/or in which 
she was performing an earlier portion of an action. In virtue of this tripartite 
temporal structure of awareness, the subject is aware of a succession of times as 
successive, of herself occupying a given perspective in time, and of immediately 
previously occupying a perspective on an immediately preceding time.  
 
                                               
222 The authors say: “At a particular moment, one is not the entirety of one’s temporally extended 
self, but one is entirely oneself, possessed of a personal identity fully determined within the 
moment” (ibid.: 50). 
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The experiencing subject’s asymmetrical awareness of other times makes the 
time which the subject is aware of as ‘now’ – that which is given in experience – 
seem to be one which is incessantly changing. In ongoing wakeful experience the 
subject is aware of occupying successive perspectives on successive times while 
the subject does not seem to be moving; rather it is time which seems to change. 
This is the sense in which time seems to pass: time seems to pass the subject who 
seems to endure.  
 
This proposal allows us to account for the phenomenological ingredient at issue 
when theorists say that time seems to pass, without supposing that this is 
presented in perceptual experience. On this proposal, developed from 
O’Shaughnessy, the two psychological orientations to the immediate past (as the 
subject experienced it) and future (as the subject anticipates experiencing it) 
bookend the time given in experience. This is how the subject is aware of a 
succession of times as successive; this makes the time the subject is aware of in 
experience seem to be incessantly changing and passing the subject. This 
proposal also accounts for the pervasiveness of the phenomenon, with time 
seeming to pass as long as the subject is wakefully conscious and experiencing, 
with her experience possessing this tripartite temporal structure. 
 
 
3.4. Qualifications 
 
The account offered of time seeming to pass is in need of several qualifications. 
Firstly, this has been offered as an account of the phenomenology. I have argued 
that objects and the subject of experience seem to endure, that this is explained 
through appeal to the tripartite temporal structure of experience, and that this 
structure of experience is responsible for the subject’s awareness of a succession 
of times as successive. This is, I have suggested, the explanation of time seeming 
to pass. It might be possible to describe what must be the case with the subject 
(in order for this account of the phenomenology to be correct) without 
appealing to tensed or perspectival terms, but this is not to give an account of 
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the phenomenology.223 What is the correct account of the metaphysics of reality 
is then a further question; we needn’t think the phenomenology determines this. 
 
Secondly, note that while I have said that time seems to pass because of how the 
subject of experience seems to endure over time, this is not committed to any 
greater claims about how the structure of experience leads us to conceive of ‘the 
self’, or what we should say about how ‘the self’ in fact fills time. The proposal 
offered above is consistent with there being many other factors that feed into 
how we come to conceive of ‘the self’. As Hofweber and Velleman illustrate, 
there may be a role for episodic recollection; there will also be various other 
features of one’s mental life which play a role in how the subject comes to 
conceive of ‘the self’ and how it persists. 
 
Thirdly and finally, having stressed that the tripartite structure of experience 
gains traction in agency, one immediate question would be: what about a 
conscious state in which there is complete passivity? This would be a state in 
which a subject is not only not engaged in overtly bodily activity, but a state 
where she is engaged in no activity whatsoever;224 where the subject is not lost 
in thought (assuming this would itself qualify as a form of mental activity), but 
lost between or without thoughts. Perhaps that which is sometimes colloquially 
spoken about as ‘being in a daze’ or ‘a trance’ would fit this description. 
 
In response, it is worth emphasising that the account I have advanced is an 
account of time’s seeming to pass for experiencing subjects in wakeful 
consciousness. It is difficult to say whether a state of complete passivity, absent of 
any intentional activity (mental or bodily), has any positively characterisable 
phenomenology.225 Even if it does, it is not at all obvious whether such a state 
should be thought of as a state of wakeful consciousness. As such, it is not at all 
                                               
223 We can say in non-perspectival terms what must be case, while the phenomenology may 
nonetheless be irreducibly perspectival. This can be read as the force of much of Nagel’s work 
(1974 and 1986); few people are persuaded that the non-perspectival sort of explanation gives 
us an account of the phenomenology of a bat, for example. 
224 Where such activity is to be construed as being poised to act or to change the course of the 
action one is engaged in. 
225 This may be one way of understanding Paul’s (2010) claim that in order to experience time 
passing a subject would minimally have to be aware of contrasts with respect to properties of her 
thoughts. 
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clear whether we should say that time does seem to pass for a subject in such a 
state, although more would have to be said about what such a state consists in 
order to make a decisive commitment either way. 
 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
In order to account for the sense in which time seems to pass I have proposed 
that we should not be merely trying to articulate some feature of what is 
presented in perceptual experience. Developing some of O’Shaughnessy’s 
(2000) claims, I argued that we should be trying to articulate an aspect of wakeful 
consciousness that concerns the experiencing subject’s temporal perspective and 
the times which bookend the (interval of) time presented in experience. Through 
a discussion of the phenomenology of agency, I developed and motivated 
O’Shaughnessy’s view of the tripartite temporal structure of wakeful 
consciousness, explaining how it can account for time seeming to pass.  
 
In wakeful consciousness, as well as being perceptually presented with some 
time (the PSP), an experiencing subject has a primitive and asymmetrical form 
of awareness of what was experienced in the immediate past and what is 
anticipated in the immediate future. This is an experiencing subject’s tensed 
temporal perspective. That the subject is aware of what she just experienced and 
what is anticipated, in this distinctive sense, captures the sense in which the time 
an experiencing subject has a vantage point upon seems to be incessantly 
changing. This is the sense in which time seems to pass. 
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Concluding remarks 
 
In this thesis I have presented a phenomenological investigation of our 
experience of time. I have argued that articulating the sense in which we have a 
point of view in time, and what this is a point of view upon, is crucial to an 
account of how things are for an experiencing subject. I previously suggested 
that the usefulness of this approach – focusing on an experiencing subject’s 
point of view in time – was to be demonstrated in how it can solve puzzles that 
arise in connection with our experience of time. I take myself to have shown 
this, in different contexts, in each of the five preceding chapters. 
 
Throughout the focus has been upon the specious present, in one form or 
another. In the first chapter, the conceptualisation of the specious present as the 
PSP was introduced. Rather than taking the specious present to be introduced 
in the service of offering an explanatory account of our experience of 
motion/change, I said that – as the PSP – it is to be introduced in offering an 
account of the phenomenal character of experience. The specious present – the 
PSP – is to be understood as an interval of time presented in experience; it is the 
interval of time that a subject seems to have a point of view upon in wakefully 
conscious experience. 
 
Granting a role to the PSP, I argued that the PSP also fulfils the explanatory role 
of the ESP: in order to experience motion/change a discriminable amount of 
motion/change must be presented over this interval. Yet I demonstrated that in 
granting a role for the ESP it does not follow that one need grant a role for the 
PSP. This demonstrates that the ESP and the PSP are conceptually distinct. 
While the PSP entails a role fitting the ESP, the reverse is not true. As 
consequence, without presenting further considerations one cannot infer that 
there is a PSP from the claim that there is an ESP, as some proponents of the 
specious present appear to have assumed; equally, one does not show that there 
is not a PSP merely by demonstrating that this does not follow from there being 
an ESP, as some recent opponents of the specious present appear to have 
assumed. 
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In the second chapter I turned to consider snapshot models of temporal 
experience, these being models provided as alternatives to theories appealing to 
something akin to the PSP. Following the discussion of the first chapter, I said 
that while a dynamic snapshot model might be able to account for our 
experience of motion and change – though I suggested that even this is not 
straightforwardly the case – we are not independently motivated to endorse such 
a proposal. Considerations arising from theoretical claims and from empirical 
findings do not support an appeal to the snapshot model of temporal experience 
over the PSP; the temporal minima that a subject can become aware of in 
isolation in reflection upon her phenomenology provides a case against the 
snapshot model. There is an absence of evidence for supposing that, when a 
subject experiences a temporally extended occurrence, there are many 
experiences – experiential snapshots, successive in time – each presenting no 
temporal extent. What is presented in experience as occurring at a time is so 
presented in virtue of what is presented in experience as occurring over that 
time. 
 
From introducing and defending an appeal to the PSP in the first two chapters, 
I turned to offer a phenomenological characterisation of the PSP and of how we 
are to characterise the experience of occurrences that unfold over super-intervals 
– such as plays, concerts, and football matches – in the third chapter. I said that 
the temporal location of an experiencing subject’s perceptual perspective on 
occurrences spanning the PSP seems, to her, to be transparent to the temporal 
location of the occurrences she seems to perceive; this contrasts with the 
perceptual perspective a subject seems to possess in the visuo-spatial case (and 
with the case of memory/imagination). Through developing Russell’s construal 
of what is given in experience, I said that the PSP is to be understood as the 
positive temporal extent a subject is invariably presented with in wakefully 
conscious experience, a temporal extent that her perceptual perspective is 
transparent to, where this interval marks the partition between the past and the 
future for the subject.  
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The PSP picks out a privileged interval, for experiencing subjects, in the sense 
that that subjects experience things that unfold over super-intervals of time 
through experiencing sub-intervals of the occurrence, as they fall within the PSP, 
over time. I further demonstrated that given the phenomenological 
characterisation of the PSP proposed, we can characterise our experience of 
occurrences that unfold over super-intervals without arriving at any principled 
way of individuating between discrete experiences. I ended by suggesting that 
what is to count as a token experience on a particular occasion may be somewhat 
context or interest relative. 
 
In Chapter 4 I compared and contrasted the experience of objects and events, 
and the perspective an experiencing subject seems to possess in space and in 
time. I suggested that the sense in which an object is perceived as a voluminous 
whole, where there is more of it to be seen than a subject can see at a given time, 
is to be accounted for through drawing attention to how it is manifest to the 
subject that she is experiencing the object from a relative point of view. I said 
that the experiencing subject’s visual experience of an object features 
perspectival-partialness and that the subject is aware that the perspective she 
possesses in space is one of many possible perspectives on the object. I 
demonstrated that in the temporal case our experience is not perspectivally-
partial; spatiotemporal occurrences presented over the PSP do not seem to 
admit of any other possible perceptual points of view in time. Yet, getting right 
how things are for the subject requires an appeal to the sense in which the subject 
has an asymmetrical awareness of the times immediately prior and subsequent 
to the time presented over the PSP: that there were earlier times/temporal parts 
she experienced, and that there will be later times/temporal parts she will 
experience. In the fifth chapter I argued that this tripartite, asymmetrical 
awareness of times either side of the PSP is (partly) responsible for the sense in 
which time seems to pass. 
 
In virtue of the tripartite temporal structure of awareness, a subject is aware of 
a succession of times as successive, of herself occupying a given perspective in 
time, and of immediately previously occupying a perspective on an immediately 
preceding time. The experiencing subject’s asymmetrical awareness of other 
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times makes the time which the subject is aware of as ‘now’ – that which her 
temporal perspective is transparent to – seem to be one which is incessantly 
changing. This is to say that in ongoing wakeful experience the subject is aware 
of occupying a perspective that seems to be invariant over time and transparent 
to that which is given over the PSP, while she nonetheless seems to occupy a 
perspective on successive times. It is the time that the subject has a perspective 
upon that seems to be changing; this is the sense in which time seems to pass the 
subject. 
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